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   Poptimism	  is	  a	  school	  of	  contemporary	  popular	  music	  criticism	  characterized	  
by	  its	  rejection	  of	  the	  notion	  of	  the	  “guilty	  pleasure”	  and	  traditions	  within	  rock	  
journalism	  called	  “rockism.”	  Through	  an	  examination	  of	  poptimist	  writing,	  
particularly	  Carl	  Wilson’s	  “Céline	  project”	  (which	  resulted	  in	  a	  book,	  Céline	  Dion’s	  
Let’s	  Talk	  About	  Love:	  A	  Journey	  to	  the	  End	  of	  Taste)	  and	  material	  on	  musician	  
Stephin	  Merritt’s	  comments	  at	  the	  Experience	  Music	  Project	  Pop	  Conference	  in	  
2006,	  trends	  emerge:	  efforts	  at	  combating	  elitism	  and	  promoting	  populism	  are	  
belied	  by	  practices	  associated	  with	  high	  levels	  of	  cultural	  capital.	  	  
	   These	  tendencies	  are	  examined	  from	  three	  angles.	  First,	  following	  Johan	  
Fornäs,	  poptimist	  attitudes	  toward	  authenticity	  and	  reflexivity	  are	  considered.	  In	  
their	  treatment	  of	  musical	  texts,	  poptimists	  reject	  rockist	  notions	  of	  authenticity	  
while	  failing	  to	  account	  for	  consumers’	  need	  for	  genuineness.	  Their	  grasp	  of	  
reflexivity	  is	  greater	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  reception;	  Wilson’s	  project,	  an	  exercise	  in	  
self-­‐scrutiny	  for	  elitist	  bias	  via	  an	  attempt	  to	  appreciate	  the	  music	  of	  Céline	  Dion,	  
shows	  the	  significance	  of	  reflexivity	  for	  poptimism.	  	  
	   Second,	  poptimists’	  approach	  to	  identity	  and	  difference	  is	  considered.	  
Commentary	  on	  Merritt,	  who	  was	  accused	  of	  racism	  due	  to	  his	  admitted	  dislike	  of	  
certain	  African-­‐American	  artists	  and	  genres,	  is	  typical:	  oversimplified	  models	  of	  
	  vi	  
hegemony	  undermine	  deep	  concern	  about	  identity	  politics.	  Poptimists’	  advocacy	  of	  
omnivorous	  consumption	  as	  an	  anti-­‐elitist	  strategy	  is	  flawed:	  using	  intellectual	  
approaches	  and	  spurning	  the	  middlebrow	  are	  practices	  associated	  with	  high	  
cultural	  capital.	  This	  strategy	  seems	  to	  lead	  to	  co-­‐optation	  rather	  than	  real	  change.	  	  
	   Third,	  poptimism’s	  relationship	  to	  value	  and	  emotion	  is	  analyzed.	  Poptimists	  
have	  doubts	  about	  value	  judgments	  given	  traditional	  aesthetics’	  hierarchical	  
baggage,	  yet	  value	  judgments	  are	  critics’	  raison	  d’être.	  Poptimism’s	  rejection	  of	  
guilty	  pleasure	  and	  Wilson’s	  “guilty	  displeasure”	  concept	  link	  aesthetics	  to	  affect.	  
Poptimists	  approach	  emotion	  inconsistently,	  embracing	  it	  when	  convenient	  but	  
subjecting	  it	  to	  doubt	  and	  intellectualization	  when	  it	  seems	  to	  support	  elitism.	  Like	  
many	  poptimist	  strategies,	  populist	  ideas	  motivate	  this	  approach,	  but	  it	  emulates	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Chapter	  One:	  An	  Introduction	  to	  Poptimism	  
	   Robert	  Christgau	  wrote	  a	  column	  in	  early	  1990	  summing	  up	  the	  decade	  just	  
passed,	  including	  “the	  ‘rockism’	  debate”	  he	  had	  recently	  witnessed	  in	  Britain.	  “Near	  
as	  a	  body	  could	  tell	  from	  here,	  rockism	  wasn’t	  just	  liking	  Yes	  and	  the	  Allman	  
Brothers—it	  was	  liking	  London	  Calling.	  It	  was	  taking	  the	  music	  seriously,	  investing	  
any	  belief	  at	  all	  not	  just	  in	  its	  self-­‐sufficiency,	  which	  is	  always	  worth	  challenging,	  but	  
in	  its	  capacity	  to	  change	  lives	  or	  express	  truth.”1	  According	  to	  music	  critic	  Paul	  
Morley,	  musician	  Pete	  Wylie	  coined	  the	  term	  rockism	  in	  1981,	  when	  he	  jokingly	  
called	  for	  a	  Race	  Against	  Rockism	  campaign	  (in	  response	  to	  Rock	  Against	  Racism).2	  	  
Morley	  uses	  the	  word	  rather	  differently.	  “Suddenly,”	  Morley	  writes,	  “you	  had	  a	  word	  
that	  you	  could	  use	  to	  swiftly	  and	  yet	  fairly	  dismiss	  Phil	  Collins,	  a	  word	  you	  could	  use	  
to	  explain	  why	  Wire	  were	  better	  than	  Yes.”3	  	  
	   Although	  “rockism”	  may	  have	  been	  in	  use	  in	  the	  early	  1980s	  by	  people	  like	  
Morley,	  it	  only	  came	  into	  common	  currency	  much	  later.	  Christgau’s	  mention	  of	  the	  
term	  in	  1990	  is	  one	  of	  the	  earliest	  examples	  of	  an	  American	  taking	  note	  of	  it.	  But	  
during	  the	  1990s,	  the	  term’s	  use	  became	  much	  more	  commonplace	  in	  the	  United	  
Kingdom	  with	  the	  rise	  of	  electronic	  dance	  music	  and	  rave	  culture.	  Popular	  music	  
scholar	  Neil	  Nehring	  describes	  this	  phenomenon	  from	  his	  vantage	  point	  as	  an	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Robert	  Christgau,	  “Decade:	  Rockism	  Faces	  the	  World,”	  The	  Village	  Voice,	  January	  2,	  
1990.	  Archived	  at	  http://www.robertchristgau.com/xg/rock/decade-­‐89.php	  
(accessed	  August	  15,	  2010).	  
2	  Paul	  Morley.	  “Rockism:	  it’s	  the	  new	  rockism,”	  The	  Guardian:	  Brief	  Encounters,	  
posted	  May	  26,	  2006,	  http://www.guardian.co.uk/music/2006/may/26/	  
popandrock.coldplay	  (accessed	  August	  15,	  2010).	  
3	  Ibid.	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American	  dealing	  with	  British	  exchange	  students	  and	  teaching	  summer	  courses	  in	  
the	  UK	  in	  his	  article	  “‘Everyone's	  Given	  Up	  and	  Just	  Wants	  to	  Go	  Dancing’:	  From	  
Punk	  to	  Rave	  in	  the	  Thatcher	  Era.”	  “From	  the	  anti-­‐rockist	  view	  of	  my	  British	  
students,”	  he	  writes,	  “anyone	  with	  any	  sense	  knew	  that	  rock	  and	  roll,	  especially	  
punk	  rock,	  was	  stone	  dead,	  and	  that	  belief	  in	  any	  potential	  social	  significance	  in	  
popular	  music	  was	  therefore	  a	  delusion.”4	  Nehring	  asserts	  that	  while	  “dance	  culture	  
may	  have	  included	  rhetoric	  about	  community,	  sometimes	  pitted	  against	  Thatcher,”	  
in	  actuality	  “the	  devotion	  of	  dance	  fans	  to	  personal	  pleasure	  clearly	  belied	  
expressions	  of	  a	  collective	  sensibility”	  with	  their	  “rampant	  hedonism	  .	  .	  .	  paralleling	  
the	  prevailing	  politics	  of	  self-­‐interest.”5	  Rave	  culture’s	  emphasis	  on	  communality	  
may	  have	  been	  belied	  by	  its	  participants’	  actual	  priorities,	  but	  its	  rhetoric	  retained	  
enough	  potency	  that	  rockism	  seemed	  problematically	  individualistic	  in	  comparison.	  
	   The	  term	  gained	  prevalence	  toward	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  twenty-­‐first	  century	  
on	  message	  boards	  like	  those	  at	  www.ilxor.com,	  then	  came	  to	  the	  attention	  of	  a	  
much	  wider	  audience	  with	  New	  York	  Times	  critic	  Kelefa	  Sanneh’s	  2004	  article	  “The	  
Rap	  Against	  Rockism.”	  “The	  rockism	  debate	  began	  in	  earnest	  in	  the	  early	  1980’s,”	  
Sanneh	  wrote,	  “but	  over	  the	  past	  few	  years	  it	  has	  heated	  up,	  and	  today,	  in	  certain	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  Neil	  Nehring.	  “‘Everyone’s	  Given	  Up	  and	  Just	  Wants	  to	  Go	  Dancing’:	  From	  Punk	  to	  
Rave	  in	  the	  Thatcher	  Era.”	  Popular	  Music	  and	  Society,	  30:1	  (2007):	  1–18.	  
5	  Ibid.	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impassioned	  circles,	  there	  is	  nothing	  worse	  than	  a	  rockist.”6	  He	  elaborates	  on	  the	  
meaning	  of	  the	  term:	  
A	  rockist	  isn’t	  just	  someone	  who	  loves	  rock’n’roll,	  who	  goes	  on	  and	  on	  about	  
Bruce	  Springsteen,	  who	  champions	  ragged-­‐voiced	  singer-­‐songwriters	  no	  one	  
has	  ever	  heard	  of.	  A	  rockist	  is	  someone	  who	  reduces	  rock’n’roll	  to	  a	  
caricature,	  then	  uses	  that	  caricature	  as	  a	  weapon.	  Rockism	  means	  idolizing	  
the	  authentic	  old	  legend	  (or	  underground	  hero)	  while	  mocking	  the	  latest	  pop	  
star;	  lionizing	  punk	  while	  barely	  tolerating	  disco;	  loving	  the	  live	  show	  and	  
hating	  the	  music	  video;	  extolling	  the	  growling	  performer	  while	  hating	  the	  lip-­‐
syncher.7	  
Sanneh	  noted	  he	  was	  responding	  to	  an	  already	  existing	  debate—he	  wrote,	  “much	  of	  
the	  most	  energetic	  resistance	  to	  rockism	  can	  be	  found	  online,	  in	  blogs	  and	  on	  critic-­‐
infested	  sites	  .	  .	  .	  where	  debates	  about	  rockism	  have	  become	  so	  common	  that	  the	  
term	  itself	  is	  something	  of	  a	  running	  joke.”8	  His	  article	  brought	  this	  debate	  out	  of	  
internet	  forums	  and	  into	  the	  critical	  mainstream.	  As	  Jody	  Rosen	  put	  it,	  he	  “took	  a	  
long-­‐running	  conversation	  in	  music-­‐wonk	  circles	  to	  the	  pages	  of	  the	  Gray	  Lady.”9	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  Kalefa	  Sanneh,	  “The	  Rap	  Against	  Rockism,”	  The	  New	  York	  Times,	  October	  31,	  2004,	  
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/10/31/arts/music/31sann.html?ex=1256965200




9	  Jody	  Rosen.	  “The	  Perils	  of	  Poptimism:	  Does	  hating	  rock	  make	  you	  a	  music	  critic?”	  
Slate,	  May	  9,	  2006,	  http://www.slate.com/id/2141418	  (accessed	  August	  4,	  2010).	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2006:	  The	  Year	  Poptimism	  Broke	  (and	  I	  Discovered	  It)	  
	   It	  was	  within	  these	  “music-­‐wonk	  circles”	  that	  the	  terms	  “poptimism”	  or	  
“popism”	  began	  being	  used	  to	  describe	  one	  school	  of	  thought	  that	  was	  critical	  of	  
rockism.	  Then	  the	  debate	  over	  rockism	  and	  the	  idea	  of	  “poptimism”	  garnered	  a	  great	  
deal	  more	  attention	  after	  a	  number	  of	  stories	  came	  out	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  the	  2006	  
Experience	  Music	  Project	  (EMP)	  Pop	  Conference.	  As	  Rosen	  wrote	  soon	  afterward,	  
during	  this	  conference	  “rockism	  talk	  was	  so	  prevalent	  that	  it	  became	  a	  kind	  of	  
running	  gag:	  When	  the	  Los	  Angeles	  Times’	  Ann	  Powers	  invoked	  the	  term	  in	  her	  
paper,	  she	  quipped,	  ‘Got	  it	  in	  there!’”10	  One	  factor	  that	  contributed	  to	  this	  was	  the	  
conference’s	  theme:	  “‘Ain't	  That	  a	  Shame’:	  Loving	  Music	  in	  the	  Shadow	  of	  Doubt,”	  
which	  corresponded	  to	  what	  Rosen	  calls	  “the	  wholesale	  rejection	  of	  ‘guilty	  pleasures	  
.	  .	  .	  a	  hallmark	  of	  the	  anti-­‐rockist	  backlash.”11	  	  
	   Two	  things	  happened	  at	  this	  conference	  that	  sparked	  discussion	  among	  
music	  journalists,	  bloggers,	  and	  fans	  for	  a	  long	  time	  afterward	  and	  which	  helped	  to	  
shape	  discourse	  about	  poptimism	  from	  that	  point	  forward.	  Musician	  Stephin	  Merritt	  
of	  the	  band	  the	  Magnetic	  Fields	  made	  some	  comments	  on	  a	  panel	  that	  certain	  music	  
journalists	  seized	  upon	  as	  evidence	  of	  racism,	  as	  detailed	  in	  John	  Cook’s	  Slate	  article	  
“Blacklisted:	  Is	  Stephin	  Merritt	  a	  racist	  because	  he	  doesn't	  like	  hip-­‐hop?”12	  First,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	  Rosen,	  “The	  Perils	  of	  Poptimism.”	  
11	  Ibid.	  
12	  John	  Cook,	  “Blacklisted:	  Is	  Stephin	  Merrit	  a	  racist	  because	  he	  doesn’t	  like	  hip-­‐
hop?”	  Slate,	  May	  9,	  2006,	  http://www.slate.com/id/2141421.	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Merritt	  said	  “Zip-­‐A-­‐Dee-­‐Doo-­‐Dah,”	  from	  Disney’s	  Song	  of	  the	  South,	  was	  “a	  great	  
song”	  (although	  his	  detractors	  failed	  to	  note	  that	  he	  also	  said	  of	  the	  film,	  “The	  rest	  of	  
it	  is	  terrible,	  actually.").	  Then	  he	  mistakenly	  referred	  to	  Céline	  Dion	  as	  black.	  Critics	  
who	  had	  already	  claimed	  Merritt	  was	  a	  racist	  for	  other	  reasons	  (which	  Cook	  
summarized	  thus:	  “he	  doesn't	  like	  hip-­‐hop,	  and	  on	  those	  occasions	  when	  he's	  
publicly	  discussed	  his	  personal	  music	  tastes,	  he	  has	  criticized	  black	  artists”)	  took	  his	  
comments	  at	  the	  conference	  as	  further	  evidence	  of	  prejudice.13	  
	   At	  the	  same	  conference,	  Canadian	  music	  critic	  Carl	  Wilson	  presented	  a	  paper,	  
coincidentally	  centering	  on	  Dion	  as	  an	  instructive	  example,	  which	  ignited	  the	  debate	  
over	  poptimism.	  “There's	  no	  such	  thing	  as	  a	  guilty	  pleasure,	  say	  the	  ‘poptimists,’”	  the	  
abstract	  for	  his	  talk	  says,	  “.	  .	  .	  But	  what	  about	  distastes?	  Say	  I	  shiver	  with	  revulsion	  
when	  I	  hear	  my	  compatriot	  Céline	  Dion	  ululate	  My	  Heart	  Will	  Go	  On,	  1999's	  
titanically	  successful	  Titanic	  theme.	  Is	  this	  somehow	  a	  more	  pure	  value	  judgement,	  
or	  should	  there	  be	  such	  a	  thing	  as	  a	  guilty	  displeasure?”14	  Although	  Wilson	  refers	  to	  
“the	  ‘poptimists’”	  not	  only	  in	  third	  person	  but	  with	  scare-­‐quotes,	  he	  both	  adopts	  
their	  rejection	  of	  the	  guilty	  pleasure	  and	  adds	  the	  corresponding	  notion	  of	  the	  guilty	  
displeasure	  in	  all	  sincerity.	  Few	  music	  critics	  explicitly	  self-­‐identify	  as	  poptimists	  or	  
popists,	  but	  I	  would	  argue	  Wilson	  clearly	  fits	  the	  bill	  and	  implies	  as	  much	  himself	  in	  
this	  passage.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13	  Ibid.	  
14	  Experience	  Music	  Project,	  “2006	  Pop	  Conference	  Bios/Abstracts,”	  http://	  
www.empsfm.org/education/index.asp?categoryID=26&ccID=127&xPopConfBioID
=660&year=2006.	  Formatting	  and	  spelling	  from	  the	  original	  has	  been	  retained.	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   Far	  from	  simply	  theorizing	  about	  “guilty	  displeasure,”	  Wilson	  proposed	  to	  
engage	  in	  an	  experiment	  to	  find	  out	  whether	  such	  suspect	  dislikes	  could	  be	  changed.	  
He	  announced	  his	  intention	  to	  undertake	  something	  called	  “the	  Céline	  project,”	  
during	  which	  he	  would	  attempt	  to	  challenge,	  and	  hopefully	  overcome,	  his	  antipathy	  
toward	  Dion’s	  music.	  This	  undertaking	  eventually	  led	  to	  the	  writing	  of	  a	  book,	  Let’s	  
Talk	  About	  Love:	  A	  Journey	  to	  the	  End	  of	  Taste.	  
	   When	  the	  fallout	  from	  the	  2006	  EMP	  Pop	  Conference	  began	  to	  spill	  out	  into	  
music	  columns	  and	  music	  critic	  blogs,	  I	  was	  a	  bored	  receptionist	  working	  in	  the	  Civil	  
Engineering	  department	  at	  the	  University	  of	  Texas.	  I	  read	  a	  lot	  of	  music	  writing	  
online	  during	  my	  copious	  downtime	  at	  work,	  from	  newspaper	  articles	  like	  Sanneh’s	  
piece,	  articles	  from	  online	  magazines	  like	  Slate,	  including	  Cook’s	  and	  Rosen’s	  
responses	  to	  the	  conference,	  and	  numerous	  blogs	  by	  critics	  from	  Wilson	  to	  Simon	  
Reynolds,	  an	  outspoken	  critic	  of	  poptimism.	  The	  conversation	  that	  followed	  the	  
conference	  was	  my	  introduction	  to	  the	  terms	  rockism	  and	  poptimism,	  as	  I	  believe	  it	  
was	  for	  many	  others,	  and	  I	  became	  fascinated	  with	  the	  discourse	  surrounding	  them.	  	  
	   As	  a	  fan	  of	  Merritt’s	  music,	  I	  had	  an	  investment	  in	  defending	  him,	  but	  as	  
someone	  interested	  in	  the	  politics	  of	  race,	  I	  also	  believed	  in	  the	  importance	  of	  
exploring	  the	  racial	  dimension	  of	  taste.	  My	  initial	  reaction	  to	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  “guilty	  
displeasure”	  was	  to	  find	  it	  absurd,	  but	  the	  critique	  of	  old	  standards	  of	  taste	  struck	  a	  
chord	  with	  me.	  As	  I	  hashed	  out	  my	  own	  views	  on	  these	  issues	  in	  conversations	  with	  
friends	  and	  on	  my	  personal	  blog	  on	  livejournal.com,	  I	  was	  excited	  about	  the	  ideas	  
these	  debates	  brought	  up,	  but	  I	  felt	  frustrated	  with	  my	  limited	  ability	  to	  make	  sense	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of	  them.	  I	  picked	  up	  books	  I	  had	  not	  read	  in	  a	  long	  time	  and	  thought	  back	  to	  courses	  
I	  had	  taken	  years	  before.	  I	  felt	  these	  questions	  demanded	  a	  more	  systematic	  
approach	  than	  they	  were	  receiving	  in	  the	  journalistic	  pieces	  and	  blog	  entries	  I	  was	  
reading,	  an	  approach	  I	  began	  to	  realize	  would	  only	  be	  afforded	  by	  an	  academic	  
perspective.	  This	  thought	  process	  coincided	  with	  a	  number	  of	  other	  events	  in	  my	  life	  
at	  the	  time,	  including	  taking	  free	  courses	  using	  the	  University’s	  staff	  educational	  
benefit,	  which	  together	  convinced	  me	  to	  apply	  to	  graduate	  school	  and	  pursue	  my	  
master’s	  degree	  in	  media	  studies.	  	  
	   Clearly,	  I	  have	  an	  investment	  in	  this	  topic.	  I	  find	  the	  poptimist	  project	  
intriguing	  and	  sympathize	  with	  many	  of	  its	  aims,	  while	  taking	  issue	  with	  many	  of	  
the	  conclusions	  drawn	  by	  its	  adherents.	  And	  I	  believe	  by	  exploring	  these	  questions	  
through	  rigorous	  academic	  research	  and	  writing	  one	  can	  avoid	  many	  of	  these	  
questionable	  conclusions.	  This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  academic	  work	  is	  more	  valid	  or	  
defensible	  than	  the	  work	  of	  journalists.	  Actually,	  my	  exploration	  of	  this	  area	  has	  led	  
me	  to	  believe	  that	  the	  greater	  freedom	  journalists	  enjoy	  makes	  it	  possible	  for	  them	  
to	  come	  up	  with	  more	  up-­‐to-­‐date,	  original	  ideas	  than	  can	  be	  readily	  advanced	  in	  
academic	  circles.	  Nevertheless,	  I	  think	  poptimist	  ideas	  could	  benefit	  greatly	  from	  
more	  academic	  attention	  in	  cooperation	  with	  the	  debates	  of	  journalists	  and	  fans.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Many	  journalists	  whose	  work	  I	  have	  examined	  make	  spurious	  assumptions,	  
“reinvent	  the	  wheel”	  when	  musing	  about	  phenomena	  that	  have	  been	  well	  
articulated	  in	  academic	  contexts,	  or	  attempt	  to	  back	  their	  ideas	  up	  with	  academic	  
theories	  in	  their	  work	  but	  mischaracterize	  them	  due	  to	  careless	  reading.	  An	  active	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dialogue	  between	  journalists	  and	  academics,	  in	  which	  both	  focus	  on	  what	  they	  do	  
better,	  would	  result	  in	  more	  fruitful	  work	  on	  the	  important	  questions	  raised	  by	  the	  
debates	  around	  poptimism.	  Hence	  this	  thesis	  is	  an	  attempt	  to	  apply	  rigorous	  
academic	  work	  to	  an	  exploration	  of	  poptimist	  thought	  and	  the	  critique	  of	  rockism.	  	  
	  
Questions	  About	  Poptimism:	  Three	  Angles	  
	   My	  main	  goal	  in	  this	  exploration	  will	  be	  to	  answer	  the	  following	  question:	  
Does	  poptimist	  music	  criticism	  attempt	  to	  exempt	  itself	  from	  systems	  of	  cultural	  
capital	  and	  privilege?	  If	  so,	  what	  can	  we	  learn	  from	  its	  successes	  and	  failures?	  The	  
idea	  of	  “guilty	  displeasure,”	  isolated	  by	  Wilson	  but	  symptomatic	  of	  poptimism	  more	  
generally,	  dictates	  that	  we	  ought	  to	  second-­‐guess	  initial	  dislikes	  and	  interrogate	  
them	  for	  signs	  of	  elitism	  or	  privilege.	  The	  more	  we	  dislike	  something,	  particularly	  if	  
our	  dislike	  is	  very	  pronounced	  or	  visceral,	  the	  more	  suspicious	  we	  ought	  to	  be.	  But	  
how	  is	  a	  school	  of	  criticism	  to	  function	  if,	  in	  its	  most	  extreme	  form,	  it	  essentially	  
outlaws	  negative	  evaluations?	  Does	  second-­‐guessing	  aesthetic	  inclinations	  on	  the	  
basis	  of	  political	  arguments	  effectively	  combat	  elitism	  or	  privilege?	  The	  timing	  of	  
poptimism’s	  development	  and	  the	  way	  it	  has	  evolved	  could	  tell	  us	  a	  lot	  about	  
contemporary	  anxieties	  about	  privilege,	  taste,	  and	  authenticity.	  Its	  critique	  of	  
rockism	  shows	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  a	  dominant	  old	  critical	  idiom	  failed	  to	  address	  
these	  concerns.	  But	  how	  well	  do	  the	  poptimists	  address	  them?	  Their	  attempts	  to	  do	  
so	  are	  illuminating	  but	  problematic.	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   I	  will	  pursue	  these	  questions	  by	  analyzing	  poptimist	  discourse	  from	  a	  variety	  
of	  sources	  in	  books,	  newspapers,	  magazines,	  websites	  and	  blogs.	  Prominent	  critics	  
whom	  I	  am	  classifying	  as	  poptimists	  include	  Wilson,	  Frank	  Kogan,	  Sasha	  Frere-­‐
Jones,	  and	  Tom	  Ewing.	  I	  will	  also	  be	  considering	  the	  work	  of	  other	  journalists	  such	  
as	  Reynolds,	  Alec	  Hanley	  Bemis,	  and	  Ann	  Powers.	  I	  will	  apply	  a	  variety	  of	  theories	  
about	  aesthetics	  and	  taste	  and	  their	  relationship	  to	  cultural	  capital	  and	  systems	  of	  
privilege	  and	  will	  put	  poptimist	  work	  into	  dialogue	  with	  contemporary	  popular	  
music	  scholarship.	  	  
	   Chapter	  Two	  will	  be	  on	  the	  subject	  of	  authenticity	  and	  reflexivity.	  In	  his	  well-­‐
known	  article	  “Listen	  to	  Your	  Voice!”	  Johan	  Fornäs	  explores	  the	  relationship	  
between	  these	  two	  concepts.15	  He	  points	  out	  that	  a	  reflexive	  relationship	  to	  musical	  
personae	  on	  the	  part	  of	  artists,	  including	  self-­‐aware	  acknowledgment	  of	  their	  
constructedness,	  both	  undermines	  and	  supports	  their	  perceived	  authenticity	  in	  an	  
era	  when	  claims	  of	  absolute,	  unconstructed	  authenticity	  seem	  suspect.16	  Taking	  a	  
cue	  from	  Fornäs,	  I	  will	  explore	  how	  the	  interrelated	  concepts	  of	  authenticity	  and	  
reflexivity	  come	  into	  play	  in	  poptimist	  discourse	  and	  contemporary	  scholarship.	  	  
Fornäs	  explored	  their	  relationship	  within	  the	  presentation	  of	  musical	  artists;	  I	  
would	  also	  like	  to	  explore	  how	  critics’	  (and	  by	  extension	  fans’)	  self-­‐awareness	  about	  
the	  suspect	  nature	  of	  some	  authenticity	  claims	  might	  apply	  to	  their	  reception	  
practices.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15	  Johan	  Fornäs.	  “Listen	  to	  Your	  Voice!	  Authenticity	  and	  Reflexivity	  in	  Rock,	  Rap	  and	  
Techno	  Music.”	  New	  Formations	  24	  (1994).	  
16	  Ibid.,	  168–9,	  172.	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   One	  of	  the	  most	  significant	  critiques	  leveled	  against	  rockism	  is	  its	  
dependence	  on	  problematic	  notions	  of	  authenticity,	  which	  correspond	  to	  its	  disdain	  
for	  blatantly	  market-­‐driven	  genres	  like	  pop.	  According	  to	  the	  Wikipedia	  entry	  on	  
rockism,	  “the	  fundamental	  tenet	  of	  rockism	  is	  that	  some	  forms	  of	  popular	  music,	  and	  
some	  musical	  artists,	  are	  more	  authentic	  than	  others.”17	  The	  critique	  of	  rockism	  
suggests	  the	  presence	  of	  contemporary	  anxiety	  about	  old	  notions	  of	  authenticity;	  
one	  need	  only	  look	  at	  the	  contemporary	  musical	  landscape	  to	  see	  evidence	  of	  this.	  
	   Although	  some	  music	  fans	  have	  abandoned	  traditional	  notions	  of	  
authenticity	  along	  with	  poptimist	  critics,	  many	  have	  continued	  to	  seek	  it	  out	  in	  
various	  forms.	  As	  Simon	  Frith	  points	  out	  in	  his	  book	  Performing	  Rites,	  the	  
importance	  of	  authenticity	  and	  conventions	  about	  what	  signals	  denote	  it	  vary	  
according	  to	  genres	  and	  their	  corresponding	  taste	  communities:	  “‘Authenticity’	  in	  
this	  context	  is	  a	  quality	  not	  of	  the	  music	  as	  such	  (how	  it	  is	  actually	  made)	  but	  of	  the	  
story	  it	  is	  heard	  to	  tell,	  the	  narrative	  of	  musical	  interaction	  in	  which	  the	  listeners	  
place	  themselves.”18	  Genres	  such	  as	  experimental	  or	  electronic	  music	  may	  appeal	  to	  
fans	  because	  their	  inaccessibility	  seems	  to	  guarantee	  a	  degree	  of	  authenticity;	  one	  
recent	  musical	  trend	  has	  been	  an	  increasing	  number	  of	  groups	  that	  combine	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17	  “Rockism,”	  Wikipedia,	  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rockism	  (accessed	  March	  
15,	  2009).	  
Please	  note:	  This	  sentence	  is	  footnoted	  “citation	  needed”	  and	  the	  article	  is	  headed	  
with	  a	  note	  stating	  that	  “editors	  are	  currently	  in	  dispute	  concerning	  points	  of	  view	  
expressed	  in	  this	  article.”	  This	  disagreement	  over	  terms	  and	  the	  difficulty	  in	  finding	  
clear	  citations	  to	  back	  up	  assertions	  is	  characteristic	  of	  discussions	  of	  rockism.	  	  
18	  Simon	  Frith.	  Performing	  Rites:	  On	  the	  Value	  of	  Popular	  Music	  (Cambridge:	  Harvard	  
University	  Press,	  1996),	  275.	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elements	  of	  experimental	  music	  with	  more	  traditional	  rock/pop	  song	  structures.	  
The	  recent	  rise	  of	  emo	  music	  shows	  that	  many	  listeners,	  particularly	  younger	  ones,	  
still	  value	  emotional	  expression.	  The	  genre’s	  over-­‐the-­‐top	  intensity	  suggests	  that	  an	  
added	  charge	  may	  be	  needed	  to	  sell	  emotionalism	  to	  present-­‐day	  fans.	  One	  recent	  
musical	  fad,	  a	  genre	  called	  “freak	  folk,”	  features	  quirky	  performers	  playing	  acoustic	  
instruments	  (an	  ersatz	  version	  of	  the	  musical	  “outsider	  art”	  of	  emotionally	  troubled	  
artists	  like	  Daniel	  Johnston);	  the	  artists	  are	  portrayed	  as	  so	  naïve	  and	  kooky	  that	  
they	  are	  incapable	  of	  self-­‐interested	  posturing.	  	  
	   While	  these	  trends	  point	  to	  music	  fans’	  continued	  interest	  in	  music	  they	  
perceive	  as	  authentic,	  they	  also	  imply	  that	  listeners	  who	  pursue	  authenticity	  have	  
had	  to	  up	  the	  ante,	  that	  the	  old	  singer-­‐songwriter	  model	  has	  begun	  to	  seem	  
insufficient.	  While	  some	  have	  attempted	  to	  abandon	  such	  claims	  entirely,	  these	  fans	  
and	  many	  of	  the	  critics	  who	  cover	  the	  genres	  they	  favor	  have	  responded	  to	  anxiety	  
about	  authenticity	  by	  investing	  in	  types	  of	  music	  that	  seem	  more	  assuredly	  
authentic	  according	  to	  traditional	  markers	  like	  market	  autonomy	  and	  
inaccessibility.	  Clearly,	  the	  poptimist	  critique	  is	  just	  one	  sign	  that	  old	  notions	  of	  
musical	  authenticity	  have	  become	  painfully	  outdated.	  	  
	   Another	  popular	  music	  scholar,	  Allan	  Moore,	  has	  responded	  to	  the	  debate	  
over	  authenticity	  by	  defending	  the	  concept	  itself	  while	  acknowledging	  problems	  
with	  old	  standards.	  As	  I	  will	  explain	  in	  more	  detail	  in	  my	  extended	  discussion,	  
Moore	  points	  out	  how	  the	  notion	  of	  authenticity	  means	  very	  different	  things	  in	  
different	  contexts.	  Moore	  seeks	  to	  analyze	  “three	  senses”	  of	  authenticity	  that	  are	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often	  conflated:	  “that	  artists	  speak	  the	  truth	  of	  their	  own	  situation;	  that	  they	  speak	  
the	  truth	  of	  the	  situation	  of	  (absent)	  others;	  and	  that	  they	  speak	  the	  truth	  of	  their	  
own	  culture,	  thus	  representing	  (present)	  others.”19	  Moore’s	  emphasis	  on	  the	  truth	  of	  
others	  points	  to	  an	  important	  component	  in	  discussions	  of	  musical	  authenticity:	  its	  
relationship	  to	  discussions	  of	  privilege	  and	  identity	  politics.	  	  
	   This	  leads	  directly	  to	  Chapter	  Three,	  which	  is	  on	  identity	  and	  difference.	  In	  
my	  research	  on	  the	  relationship	  between	  identity	  and	  musical	  taste,	  I	  ran	  into	  the	  
same	  assertion	  in	  any	  number	  of	  books	  and	  articles:	  aligning	  oneself	  with	  certain	  
types	  of	  music	  and	  certain	  musicians	  is	  supposed	  to	  help	  constitute	  and	  support	  a	  
constructed	  social	  identity	  (a	  position	  clearly	  informed	  by	  the	  work	  of	  Pierre	  
Bourdieu).	  For	  example,	  Frith	  writes	  that	  “if	  social	  relations	  are	  constituted	  in	  
cultural	  practice,	  then	  our	  sense	  of	  identity	  and	  difference	  is	  established	  in	  the	  
process	  of	  discrimination.	  And	  this	  is	  as	  important	  for	  popular	  as	  for	  bourgeois	  
cultural	  activity.”20	  Wilson	  echoes	  such	  scholarly	  claims	  (and	  at	  times	  quotes	  them	  
verbatim)	  in	  Let’s	  Talk	  About	  Love,	  such	  as	  when	  he	  writes,	  “musical	  subcultures	  
exist	  because	  our	  guts	  tell	  us	  certain	  kinds	  of	  music	  are	  for	  certain	  kinds	  of	  people.	  
The	  codes	  are	  not	  always	  transparent.	  .	  .	  .But	  it’s	  hard	  not	  to	  notice	  how	  those	  
processes	  reflect	  and	  contribute	  to	  self-­‐definition,	  how	  often	  persona	  and	  musical	  
taste	  happen	  to	  jibe.”21	  Such	  critiques	  of	  taste	  not	  only	  connect	  aesthetic	  judgments	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19	  Allan	  Moore.	  “Authenticity	  as	  Authentication,”	  Popular	  Music	  21	  (2002):	  209.	  
20	  Frith.	  Performing	  Rites,	  18.	  
21	  Carl	  Wilson.	  Céline	  Dion’s	  Let’s	  Talk	  About	  Love:	  A	  Journey	  to	  the	  End	  of	  Taste.	  (New	  
York:	  Continuum	  Publishing	  Group,	  2007),	  17.	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with	  identity,	  they	  also	  constitute	  an	  interesting	  twist	  on	  concerns	  about	  
authenticity,	  bringing	  not	  only	  the	  credibility	  of	  musical	  texts	  into	  question	  but	  
personal	  taste	  as	  well.	  	  
	   In	  the	  nineteenth	  installment	  of	  Ewing’s	  “Poptimist”	  column	  on	  the	  
influential	  music	  site	  Pitchfork,	  he	  enters	  into	  similar	  territory:	  
Teenage	  market	  research	  gurus	  TRU	  recently	  did	  some	  work	  on	  British	  youth	  
.	  .	  .	  asking	  them	  a	  question	  about	  what	  factors	  led	  them	  to	  try	  something	  new.	  
“Everyone	  else	  likes	  it”	  was	  one	  option	  among	  many.	  “No	  one	  else	  likes	  it”	  
was	  another.	  Older	  kids	  picked	  both	  in	  roughly	  equal	  proportions:	  I	  suspect	  
they	  were	  showing	  more	  honesty	  and	  self-­‐knowledge	  than	  most	  adults	  
would.22	  
Ewing’s	  piece	  points	  out	  an	  important	  aspect	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  musical	  
taste	  and	  identity:	  it	  is	  not	  only	  about	  identifying	  with	  certain	  music	  in	  support	  of	  a	  
given	  identity	  but	  also	  about	  difference—about	  distinguishing	  oneself	  from	  people	  
one	  wishes	  not	  to	  identify	  with	  by	  not	  liking	  certain	  music.	  	  
	   In	  a	  similar	  vein,	  Deena	  Weinstein	  argues	  in	  “Rock	  Critics	  Need	  Bad	  Music”	  
that	  adolescent	  experiences	  shape	  music	  critics’	  attitudes	  toward	  certain	  genres.	  
“The	  rock	  critics	  and	  their	  readers	  originate	  in	  the	  cliques	  that	  affirm	  themselves	  by	  
being	  ‘hip’	  and	  ‘cool,’	  superior	  in	  their	  sophistication	  and	  depth,”	  she	  writes,	  and	  the	  
“weapon”	  that	  “the	  hipoisie	  crowd”	  uses	  to	  make	  up	  for	  a	  deficit	  of	  social	  status	  is	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22	  Tom	  Ewing.	  “Poptimist	  #19:	  Fated	  to	  Pretend,”	  http://pitchfork.com/features/	  
poptimist/7549-­‐poptimist-­‐19/	  (accessed	  June	  13,	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“the	  tried-­‐and-­‐true	  approach	  of	  those	  with	  pretension	  to	  refinement,	  intellect	  and	  
superior	  discernment—snobbery.”23	  	  
	   Wilson	  explores	  his	  own	  adolescence	  in	  Let’s	  Talk	  About	  Love	  as	  part	  of	  a	  
personal	  “taste	  biography.”24	  “I	  remember	  at	  age	  twelve	  telling	  people	  I	  liked	  ‘all	  
kinds	  of	  music,	  except	  disco	  and	  country,’	  two	  genres	  I	  now	  adore,”	  he	  writes.25	  He	  
then	  adds	  that	  after	  gaining	  an	  appreciation	  for	  both	  genres	  later	  in	  life,	  he	  realized	  
“my	  blind	  spots	  were	  a	  regional	  and	  cultural	  bias,”	  and	  “my	  easy	  scorn	  had	  betrayed	  
an	  ignorance	  of	  whole	  communities	  and	  ways	  of	  life,	  prejudices	  I	  did	  not	  want	  to	  live	  
with.”26	  Given	  that	  among	  the	  “social	  experiences”	  that	  caused	  him	  to	  reconsider	  
these	  genres	  was	  “dancing	  in	  Montreal	  gay	  clubs	  where	  body-­‐rocking	  techno	  mixed	  
seamlessly	  into	  disco	  classics,”	  I	  think	  Wilson	  is	  implying	  that	  his	  dislike	  of	  disco	  
could	  have	  had	  a	  homophobic	  component	  (or	  if	  not,	  perhaps	  he	  should	  be).27	  In	  
addition	  to	  the	  “regional	  and	  cultural	  bias,”	  dislike	  of	  country	  music	  could	  also	  be	  
attributed	  to	  classism	  or	  elitism.	  
	   Wilson	  takes	  an	  inverse	  approach	  in	  his	  attempt	  to	  appreciate	  Dion,	  
emphasizing	  her	  Québécois	  heritage	  (giving	  readers	  an	  impromptu	  history	  lesson	  
on	  Québécois	  oppression	  in	  the	  process)	  and	  her	  working-­‐class	  background—in	  
effect,	  casting	  her	  as	  an	  “other.”	  In	  Moore’s	  terms,	  Wilson	  asserts	  that	  Dion	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23	  Deena	  Weinstein,	  “Rock	  Critics	  Need	  Bad	  Music,”	  in	  Bad	  Music:	  The	  Music	  We	  Love	  
to	  Hate,	  ed.	  Christopher	  J.	  Washburne	  and	  Maiken	  Derno	  (New	  York:	  Routledge,	  
2004),	  306.	  





represents	  “others”	  by	  “speak[ing]	  the	  truth	  of	  [her]	  own	  culture.”	  Wilson	  also	  aligns	  
her	  with	  “(absent)	  others”	  by	  recounting	  the	  story	  of	  the	  Larry	  King	  interview	  in	  
which	  she	  famously	  made	  supportive	  comments	  about	  New	  Orleans	  looters	  (“’Some	  
of	  the	  people	  who	  do	  that,	  they’re	  so	  poor	  they’ve	  never	  touched	  anything	  in	  their	  
life.	  Let	  them	  touch	  those	  things	  for	  once!’”).28	  It	  is	  as	  if	  Wilson	  feels	  better	  equipped	  
to	  appreciate	  and	  defend	  Dion	  if	  he	  can	  paint	  her	  as	  part	  of	  an	  underprivileged	  
group	  or	  cast	  her	  as	  an	  underdog.	  	  
	   Although	  he	  seems	  to	  be	  dancing	  around	  the	  idea	  for	  much	  of	  his	  book,	  
Wilson	  never	  explicitly	  links	  the	  type	  of	  “displeasure”	  he	  thinks	  we	  ought	  to	  feel	  
guilty	  about	  with	  racism	  or	  homophobia	  or	  any	  of	  the	  other	  –isms	  and	  –phobias	  
associated	  with	  positions	  of	  cultural	  privilege.	  Nevertheless,	  I	  think	  when	  he	  refers	  
to	  “ignorance	  of	  whole	  communities	  and	  ways	  of	  life”	  reflected	  in	  a	  dislike	  of	  certain	  
genres,	  this	  is	  what	  he	  clearly	  implies.	  	  
	   One	  critic	  who	  does	  not	  avoid	  making	  accusations	  of	  privilege	  is	  Frere-­‐Jones.	  
Frere-­‐Jones	  was	  one	  of	  the	  writers	  who	  criticized	  Merritt	  both	  before	  and	  after	  his	  
comments	  at	  the	  EMP	  conference	  in	  2006.	  This	  was	  not	  the	  first	  time	  he	  had	  taken	  
issue	  with	  Merritt’s	  musical	  taste.	  In	  May	  2004	  he	  posted	  an	  angry	  response	  on	  his	  
blog	  to	  the	  New	  York	  Times	  feature	  “Playlist,”	  which	  had	  recently	  featured	  Merritt	  
being	  asked	  for	  a	  list	  of	  recommended	  albums.	  In	  his	  blogged	  response,	  Frere-­‐Jones	  
called	  Merritt	  “a	  rockist	  cracker”	  and	  accused	  him	  of	  displaying	  a	  racist	  and	  
misogynist	  bias.	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  37	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   Wilson	  confines	  his	  examples	  of	  bias	  to	  anecdotes	  about	  his	  own	  “taste	  
biography,”	  like	  a	  good	  communicator	  who	  only	  uses	  “I-­‐statements,”	  and	  avoids	  
explicitly	  mentioning	  highly	  charged	  types	  of	  bias	  such	  as	  racism.	  Frere-­‐Jones	  has	  no	  
qualms	  about	  asserting	  that	  Merritt	  is	  a	  racist.	  But	  despite	  the	  differences	  in	  their	  
approaches,	  their	  skepticism	  about	  judgments	  of	  taste	  is	  very	  similar.	  
	   Kogan	  describes	  a	  similar	  identification	  with	  a	  downtrodden	  group,	  which	  he	  
relates	  to	  his	  appreciation	  for	  Paris	  Hilton	  in	  a	  blog	  entry	  famous	  (and	  infamous)	  for	  
containing	  the	  slogan	  “Paris	  is	  Our	  Vietnam.”29	  He	  relates	  an	  anecdote	  from	  his	  
youth,	  detailing	  how	  he	  switched	  from	  supporting	  the	  war	  in	  Vietnam	  to	  opposing	  it	  
in	  large	  part	  because	  of	  a	  news	  report	  he	  heard	  about	  “an	  antiwar	  demonstration	  
where	  the	  peaceful	  demonstrators	  were	  attacked	  by	  a	  stone-­‐throwing	  mob,”	  causing	  
him	  to	  doubt	  his	  previous	  belief	  that	  “we	  were	  the	  good	  guys	  in	  Vietnam”	  and	  
conclude,	  “I	  didn’t	  want	  to	  be	  on	  the	  side	  of	  the	  stone-­‐throwers.”	  30	  
	   In	  a	  similar	  way,	  Kogan	  explains,	  he	  does	  not	  want	  to	  be	  on	  the	  side	  of	  people	  
who	  are	  attacking	  Hilton	  (when	  he	  wrote	  the	  piece	  in	  the	  summer	  of	  2007,	  anti-­‐
Hilton	  sentiment	  was	  particularly	  high).	  He	  writes,	  “the	  point	  isn’t	  that	  these	  social	  
reasons	  cause	  me	  to	  like	  her	  sound	  —	  and	  anyway	  I	  liked	  her	  album	  before	  I	  
realized	  the	  virulence	  of	  the	  hatred	  towards	  her	  —	  but	  it	  certainly	  opens	  me	  to	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  Frank	  Kogan,	  “Rules	  Of	  The	  Game	  Followup	  #2:	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  Is	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  Vegas	  
Weekly	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  Blog,	  June	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liking	  what	  I	  hear.”31	  	  Wilson	  might	  cast	  a	  skeptical	  eye	  at	  Kogan’s	  interest	  in	  
defining	  himself	  as	  different	  from	  others	  through	  his	  interest	  in	  Hilton.	  Yet	  his	  
attempt	  to	  use	  this	  distinction	  to	  distance	  himself	  from	  objectionable	  mainstream	  
sentiments	  and	  position	  himself	  as	  an	  ally	  to	  a	  figure	  he	  sees	  as	  being	  unfairly	  
attacked	  means	  Kogan’s	  approach	  to	  Hilton	  bears	  a	  strong	  resemblance	  to	  Wilson’s	  
orientation	  toward	  Dion.	  	  
	   Wilson’s	  seeming	  interest	  in	  identifying	  with	  “others”	  and	  Kogan’s	  alignment	  
with	  figures	  he	  perceives	  as	  downtrodden	  are	  hardly	  novel	  in	  the	  history	  of	  musical	  
taste.	  Taste	  has	  long	  been	  a	  means	  for	  audiences	  to	  identify	  with	  less	  privileged	  
groups.	  The	  history	  of	  blackness	  as	  a	  popular	  musical	  signifier,	  for	  one,	  provides	  a	  
multitude	  of	  examples,	  and	  scholarly	  explorations	  of	  these	  abound.	  But	  the	  self-­‐
conscious	  revision	  of	  value	  judgments	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  political	  concerns	  advocated	  
by	  poptimist	  critics	  is	  relatively	  unprecedented.	  In	  the	  section	  of	  my	  thesis	  on	  
identity	  and	  difference,	  I	  will	  look	  closely	  at	  a	  number	  of	  poptimist	  writings	  and	  how	  
they	  deal	  with	  these	  issues,	  putting	  them	  in	  context	  with	  related	  scholarly	  work	  in	  
popular	  music	  studies.	  
	   Chapter	  Four	  is	  on	  value	  and	  emotion	  and	  will	  explore	  musical	  value	  
judgments	  in	  more	  specific	  detail.	  Value	  judgments	  are	  a	  tricky	  area	  for	  anyone	  who	  
makes	  a	  living	  (or	  just	  spends	  free	  time)	  studying	  culture,	  from	  literature	  faculty	  
making	  decisions	  about	  what	  readings	  to	  assign	  to	  music	  critics	  deciding	  what	  to	  
put	  on	  their	  ballot	  for	  the	  Pazz	  &	  Jop	  poll	  (a	  yearly	  critics’	  poll	  run	  by	  The	  Village	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31	  	  Kogan,	  “Paris	  Is	  Our	  Vietnam.”	  
	  18	  
Voice).	  But	  value	  judgments	  are	  about	  more	  than	  just	  deciding	  what	  is	  good;	  they	  
also	  involve	  deciding	  some	  things	  are	  bad.	  Weinstein’s	  central	  argument	  in	  “Rock	  
Critics	  Need	  Bad	  Music”	  (the	  title	  of	  which	  speaks	  for	  itself)	  is	  that	  traditional	  music	  
criticism	  is	  particularly	  dependent	  upon	  consigning	  certain	  music,	  even	  entire	  
genres,	  to	  abject	  status.	  	  
	   This	  is	  one	  of	  the	  main	  points	  where	  poptimist	  criticism	  differs	  from	  more	  
traditional	  approaches:	  the	  rejection	  of	  the	  guilty	  pleasure	  and	  the	  notion	  of	  the	  
guilty	  displeasure	  problematize	  judgments	  of	  value	  and	  potentially	  outlaw	  negative	  
judgments.	  At	  times	  value	  and	  badness	  seem	  confused,	  even	  inverted.	  In	  fact,	  Wilson	  
admits	  to	  some	  reservations	  in	  the	  opening	  chapter	  of	  Let’s	  Talk	  About	  Love:	  “Maybe	  
I	  am	  heading	  down	  a	  relativistic	  rabbit	  hole.	  If	  even	  Céline	  can	  be	  redeemed,	  is	  there	  
no	  good	  or	  bad	  taste,	  or	  good	  and	  bad	  art?”32	  Music	  critic	  Simon	  Reynolds,	  who	  is	  
well	  known	  for	  his	  critical	  take	  on	  poptimism,	  likened	  Wilson’s	  Céline	  project	  to	  a	  
“Maoist	  self-­‐criticism	  session”	  in	  which	  “party	  members	  and	  low-­‐level	  bureaucrats	  
calling	  themselves	  and	  others	  out	  for	  their	  crypto-­‐bourgeois	  tendencies”	  and	  wrote	  
that	  it	  represented	  a	  “new	  frontier	  of	  fretful	  self-­‐cancellation.”33	  
	   This	  brings	  me	  to	  the	  other	  topic	  of	  my	  final	  chapter:	  emotion.	  Poptimism’s	  
approach	  to	  emotions	  is	  complex	  and	  contradictory,	  and	  it	  illustrates	  the	  complex	  
relationship	  between	  affect	  and	  value	  judgments.	  By	  engaging	  in	  an	  intellectual	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32	  Wilson,	  Let’s	  Talk	  About	  Love,	  20.	  
33	  Simon	  Reynolds,	  “Thinking	  about	  that	  Greil	  Marcus	  quote	  that	  got	  
uTopianTurtleTop	  riled	  up,”	  Blissblog,	  posted	  June	  1,	  2006,	  http://blissout.blogspot	  
.com/2006/06/thinking-­‐about-­‐that-­‐greil-­‐marcus-­‐quote.html	  (accessed	  July	  23,	  
2010).	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attempt	  to	  appreciate	  music	  he	  finds	  viscerally	  repellent,	  Wilson	  privileges	  the	  
rational	  over	  the	  emotional.	  Yet	  he	  champions	  the	  emotional	  immediacy	  of	  Dion’s	  
music	  against	  charges	  of	  crass	  sentimentality,	  and	  the	  pinnacle	  of	  his	  appreciation	  
for	  her	  work	  comes	  when	  he	  feels	  genuinely	  moved	  at	  a	  live	  performance	  by	  Dion.	  
This	  inconsistency	  is	  characteristic	  of	  Wilson’s	  book,	  which	  in	  turn	  is	  characteristic	  
of	  the	  attitudes	  of	  many	  poptimist	  critics.	  	  
	   The	  skepticism	  Wilson	  applies	  to	  his	  own	  reactions	  are	  mirrored	  in	  the	  
skepticism	  Frere-­‐Jones	  applies	  to	  Merritt	  and	  the	  “magical,	  coincidence-­‐prone	  
scythe”	  that	  allows	  him	  to	  choose	  seven	  new	  records	  to	  recommend	  that	  all	  happen	  
to	  be	  made	  by	  white	  artists.	  When	  replacing	  affective	  reactions	  with	  reasoned	  
arguments,	  this	  critical	  mindset	  seems	  to	  reach	  toward	  an	  ideal	  of	  greater	  
objectivity.	  Yet,	  as	  I	  have	  discussed,	  the	  poptimist	  program	  raises	  concerns	  about	  a	  
different	  sort	  of	  relativism,	  which	  replaces	  concerns	  about	  elitist	  bias	  with	  a	  critical	  
methodology	  which	  Wilson	  himself	  admits	  leads	  down	  a	  confusing	  “rabbit	  hole”	  
when	  it	  comes	  to	  textual	  value.	  	  
	  
My	  Theoretical	  Approach	  
	   Poptimist	  writing	  on	  these	  topics	  raises	  an	  important	  point:	  looking	  closely	  
at	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  our	  tastes	  are	  intertwined	  with	  hegemonic	  hierarchies	  is	  
disturbing.	  What	  do	  we	  do	  when	  we	  realize	  our	  personal	  status	  as	  formed	  through	  
taste	  credentials—a	  dimension	  of	  our	  identity	  of	  which	  we	  repress	  our	  awareness	  
while	  we	  semi-­‐consciously	  slave	  away	  to	  build	  it—seems	  to	  implicate	  us	  in	  a	  system	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of	  privilege?	  What	  does	  the	  discomfort	  created	  by	  this	  awareness	  say	  about	  our	  
relationship	  to	  identity,	  privilege,	  and	  cultural	  capital	  in	  contemporary	  culture?	  
Wilson’s	  project,	  and	  indeed	  much	  of	  poptimist	  writing,	  revolves	  around	  this	  
discomfort	  and	  various	  attempts	  to	  step	  around	  it.	  	  
	   At	  one	  time,	  these	  sorts	  of	  questions	  might	  have	  been	  reserved	  for	  the	  
academy.	  Contiuum	  published	  Wilson’s	  book	  as	  part	  of	  33	  1/3,	  a	  series	  of	  tiny	  
volumes	  that	  are	  each	  dedicated	  to	  a	  specific	  album	  and	  are	  primarily	  sold	  in	  music	  
shops.	  When	  this	  sort	  of	  book	  quotes	  Bourdieu	  and	  refers	  to	  contemporary	  
cognitive	  psychology	  work	  on	  “framing,”	  it	  represents	  a	  shift	  in	  the	  relationship	  
between	  academic	  and	  journalistic	  discourses	  on	  popular	  music.	  This	  shift	  has	  the	  
potential	  to	  bring	  exciting	  new	  ideas	  and	  an	  added	  degree	  of	  political	  awareness	  and	  
criticality	  to	  journalistic	  discourse,	  but	  it	  also	  has	  more	  burdensome	  consequences.	  
Making	  value	  judgments	  about	  music	  is	  in	  many	  respects	  the	  popular	  music	  
journalist’s	  raison	  d’être.	  Delving	  into	  certain	  questions	  could	  be	  like	  taking	  an	  apple	  
from	  the	  tree	  of	  knowledge—how	  does	  one	  continue	  to	  write	  music	  reviews	  while	  
taking	  a	  “journey	  to	  the	  end	  of	  taste”?	  
	   I	  believe	  an	  academic	  approach	  to	  these	  questions	  with	  a	  thorough	  analysis	  
of	  poptimist	  discourse	  has	  the	  potential	  to	  further	  our	  understanding	  of	  these	  
questions	  in	  a	  meaningful	  way.	  Journalists’	  freedom,	  especially	  in	  blogs,	  to	  spout	  off	  
on	  these	  topics	  with	  unapologetic	  stridency	  is	  beneficial	  in	  some	  respects.	  Part	  of	  
what	  makes	  poptimist	  writing	  so	  compelling	  is	  that	  it	  brings	  up	  salient	  questions	  
that	  have	  been	  almost	  entirely	  ignored	  in	  academic	  work	  on	  popular	  music,	  and	  I	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think	  their	  ability	  to	  express	  these	  ideas	  without	  all	  of	  the	  checks	  and	  balances	  and	  
built-­‐in	  delays	  of	  academic	  writing	  facilitated	  this.	  But	  when	  journalists	  try	  to	  
approximate	  academic	  coverage	  of	  these	  topics,	  the	  free-­‐wheeling,	  out-­‐of-­‐context	  
theoretical	  bricolage	  that	  usually	  results	  tends	  to	  mangle	  existing	  scholarly	  ideas	  
without	  providing	  clear	  support	  for	  an	  argument.	  These	  issues	  cry	  out	  for	  a	  more	  
rigorous,	  theoretically	  informed	  treatment—which	  is	  where	  my	  project	  comes	  in.	  	  
	   To	  put	  it	  simply,	  my	  goal	  is	  a	  discourse	  analysis	  of	  poptimist	  texts	  and	  
responses	  to	  poptimism.	  This	  type	  of	  discourse	  analysis	  comes	  out	  of	  a	  tradition	  
typified	  recently	  by	  Michel	  Foucault.	  While	  arguing	  for	  and	  against	  aspects	  of	  
poptimism	  is	  a	  worthwhile	  task	  and	  one	  I	  will	  engage	  in	  at	  times,	  my	  aim	  is	  
something	  deeper—to	  understand	  the	  context	  in	  which	  poptimist	  discourse	  has	  
become	  possible,	  even	  inevitable,	  and	  by	  placing	  it	  in	  context	  to	  reach	  toward	  a	  
greater	  understanding	  of	  the	  important	  political	  issues	  that	  animate	  it.	  	  
	   It	  is	  easy	  to	  see	  that	  discourse	  shapes	  aesthetics	  and	  journalism.	  But	  
contemporary	  theories	  and	  debates	  about	  gender,	  race	  and	  sexuality	  show	  how	  they	  
are	  also	  discursively	  produced	  and	  in	  turn	  shape	  and	  limit	  thought	  and	  discussion.	  
Instead	  of	  embroiling	  myself	  in	  the	  music	  critic	  turf	  war	  over	  poptimism,	  I	  will	  aim	  
for	  a	  more	  critical	  perspective	  (without	  pretensions	  of	  total	  objectivity)	  that	  
attempts	  to	  account	  for	  the	  conditions	  surrounding	  the	  dialogue.	  	  
	   Another	  important	  theoretical	  component	  of	  my	  analysis	  will	  be	  cultural	  
studies	  scholarship	  informed	  by	  Antonio	  Gramsci,	  including	  work	  by	  Stuart	  Hall	  and	  
Frith.	  Given	  cultural	  studies’	  strong	  grasp	  of	  identity	  issues,	  engagement	  with	  
	  22	  
popular	  culture,	  and	  emphasis	  on	  the	  political,	  this	  type	  of	  theory	  is	  very	  well	  suited	  
to	  understanding	  poptimism.	  	  
	   Approaches	  to	  popular	  culture	  that	  emphasize	  fan	  activity	  have	  elements	  in	  
common	  with	  cultural	  studies.	  Both	  schools	  focus	  on	  the	  reception	  side	  of	  the	  
cultural	  equation	  and	  on	  the	  agency	  of	  consumers	  to	  make	  meaning.	  Appropriately,	  
work	  by	  scholars	  of	  fandom	  such	  as	  Henry	  Jenkins	  and	  Jonathan	  Fiske	  will	  also	  
come	  into	  play	  in	  my	  analysis.	  	  
	   I	  will	  also	  be	  engaging	  with	  theories	  in	  the	  tradition	  of	  Bourdieu,	  who	  
recently	  cultivated	  the	  sociological	  study	  of	  aesthetic	  taste.	  Richard	  A.	  Peterson	  and	  
Roger	  M.	  Kern,	  authors	  of	  a	  prescient	  piece	  on	  omnivorous	  cultural	  consumption,	  
and	  Jason	  Middleton	  and	  Roger	  Beebe,	  whose	  work	  in	  a	  similar	  vein	  elaborates	  on	  
contemporary	  reception	  practices,	  provide	  a	  context	  for	  my	  analysis.	  In	  a	  similar	  
vein,	  my	  investigation	  will	  also	  be	  informed	  by	  work	  that	  places	  “bad”	  genres	  like	  
heavy	  metal,	  country,	  and	  schmaltz	  in	  a	  sociohistorical	  context.	  	  
	   Naturally,	  scholarship	  from	  the	  popular	  music	  studies	  field	  more	  generally	  
will	  also	  come	  into	  play.	  As	  I	  have	  mentioned,	  in	  addition	  to	  the	  aforementioned	  
material	  on	  omnivorous	  reception	  and	  abject	  genres,	  studies	  of	  authenticity	  and	  the	  
discourse	  surrounding	  it	  by	  writers	  like	  Fornäs	  and	  Moore	  will	  be	  highly	  significant	  
to	  my	  inquiry.	  	  
	   Now,	  time	  to	  dive	  into	  that	  rabbit	  hole	  .	  .	  .	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Chapter	  Two:	  Authenticity	  and	  Reflexivity	  
	   Fittingly,	  my	  first	  stop	  beyond	  the	  rabbit	  hole	  will	  be	  to	  approach	  the	  
looking-­‐glass	  of	  reflexivity.	  I	  will	  take	  a	  cue	  from	  Johan	  Fornäs,	  author	  of	  “Listen	  to	  
Your	  Voice!	  Authenticity	  and	  Reflexivity	  in	  Rock,	  Rap	  and	  Techno	  Music,”	  who	  
details	  the	  relationship	  between	  reflexivity	  and	  authenticity,	  a	  concept	  which	  
continues	  to	  command	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  attention	  despite	  connotations	  of	  rockism.	  	  
	   Authenticity	  has	  other	  negative	  associations	  as	  well.	  As	  I	  will	  show	  during	  
this	  chapter,	  traditional	  versions	  of	  the	  concept	  have	  become	  problematic	  during	  
late	  modernity—yet	  it	  remains	  fraught	  with	  significance.	  Fornäs’s	  work	  will	  form	  
the	  framework	  of	  my	  discussion,	  along	  with	  related	  work	  by	  fellow	  popular	  music	  
scholar	  Allan	  Moore.	  Of	  particular	  interest	  to	  my	  discussion	  is	  Fornäs’s	  notion	  of	  
“meta-­‐authenticity,”	  which	  he	  describes	  as	  occurring	  when	  cultural	  texts	  show	  an	  
awareness	  of	  their	  own	  symbolic	  context	  and,	  in	  the	  process,	  their	  own	  artificiality.	  
Moore	  provides	  an	  additional	  focus	  on	  authenticity’s	  relationship	  to	  identity	  and	  
difference.	  I	  will	  use	  both	  Fornäs’s	  and	  Moore’s	  models	  to	  examine	  differing	  
attitudes	  toward	  authenticity	  among	  poptimist	  critics	  and	  to	  demonstrate	  the	  
significance	  of	  reflexivity	  in	  contemporary	  estimations	  of	  authenticity	  and	  value.	  	  
	   I	  will	  also	  take	  a	  look	  at	  poptimist	  writing	  on	  authenticity	  in	  reception.	  The	  
legitimacy	  and	  sincerity	  of	  value	  judgments	  are	  an	  integral	  part	  of	  poptimist	  
critiques	  of	  taste;	  while	  they	  avoid	  evoking	  authenticity	  by	  name,	  the	  spirit	  of	  the	  
term	  infuses	  their	  discussions.	  In	  the	  process,	  I	  will	  examine	  the	  sometimes	  
contradictory	  attitudes	  poptimist	  critics	  hold	  toward	  reflexivity.	  	  
	  24	  
	  
Fornäs	  and	  Moore:	  Authenticity,	  Reflexivity,	  the	  Self,	  and	  Others	  
	   Fornäs	  begins	  his	  groundbreaking	  essay	  by	  describing	  Lawrence	  Grossberg’s	  
scheme	  in	  which	  he	  lays	  out	  three	  types	  of	  authenticity.	  The	  first	  is	  based	  on	  
Romantic	  ideology	  and	  its	  opposition	  of	  authenticity	  against	  commercial	  appeal,	  
which	  is	  linked	  with	  rock	  music;	  the	  second	  applies	  to	  “dance-­‐oriented	  and	  black	  
genres”	  which	  finds	  authenticity	  “in	  the	  construction	  of	  a	  rhythmical	  and	  sexual	  
individual	  body”;	  and	  the	  third	  “appears	  in	  postmodernist	  self-­‐conscious	  pop	  and	  
avant-­‐garde	  rock”	  whose	  “very	  self-­‐knowledge,	  in	  all	  its	  cynicism,	  shows	  a	  kind	  of	  
realistic	  honesty.”34	  
	   Fornäs	  reformulates	  these	  types	  slightly	  to	  suit	  his	  own	  purposes.	  The	  first	  
he	  terms	  “social	  authenticity,	  since	  it	  uses	  criteria	  taken	  from	  the	  level	  of	  collective	  
group	  interaction”	  and	  the	  second	  he	  calls	  “subjective	  authenticity,	  since	  it	  focuses	  
on	  the	  relation	  between	  an	  individual	  performer	  and/or	  listener	  and	  her	  own	  mind	  
and	  body,	  as	  a	  state	  of	  presence.”35	  Both,	  he	  points	  out	  “stress	  either	  source	  or	  
reception	  authenticity,	  with	  textual	  authenticity	  as	  a	  silent	  presumption.”36	  “The	  
third	  form,”	  he	  writes,	  “could	  be	  defined	  as	  cultural	  or	  meta-­authenticity,	  since	  it	  
moves	  within	  (and	  derives	  legitimacy	  from)	  the	  level	  of	  the	  symbolic	  expressions	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34	  Johan	  Fornäs.	  “Listen	  to	  Your	  Voice!	  Authenticity	  and	  Reflexivity	  in	  Rock,	  Rap	  and	  
Techno	  Music.”	  New	  Formations	  24	  (1994):	  168.	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(‘texts’)	  themselves.”37	  Unlike	  the	  first	  two	  types,	  meta-­‐authenticity	  deals	  with	  the	  
authenticity	  of	  texts	  themselves	  rather	  than	  that	  of	  their	  producers	  or	  audiences.38	  
	   This	  third	  form	  of	  authenticity	  is	  Fornäs’s	  primary	  focus.	  He	  maintains	  that	  
its	  significance	  is	  an	  inevitable	  consequence	  of	  the	  conditions	  of	  present-­‐day	  late	  
modernity:	  
It	  is	  almost	  impossible	  any	  more	  to	  repress	  the	  insight	  that	  this	  takes	  place	  
through	  a	  complicated	  play	  of	  gestures,	  signs	  and	  strategies.	  Actually,	  unlike	  
in	  earlier	  times,	  one	  now	  has	  the	  best	  chance	  to	  attain	  social	  and	  subjective	  
authenticity	  if	  the	  symbolic	  contexts	  are	  made	  conscious.	  Modernization	  has	  
irreversibly	  made	  reflexivity	  an	  inescapable	  condition	  of	  all	  cultural	  
activities.39	  	  
In	  other	  words,	  our	  awareness	  of	  the	  context	  of	  musical	  texts	  makes	  it	  impossible	  
for	  us	  to	  believe	  in	  traditional	  notions	  of	  authenticity,	  but	  the	  reflexivity	  this	  
awareness	  brings	  about	  actually	  reinforces	  authenticity,	  but	  in	  a	  new	  and	  different	  
way.	  Fornäs	  “agree[s]	  with	  many	  other	  critics	  that	  the	  old	  tradition	  of	  romantic	  
rock-­‐ideology	  is	  today	  luckily	  in	  decline”	  but	  suggests	  that	  “instead	  of	  throwing	  
away	  the	  concept	  of	  authenticity”	  because	  it	  is	  used	  in	  such	  suspect	  ways	  by	  rock	  
Romanticism,	  we	  should	  “rethink”	  it.40	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  168.	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  Ibid.,	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Authenticity	  does	  not	  have	  to	  be	  defined	  as	  naturalness	  or	  as	  related	  to	  any	  
absolute	  and	  autonomous	  origin,	  but	  can	  instead	  fruitfully	  refer	  to	  a	  
specifically	  constructed	  relation	  between	  subjects	  and	  cultural	  expressions	  .	  .	  
.	  Reflexivity	  need	  not	  be	  restricted	  only	  to	  intellectual	  reflections	  nor	  imply	  
any	  total	  self-­‐transparency,	  but	  may	  indicate	  any	  symbolically	  mediated	  
reference	  to	  one’s	  own	  identity.	  .	  .	  .	  it	  seems	  to	  me	  that	  the	  increasing	  
reflexivity	  of	  late	  modern	  life	  and	  popular	  music	  does	  not	  erode	  
authenticity—it	  only	  changes	  its	  forms.	  Authenticity	  today	  cannot	  be	  
achieved	  without	  reflexivity,	  nor	  can	  it	  be	  defined	  as	  a	  given	  entity.41	  
Thus,	  in	  Fornäs’s	  view,	  by	  acknowledging	  its	  symbolic	  context	  (and	  in	  the	  process	  its	  
own	  artificiality)	  music	  can	  attain	  some	  kind	  of	  authenticity	  for	  late-­‐modern	  
listeners.	  	  
	   The	  complex	  relationship	  between	  authenticity	  and	  reflexivity	  which	  he	  
describes	  may	  seem	  counter-­‐intuitive	  to	  anyone	  steeped	  in	  the	  traditional	  notions	  of	  
authenticity	  that	  built	  up	  around	  rock	  music	  in	  the	  latter	  part	  of	  the	  twentieth	  
century	  (which	  Fornäs	  criticizes	  as	  “essentialist”).42	  “Reflexivity	  may	  be	  felt	  as	  
inducing	  artificiality”	  to	  some,	  Fornäs	  points	  out,	  but	  he	  believes	  that	  it	  is	  not	  only	  
“intimately	  connected	  to	  authenticity”	  but	  indispensable	  to	  it	  if	  it	  is	  to	  remain	  a	  
relevant	  concept	  under	  present	  conditions.43	  It	  is	  tempting	  to	  look	  for	  authenticity	  
in	  the	  most	  guileless	  performers	  and	  thus	  to	  “value	  pre-­‐modern,	  youthful	  or	  naïve	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musics	  as	  more	  authentic,”	  but	  “it	  could	  however	  be	  argued	  that	  it	  is	  exactly	  the	  
unconscious	  voice	  that	  runs	  the	  greatest	  risk	  of	  getting	  inauthentic,	  steered	  by	  
uncontrollable	  external	  forces	  in	  nature,	  culture	  and	  society.”44	  On	  the	  contrary,	  
Fornäs	  says,	  “Only	  by	  carefully	  listening	  to	  your	  voice,	  reflecting	  upon	  one’s	  limits	  
and	  potentials,	  might	  it	  be	  possible	  to	  gain	  a	  real,	  active	  subjectivity”	  and	  thus	  a	  
more	  genuine	  degree	  of	  authenticity.45	  
	   In	  his	  piece	  ‘Authenticity	  as	  Authentication,’	  Allan	  Moore	  both	  expands	  on	  
and	  reacts	  to	  Fornäs’s	  ideas.	  Like	  Fornäs,	  he	  writes	  that	  he	  starts	  “from	  an	  
assumption	  that	  authenticity	  does	  not	  inhere	  in	  any	  combination	  of	  musical	  sounds”	  
but	  rather	  that	  “‘[a]uthenticity’	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  interpretation	  which	  is	  made	  and	  
fought	  for	  from	  within	  a	  cultural	  and,	  thus,	  historicised	  position.	  It	  is	  ascribed,	  not	  
inscribed.”46	  Given	  this,	  he	  asks,	  “where	  does	  it	  lie?	  It	  is	  my	  second	  assumption	  in	  
this	  article	  that	  it	  is	  a	  construction	  made	  on	  the	  act	  of	  listening.”	  He	  acknowledges	  
that	  there	  is	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  skepticism	  about	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  very	  idea	  of	  
authenticity,	  quoting	  Georgina	  Born	  and	  David	  Hesmondhalgh’s	  assertion	  that	  “the	  
concept	  ‘has	  been	  consigned	  to	  the	  intellectual	  dust-­‐heap’	  since,	  in	  a	  postmodern	  
world	  where	  appropriation	  .	  .	  .	  is	  everywhere	  evident,	  it	  no	  longer	  carries	  its	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  Ibid.,	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  “Authenticity	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  Authentication,”	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originary	  force.”47	  But	  Moore	  nonetheless	  finds	  that	  “such	  an	  abandonment	  is	  
premature.”48	  
	   Moore	  finds	  authenticity	  useful	  not	  as	  a	  descriptor	  for	  concrete	  musical	  
qualities	  but	  as	  a	  way	  of	  explaining	  a	  certain	  kind	  of	  relationship	  between	  listeners	  
and	  texts	  (harking	  back	  to	  the	  first	  two	  types	  of	  authenticity	  outlined	  by	  Fornäs).	  
“Theorisation	  of	  observations	  made	  on	  how	  things	  count	  as	  authentic	  will	  in	  turn	  
inform	  the	  question	  of	  how	  such	  observers	  constitute	  their	  subjectivity.	  Thus,	  rather	  
than	  ask	  what	  (piece	  of	  music,	  or	  activity)	  is	  being	  authenticated,	  in	  this	  article	  I	  ask	  
who.”49	  
	   Moore	  recognizes	  three	  theoretically	  valid	  forms	  of	  authenticity,	  which	  occur	  
given	  one	  of	  three	  things:	  “that	  artists	  speak	  the	  truth	  of	  their	  own	  situation;	  that	  
they	  speak	  the	  truth	  of	  the	  situation	  of	  (absent)	  others;	  [or]	  that	  they	  speak	  the	  
truth	  of	  their	  own	  culture,	  thereby	  representing	  (present)	  others.”50	  The	  first	  he	  
terms	  “first	  person	  authenticity”	  or	  “authenticity	  of	  expression”;	  it	  can	  be	  found	  in	  
cases	  where	  “an	  originator	  (composer,	  performer)	  succeeds	  in	  conveying	  the	  
impression	  that	  his/her	  utterance	  is	  one	  of	  integrity,	  that	  it	  represents	  an	  attempt	  to	  
communicate	  in	  an	  unmediated	  form	  with	  an	  audience.”51	  	  
	   He	  also	  delineates	  a	  “‘second	  person’	  authenticity,	  or	  authenticity	  of	  
experience,	  which	  occurs	  when	  a	  performance	  succeeds	  in	  conveying	  the	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impression	  to	  a	  listener	  that	  that	  listener’s	  experience	  of	  life	  is	  being	  validated.”52	  
The	  third	  option,	  “third	  person	  authenticity,”	  takes	  place	  when	  the	  audience	  is	  
convinced	  that	  an	  artist	  is	  conveying	  a	  truthful	  account	  of	  the	  experiences	  of	  
another	  (or	  an	  Other);	  the	  example	  Moore	  uses	  to	  flesh	  out	  this	  idea—that	  of	  white	  
performers’	  appropriation	  of	  the	  African-­‐American	  blues	  tradition—is	  both	  apt	  and	  
telling.53	  
	   Although	  the	  three	  types	  of	  authenticity	  Moore	  delineates	  are	  specific,	  they	  
remain	  incredibly	  subjective—intentionally	  so.	  Although	  it	  would	  be	  beyond	  the	  
scope	  of	  a	  single	  article	  to	  describe	  in	  the	  necessary	  detail	  exactly	  how	  and	  why	  
certain	  people	  or	  groups	  might	  find	  different	  musical	  texts	  authentic	  in	  one	  of	  these	  
ways,	  Moore	  does	  mention	  that	  he	  believes	  one	  factor	  is	  popular	  music	  discourse	  
itself:	  
While	  the	  question	  of	  why	  particular	  (groups	  of)	  listeners	  give	  value	  to	  some	  
musical	  experiences	  above	  others	  may	  depend	  on	  what	  music	  connotes	  or	  
denotes,	  it	  also	  depends	  on	  how	  the	  musical	  experience	  is	  constructed	  around	  a	  
basic	  distinction	  which	  may	  be	  summarised	  as	  mainstream/margin,	  
centre/periphery,	  or	  coopted/underground.	  The	  basic	  distinction	  most	  relevant	  
at	  this	  point	  is	  that	  which	  originated	  in	  the	  mid-­‐1960s	  between	  a	  popular	  music	  
centre	  (“pop”)	  and	  periphery	  (“rock”),	  concerning	  as	  it	  did	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  
commercial	  enterprise	  surrounding	  examples	  of	  each	  particular	  style:	  the	  degree	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to	  which	  it	  could	  be	  perceived	  as	  “authentic”.	  Dispassionately	  speaking,	  of	  
course,	  this	  commercial/authentic	  polarity	  is	  illusory,	  since	  all	  mass-­‐mediated	  
music	  is	  subject	  to	  commercial	  imperatives,	  but	  what	  matters	  to	  listeners	  is	  
whether	  such	  subjection	  appears	  to	  be	  accepted,	  resisted,	  or	  negotiated	  with,	  by	  
those	  to	  whom	  they	  are	  listening.54	  
He	  believes	  “the	  burning	  question,”	  which	  “is	  one	  of	  belonging,”	  is	  viewed	  through	  
the	  lens	  of	  these	  sorts	  of	  perceived	  polarities.	  	  
	   These	  linked	  sets	  of	  opposing	  concepts	  not	  only	  date	  back	  to	  the	  rise	  of	  the	  
pop/rock	  distinction	  in	  the	  1960s,	  as	  Moore	  points	  out,	  but	  also	  have	  antecedents	  in	  
even	  older	  aesthetic	  traditions.	  Such	  terms	  come	  up	  continually	  in	  academic	  
literature	  about	  popular	  music	  aesthetics.	  In	  his	  book	  Rhythm	  and	  Noise,	  Theodore	  
Gracyk	  mentions	  a	  similar	  grouping	  of	  terms	  much	  like	  Moore’s:	  “rock	  and	  pop,	  
entertainment	  and	  art,	  authenticity	  and	  insincerity,	  and	  the	  marginal	  and	  the	  
commercial.”55	  In	  a	  piece	  on	  reflexivity	  in	  youth	  culture,	  Fornäs	  describes	  this	  
opposition	  of	  “commercial	  and	  technological	  artificiality”	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  as	  that	  
“which	  is	  supposed	  to	  destroy	  natural	  authenticity	  of	  genuine,	  rooted,	  live	  culture,”	  
and	  on	  the	  other,	  is	  “a	  central	  part	  of	  the	  self-­‐understanding	  of	  rock	  in	  relation	  to	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pop”	  but	  writes	  that	  “it	  goes	  back	  to	  the	  ancient	  nature/culture-­‐dichotomy	  and	  in	  
fact	  turns	  up	  in	  new	  forms	  within	  virtually	  every	  genre.”56	  
	   Often,	  academic	  discussions	  problematize	  these	  oppositions.	  For	  example,	  in	  
his	  article	  “Producing	  Artistic	  Value:	  The	  Case	  of	  Rock	  Music,”	  Motti	  Regev	  argues	  
“that	  the	  discourse	  about	  rock	  music	  which	  has	  been	  developed	  .	  .	  .	  has	  gradually	  
constructed	  distinctions	  and	  hierarchies	  which	  resulted	  from	  the	  application	  of	  the	  
traditional	  ideology	  of	  autonomous	  art.”57	  He	  points	  to	  “changes	  in	  the	  status	  of	  film	  
and	  photography”	  as	  “evidence	  to	  the	  successful	  struggles	  which	  producers	  and	  
analyzers	  of	  ‘popular’	  forms	  have	  conducted	  over	  the	  recognition	  of	  these	  forms	  as	  
‘artistic’	  .	  .	  .	  They	  did	  so	  as	  part	  of	  the	  field,	  and	  by	  accepting	  its	  rules.	  .	  .	  .	  the	  
struggles	  were	  not	  conducted	  against	  the	  existing	  parameters	  of	  art,	  but	  on	  the	  basis	  
of	  adherence	  to	  the	  belief	  in	  them.”58	  
	   In	  other	  words,	  though	  the	  texts	  produced	  by	  these	  forms	  are	  easily	  
commodified,	  they	  have	  achieved	  a	  degree	  of	  cultural	  capital	  previously	  reserved	  for	  
“autonomous”	  art	  (art	  that,	  theoretically	  at	  least,	  is	  untainted	  by	  profit	  motives)	  by	  
conforming	  to	  discursive	  strategies	  employed	  around	  such	  traditionally	  “high”	  art	  
forms	  (or,	  in	  Bourdieu’s	  terms,	  playing	  the	  cultural	  capital	  field	  according	  to	  its	  long-­‐
standing	  rules).	  John	  Fiske	  makes	  a	  similar	  point	  in	  “The	  Cultural	  Economy	  of	  
Fandom”	  when	  he	  writes	  that	  when	  fans	  have	  advocated	  for	  the	  artistic	  legitimacy	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of	  the	  texts	  they	  love,	  “their	  criteria	  .	  .	  .	  were	  not	  dissimilar	  to	  those	  of	  the	  literary	  
scholars.	  .	  .	  .	  Authenticity,	  particularly	  when	  validated	  as	  the	  production	  of	  an	  
artistic	  individual	  (writer,	  painter,	  performer),	  is	  a	  criterion	  of	  distinction	  normally	  
used	  to	  accumulate	  official	  cultural	  capital	  but	  which	  is	  readily	  appropriated	  by	  fans	  
in	  their	  moonlighting	  cultural	  economy.”59	  	  
	  
The	  Specter	  of	  Authenticity	  
	   But	  even	  when	  academic	  discussions	  call	  into	  question	  notions	  of	  the	  
authentic	  and	  autonomous	  versus	  the	  inauthentic	  and	  commercial,	  they	  underscore	  
their	  continued	  relevance	  by	  focusing	  on	  them.	  As	  Aaron	  Fox	  writes	  in	  “White	  Trash	  
Alchemies	  of	  the	  Abject	  Sublime:	  Country	  as	  ‘Bad’	  Music,”	  “The	  general	  consensus	  of	  
recent	  scholarship—that	  the	  discourse	  of	  authenticity	  is	  an	  elaborate	  and	  cynical	  
construction	  of	  value—has	  become	  a	  hackneyed	  point.	  And	  yet	  the	  logics	  of	  this	  
construction,	  devolving	  around	  key	  oppositions	  .	  .	  .	  continue	  to	  compel	  the	  same	  
scholars	  who	  would	  reject	  them.”60	  
	   The	  same	  thing	  occurs	  in	  popular	  music	  criticism	  and	  commentary	  by	  
journalists.	  Carl	  Wilson	  writes	  that	  “‘authentic	  inauthenticity’	  is	  really	  just	  another	  
way	  of	  saying	  ‘art,’	  but	  people	  caught	  up	  in	  romantic	  ideals	  still	  bristle	  to	  admit	  how	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much	  of	  creativity	  is	  being	  able	  to	  manipulate	  artifice.”61	  He	  came	  across	  this	  
Fornäs-­‐esque	  phrase	  in	  the	  work	  of	  Grossberg,	  and	  he	  does	  not	  react	  favorably	  to	  it.	  
Later	  in	  his	  book,	  in	  the	  process	  of	  exploring	  reactions	  to	  Céline	  Dion’s	  work,	  he	  rails	  
against	  the	  idea	  that	  sentimentality	  in	  pop	  music	  is	  a	  bad	  thing.	  62	  “I	  can	  absolve	  
sentimentality	  of	  the	  superficial	  charges	  fast.	  Manipulative?	  Manipulating	  listeners,	  
moving	  them,	  is	  what	  music	  is	  supposed	  to	  do,	  skillfully.	  Phony?	  All	  art	  is	  fake.	  What	  
matters	  is	  to	  be	  a	  convincing	  fake,	  a	  lie	  that	  feels	  true.	  Clearly	  Céline	  has	  her	  
audience	  convinced.”63	  	  
	   Wilson’s	  position	  here	  actually	  echoes	  a	  point	  made	  by	  Fornäs	  and	  Moore.	  
Despite	  his	  reluctance	  to	  name	  authenticity	  as	  a	  value,	  his	  assertion	  of	  the	  
importance	  of	  a	  “convincing”	  performance	  that	  makes	  sense	  to	  an	  artist’s	  audience	  
and	  “feels	  true”	  echoes	  both	  scholars’	  theorization	  of	  authenticity	  as	  a	  social	  value,	  
which	  Fornäs	  calls	  “reception	  authenticity,”	  a	  “form	  of	  identificatory	  discourse,”	  one	  
that	  is	  not	  inherent	  to	  a	  text	  but	  that	  emerges	  through	  an	  audience’s	  meaningful	  
engagement	  with	  it.64	  	  
	   This	  is	  not	  the	  only	  point	  in	  Wilson’s	  study	  of	  Dion	  where	  he	  avoids	  the	  term	  
“authenticity,”	  seemingly	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  distance	  himself	  from	  outdated	  rockist	  
values,	  yet	  draws	  upon	  traditional	  authenticity	  discourse	  to	  support	  a	  favorable	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  Love:	  A	  Journey	  to	  the	  End	  of	  Taste.	  (New	  
York:	  Continuum	  Publishing	  Group,	  2007),	  71.	  
62	  Ibid.,	  122–4.	  
63	  Ibid.,	  123.	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  Fornäs,	  “Listen	  to	  Your	  Voice!,”	  168.	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view	  of	  his	  subject.	  One	  of	  the	  most	  striking	  examples	  of	  this	  is	  Wilson’s	  description	  
of	  Dion’s	  Québécois	  heritage,	  which	  he	  spends	  an	  entire	  chapter	  exploring.	  	  
	   “To	  most	  of	  the	  English	  world,”	  he	  asserts,	  “Céline’s	  Frenchness	  remains	  a	  
vague	  thing,	  almost	  an	  affectation;	  that	  it	  represents	  a	  whole	  culture	  groping	  its	  way	  
to	  self-­‐determination	  doesn’t	  translate	  .	  .	  .	  If	  she	  fails	  most	  non-­‐fans’	  authenticity	  
tests,	  the	  trouble	  may	  be	  not	  only	  her	  showbiz	  upbringing	  but	  that	  her	  personal	  
touchstones	  are	  off	  the	  map.”65	  As	  often	  happens	  when	  he	  grapples	  with	  a	  term	  like	  
authenticity,	  which	  he	  seems	  deeply	  ambivalent	  about,	  Wilson	  does	  a	  bit	  of	  
rhetorical	  gymnastics	  here,	  managing	  not	  to	  own	  up	  to	  valuing	  authenticity	  while	  at	  
the	  same	  time	  arguing	  against	  those	  who	  would	  impugn	  Dion’s	  lack	  of	  it.	  	  
	   Later	  he	  writes,	  “Céline	  Dion’s	  music	  and	  career	  are	  more	  understandable	  if	  
she	  is	  added	  to	  the	  long	  line	  of	  ethnic	  ‘outsiders’	  who	  expressed	  emotions	  too	  
outsized	  for	  most	  white	  American	  performers	  but	  in	  non-­‐African	  American	  codes,	  
letting	  white	  audiences	  loosen	  up	  without	  crossing	  the	  ‘color	  line.’”66	  He	  also	  seizes	  
on	  her	  famous	  comment,	  “Let	  them	  touch	  those	  things!”	  made	  on	  the	  Larry	  King	  
Show	  in	  response	  to	  the	  looting	  that	  took	  place	  after	  Hurricane	  Katrina,	  often	  
considered	  a	  gaffe	  on	  her	  part.	  Wilson	  not	  only	  finds	  Dion’s	  sympathy	  toward	  
underprivileged	  New	  Orleans	  residents	  poignant	  and	  relatable	  but	  uses	  it	  to	  bring	  
up	  her	  own	  underprivileged	  background	  and	  to	  frame	  her	  music	  in	  relation	  to	  it.	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  Wilson,	  Let’s	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   “I’ve	  come	  to	  hear	  [the	  post-­‐Katrina	  comment]	  as	  Céline’s	  one-­‐line	  
manifesto,”	  Wilson	  says.	  “The	  overgrown	  sonics	  of	  her	  music,	  what	  you	  might	  call	  
conspicuous	  production,	  are	  there	  so	  that	  she,	  the	  poor	  girl	  from	  Charlemagne,	  can	  
touch	  them.	  Like	  hip-­‐hop,	  it’s	  aspirational	  music.”67	  Without	  being	  explicit	  about	  it,	  
Wilson	  casts	  Dion	  as	  an	  ethnic	  Other	  and	  emphasizing	  the	  low	  socioeconomic	  status	  
of	  her	  childhood,	  while	  implying	  that	  both	  shore	  up	  claims	  of	  legitimacy	  (and,	  
explicitly	  or	  implicitly,	  of	  authenticity)	  for	  her	  music.	  	  
	   Moore	  describes	  a	  similar	  discursive	  dynamic	  in	  his	  discussion	  of	  blues	  
appropriation,	  which	  I	  mentioned	  earlier.	  He	  writes	  that	  audiences	  perceived	  music	  
by	  British	  artists	  like	  Eric	  Clapton	  as	  “telling	  the	  truth	  of	  (absent)	  others”	  in	  part	  
because	  of	  “an	  unquestioned	  assumption	  that	  African	  Americans	  in	  the	  south	  USA	  
were	  somehow	  more	  ‘natural’	  beings	  than	  white,	  college-­‐educated	  Londoners	  .	  .	  .	  
such	  an	  appropriation	  is	  commonly	  considered	  normative.”68	  Moore	  points	  out	  that	  
Grossberg’s	  “genre-­‐specific”	  categories	  of	  authenticity,	  the	  springboard	  for	  Fornäs’s	  
formulation,	  includes	  “black	  genres	  (founded	  on	  the	  rhythmicised	  and	  sexual	  
body).”69	  While	  Wilson	  is	  careful	  to	  point	  out	  the	  significance	  of	  Dion’s	  whiteness,	  
his	  emphasis	  on	  her	  potential	  Other-­‐ness	  places	  him	  squarely	  in	  an	  established	  
tradition	  of	  authenticity	  discourse	  normally	  associated	  with	  rockism.	  	  
	   I	  have	  shied	  away	  from	  referring	  to	  Wilson	  as	  a	  poptimist	  here.	  As	  far	  as	  I	  
know,	  he	  has	  never	  embraced	  the	  title.	  But	  I	  have	  yet	  to	  encounter	  any	  journalist—
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  215.	  
69	  Ibid.,	  214.	  
	  36	  
or	  any	  fan	  for	  that	  matter—who	  self-­‐identifies	  as	  a	  poptimist,	  except	  for	  those	  who	  
use	  the	  term	  with	  enough	  irony	  to	  call	  the	  label	  into	  question.	  Poptimism	  is	  similar	  
to	  rockism	  (indeed,	  this	  may	  be	  their	  greatest	  similarity)	  in	  that	  it	  is	  a	  term	  
generally	  used	  to	  describe	  others	  and	  never	  fully	  owned	  as	  a	  description	  of	  oneself.	  
Nevertheless,	  I	  believe	  that	  Wilson	  is,	  if	  not	  unequivocally	  a	  poptimist,	  as	  clearly	  
emblematic	  of	  poptimism	  as	  any	  critic	  can	  be.	  	  
	   Another	  good	  candidate	  for	  the	  poptimist	  label	  is	  Frank	  Kogan.	  His	  status	  as	  
the	  author	  of	  the	  famous	  “Paris	  is	  Our	  Vietnam”	  column	  would	  seem	  not	  only	  to	  
guarantee	  his	  membership	  in	  the	  poptimist	  club	  but	  also	  make	  him	  a	  contender	  for	  
some	  sort	  of	  leadership	  position.	  Yet	  Kogan	  has	  stated	  for	  the	  record	  that	  he	  might	  
be	  a	  rockist.	  In	  a	  2008	  column	  decrying	  the	  untenability	  of	  both	  the	  concept	  of	  
rockism	  and	  the	  rejection	  of	  authenticity	  as	  a	  concept,	  he	  writes:	  
My	  problem	  is	  more	  personal:	  I	  can’t	  tell	  if	  I’m	  a	  rockist	  or	  not,	  or	  whether	  a	  
lot	  of	  other	  rock	  critics	  are	  rockists	  or	  not	  (Dave	  Marsh,	  Greil	  Marcus,	  
Richard	  Meltzer,	  Lester	  Bangs,	  Robert	  Christgau,	  Chuck	  Eddy),	  and	  I	  think	  the	  
confusion	  is	  in	  the	  concept,	  not	  in	  me.	  My	  problem	  with	  the	  antirockists	  was	  
their	  tendency	  to	  externalize	  “rockism”	  as	  some	  foreign	  body	  that	  needed	  to	  
be	  defeated—or,	  if	  internal,	  as	  something	  that	  needed	  to	  be	  outgrown—
rather	  than	  as	  cultural	  processes	  that	  we	  participate	  in.	  And	  authenticity	  .	  .	  .	  
[ellipsis	  in	  original]	  I	  may	  hate	  the	  noun	  form,	  but	  I	  find	  the	  adjectives—
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“real,”	  “actual,”	  “authentic”—absolutely	  crucial,	  and	  the	  tensions	  they	  signal	  
are	  as	  alive	  and	  burbling	  and	  googooing	  now	  as	  the	  day	  they	  were	  born.70	  	  
Kogan	  even	  offers	  a	  quote	  from	  his	  past	  from	  a	  1985	  piece	  in	  issue	  #20	  of	  the	  
legendary	  zine	  Cometbus	  called	  “The	  Autobiography	  of	  Bob	  Dylan”	  as	  “an	  
authenticity	  argument	  if	  I’ve	  ever	  seen	  one”:	  “Now	  so	  many	  musicians	  conform	  to	  
the	  idea	  of	  truth	  that	  says	  that	  truth	  is	  raw,	  ugly,	  and	  primitive	  that	  this	  
primitiveness	  is	  a	  cliché,	  it’s	  a	  new	  brand	  of	  deodorant,	  punk-­‐hardcore	  deodorant;	  
ultimately,	  it’s	  nothing.	  Punk	  isn’t	  punk	  anymore,	  it’s	  a	  bunch	  of	  musical/clothing	  
signs	  that	  symbolize	  punk.	  It’s	  closer	  to	  literature	  or	  advertising	  than	  to	  music.”71	  
	   Although	  this	  quote	  is	  from	  a	  period	  when	  Kogan	  was	  much	  more	  focused	  on	  
punk,	  a	  genre	  with	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  emphasis	  on	  authenticity	  and	  an	  aesthetic	  
sensibility	  that	  at	  times	  can	  resemble	  a	  more	  purified	  version	  of	  1960s	  rock	  
chauvinism,	  Kogan	  was	  always	  a	  champion	  of	  certain	  commercial	  artists,	  and	  he	  has	  
continued	  to	  draw	  upon	  authenticity	  discourse	  in	  his	  more	  pop-­‐focused	  recent	  
writings.	  He	  is	  speaking	  in	  the	  present	  tense	  when	  he	  writes	  that	  for	  him	  the	  words	  
“real,”	  “actual,”	  and	  “authentic”	  are	  “absolutely	  crucial.”72	  Although	  he	  looks	  from	  
some	  angles	  like	  a	  poster	  child	  for	  poptimism	  (or	  antirockism,	  as	  Kogan	  would	  
say—he	  scrupulously	  avoids	  the	  p-­‐word),	  Kogan	  has	  a	  serious	  problem	  with	  the	  
rejection	  of	  authenticity	  discourse	  associated	  with	  it.	  As	  he	  put	  it	  in	  a	  2007	  comment	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  Kogan.	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on	  his	  livejournal,	  “My	  antagonism	  towards	  antirockism	  is	  that	  it's	  what	  people	  did	  
instead	  of	  trying	  to	  think	  their	  way	  through	  ideas	  like	  mine.	  I	  don't	  think	  anything	  
about	  the	  drive	  towards	  authenticity	  or	  Significance	  has	  been	  well-­‐discussed,	  much	  
less	  laid	  to	  rest.”73	  
	   Kogan	  is	  not	  the	  only	  holdout,	  and	  not	  all	  critics	  are	  skirting	  the	  issue	  like	  
Wilson	  by	  evoking	  authenticity	  without	  naming	  it.	  While	  working	  on	  this	  chapter,	  I	  
actually	  found	  myself	  wondering	  whether	  authenticity	  were	  really	  a	  burning	  
question	  in	  musical	  discussions	  these	  days,	  and	  my	  answer	  came	  almost	  
immediately	  when	  two	  pieces	  about	  Lady	  Gaga	  came	  to	  my	  attention	  within	  a	  day	  of	  
one	  another.	  First	  a	  friend	  sent	  me	  a	  link	  to	  a	  piece	  by	  Ann	  Powers	  called	  “When	  
Rock	  Stars	  Fake	  It.”	  Then	  a	  new	  issue	  of	  the	  online	  journal	  Flow	  came	  out,	  including	  
a	  piece	  by	  my	  friend	  and	  colleague	  Alexander	  Cho	  titled	  “Lady	  Gaga,	  Balls-­‐Out:	  
Recuperating	  Queer	  Performativity.”	  	  
	   Powers	  is	  not	  particularly	  associated	  with	  poptimism,	  though	  she	  has	  
written,	  “I'm	  happy	  the	  tide	  has	  turned	  toward	  poptimism.	  Not	  only	  does	  it	  widen	  
the	  field	  for	  us	  music-­‐obsessed	  chin-­‐scratchers,	  it	  has	  allowed	  for	  important	  new	  
discussions	  about	  race,	  class	  and	  gender,	  those	  old	  staple	  subjects	  of	  music	  
writing.”74	  She	  also	  wrote,	  in	  the	  same	  piece,	  that	  “poptimism	  has	  also	  taken	  the	  
habitual	  tussling	  among	  music	  writers	  to	  a	  whole	  new	  level”	  and	  that	  “this	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atmosphere	  of	  openness	  is	  mostly	  fantastic,	  but	  characteristically,	  pop	  critics	  have	  
found	  a	  way	  to	  turn	  it	  confrontational.”75	  Powers’s	  engagement	  with	  the	  trend	  
toward	  poptimism—intrigued	  and	  excited	  by	  some	  aspects,	  critical	  of	  others—is	  
much	  more	  common	  among	  critics	  whose	  work	  I	  have	  examined	  than	  positions	  such	  
as	  Wilson’s	  or	  Kogan’s.	  Although	  it	  would	  be	  inaccurate	  to	  classify	  her	  as	  a	  
poptimist,	  she	  nevertheless	  is	  informed	  by	  poptimist	  critiques	  of	  traditional	  music	  
criticism.	  	  
	   Powers	  notes	  Lady	  Gaga’s	  insistence	  that	  her	  musical	  persona	  is	  “‘not	  a	  
character’”	  and	  her	  refusal	  to	  answer	  to	  her	  given	  name,	  Stefani	  Germanotta,	  writing	  
that	  she	  “is	  only	  the	  most	  insistent	  in	  a	  wave	  of	  pop	  artists	  actively	  questioning	  the	  
value	  of	  an	  old	  and	  often-­‐debated	  artistic	  standard:	  authenticity.”76	  Powers	  sees	  
something	  new	  in	  the	  way	  artists	  like	  Gaga	  use	  performance,	  claiming	  that	  in	  the	  
past,	  “the	  balance	  between	  ‘real’	  and	  ‘fake’	  in	  pop	  has	  run	  in	  cycles.	  Rawness	  and	  
spontaneity	  come	  into	  fashion,	  then	  formalism	  and	  glitz,”	  but	  now,	  “the	  split	  
between	  ‘real’	  and	  ‘fake’	  seems	  to	  have	  closed.”77	  	  As	  Powers	  sees	  it,	  “this	  isn't	  
because	  the	  quest	  for	  authenticity	  has	  been	  abandoned.	  It's	  because,	  for	  artists	  like	  
Gaga,	  fake	  has	  become	  what	  feels	  most	  real.”78	  	  
	   Powers	  also	  sees	  the	  prevalence	  of	  Auto-­‐Tune	  as	  characteristic	  of	  “the	  
gradual	  emergence	  of	  the	  computer	  as	  pop’s	  main	  musical	  instrument,”	  not	  only	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within	  genres	  previously	  dominated	  by	  synthesized	  sounds	  but	  across	  the	  board,	  
given	  the	  pervasiveness	  of	  computer	  recording.79	  “Using	  Pro	  Tools	  or	  other	  digital	  
audio	  workstations	  that	  provide	  huge	  libraries	  of	  sampled	  sounds,”	  she	  writes,	  
“songwriters	  can	  create	  whole	  soundscapes	  without	  strumming	  a	  guitar	  or	  hitting	  a	  
drum.”80	  
	   Powers	  provides	  quotes	  from	  David	  Bowie	  and	  Grace	  Jones,	  artists	  who	  
prefigure	  Gaga’s	  performance	  style,	  on	  the	  division	  between	  their	  stage	  personae	  
and	  real	  selves,	  to	  distinguish	  them	  from	  performers	  like	  Lady	  Gaga,	  who	  “are	  the	  
ones	  who've	  gone	  beyond	  fake.	  It's	  not	  that	  they	  no	  longer	  recognize	  the	  distinction	  
between	  real	  life	  and	  performance;	  it's	  that	  they	  don't	  care	  about	  it.	  The	  pose	  
initiates	  the	  self;	  what's	  behind	  it	  just	  can't	  be	  that	  interesting.”81	  	  
	   “Originality	  is,	  in	  its	  own	  way,	  a	  sign	  of	  authenticity,”	  Powers	  writes.	  “Only	  
Bowie	  could	  be	  Ziggy	  Stardust,	  because	  the	  character,	  however	  elaborately	  garbed	  
and	  alien-­‐seeming,	  came	  from	  within.”82	  But	  “Lady	  Gaga	  is	  more	  like	  a	  collection	  of	  
quotes	  than	  a	  singular	  performer	  .	  .	  .	  a	  human	  mash-­‐up,	  a	  sample	  bank,	  recycled	  and	  
reused.”	  Given	  that	  “the	  moves	  these	  young	  artists	  make	  rarely	  seem	  new,”	  Powers	  
wonders,	  “is	  this	  a	  lack	  of	  originality,	  or	  a	  refusal	  of	  it?”83	  She	  concludes,	  with	  what	  
sounds	  to	  me	  like	  a	  note	  of	  sarcasm,	  that	  “in	  the	  permanent	  state	  of	  Gaga,	  ‘new’	  is	  a	  







false	  category,	  just	  like	  ‘real.’	  .	  .	  .	  The	  evidence	  is	  before	  us	  now,	  that	  every	  artist	  is	  a	  
borrower,	  every	  genius	  is	  a	  liar.	  Why	  pretend	  otherwise?”84	  
	   Cho’s	  perspective	  on	  Lady	  Gaga	  has	  some	  notable	  similarities	  to	  Powers’s.	  He	  
emphasizes	  many	  of	  the	  same	  qualities	  Powers	  does:	  Gaga’s	  refusal	  to	  answer	  to	  her	  
birth	  name	  and	  the	  way	  her	  outlandish	  stage	  persona	  (and	  the	  associated	  costumes)	  
extend	  into	  every	  appearance,	  press	  conference,	  and	  interview,	  giving	  an	  
appearance	  of	  a	  seamlessly	  constructed	  false	  identity.	  He	  concurs	  that,	  “on	  the	  
surface”	  at	  least,	  “her	  music	  and	  persona	  are	  entirely	  derivative”	  and	  adds	  that	  “she	  
seems	  concerned	  mainly	  with	  acts	  of	  conspicuous	  consumption,	  and	  she	  adheres	  to	  
a	  fascist	  body	  regime	  beholden	  to	  elitist,	  white,	  hyper-­‐feminine	  beauty	  norms.”85	  
Although	  “it	  may	  be	  simple	  to	  dismiss	  her	  outright	  as	  a	  bit	  of	  normative	  pop	  fluff,”	  
he	  maintains	  that:	  
In	  fact,	  Lady	  Gaga	  makes	  a	  very	  explicit	  attempt	  to	  shrewdly,	  purposefully—
even	  politically—expose	  the	  nature	  of	  our	  fascination	  with	  pop	  icons	  by	  
making	  it	  her	  mission	  to	  foreground	  the	  artifice	  of	  her	  own	  performance	  .	  .	  .	  
[she]	  makes	  it	  her	  chief	  purpose	  to	  expose	  pop’s	  artificiality;	  her	  
performance	  is	  the	  performance	  of	  fakeness.	  In	  other	  words,	  because	  Lady	  
Gaga	  is	  always	  performing.	  .	  .	  .	  Onstage	  and	  off,	  in	  interviews	  and	  in	  her	  lyrics,	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Lady	  Gaga	  collapses	  the	  distinction	  between	  star	  image,	  character,	  and	  
performance,	  thus	  emphasizing	  pop’s	  own	  artifice.86	  
Cho	  further	  asserts	  that	  Gaga’s	  “chief	  mechanism”	  for	  carrying	  out	  her	  performance	  
is	  “her	  body	  and	  its	  particularly	  gendered	  politics”	  and	  that	  by	  extension	  she	  
“interrogates	  the	  performative	  nature	  of	  gender,	  sex,	  and	  sexuality	  and	  their	  
relationship	  to	  celebrity”;	  for	  that	  reason,	  “Lady	  Gaga’s	  highlighted	  artifice	  of	  pop	  
performativity	  itself	  becomes	  a	  queer	  act.”87	  
	   For	  Cho,	  one	  of	  the	  crucial	  aspects	  of	  Lady	  Gaga’s	  “performance	  of	  celebrity,”	  
what	  sets	  her	  apart	  from	  other	  pop	  stars	  who	  have	  done	  otherwise	  similar	  work,	  is	  
that	  their	  performances	  are	  “entirely	  less	  reflexive.”88	  In	  many	  respects,	  it	  is	  the	  
assumption	  of	  a	  complex,	  intentional,	  and	  self-­‐aware	  effort	  on	  the	  part	  of	  Lady	  Gaga	  
and	  her	  accomplices	  that	  separates	  Cho’s	  more	  favorable	  reading	  of	  Lady	  Gaga	  from	  
Powers’s,	  which	  is,	  at	  best,	  ambivalent	  and,	  at	  worst,	  anxious.	  	  
	   At	  the	  very	  least,	  these	  two	  responses	  to	  Lady	  Gaga,	  one	  a	  comparatively	  
intellectual	  piece	  of	  rock	  criticism,	  the	  other	  a	  comparatively	  informal	  piece	  of	  
academic	  writing,	  which	  share	  so	  many	  observations	  in	  common	  but	  come	  to	  such	  
different	  conclusions,	  show	  that	  authenticity	  and	  its	  conceptual	  vagaries	  remain	  
vital	  in	  contemporary	  discourse	  on	  popular	  music.	  They	  also	  illustrate	  Fornäs’s	  
claims	  about	  authenticity	  in	  that	  both	  writers’	  reactions	  to	  Lady	  Gaga	  seems	  in	  large	  
part	  dependent	  on	  whether	  they	  believe	  in	  her	  potential	  for	  reflexivity.	  Although	  





Cho	  does	  not	  evoke	  authenticity	  by	  name,	  his	  description	  of	  Gaga’s	  persona	  is	  
similar	  to	  the	  notion	  of	  the	  “authentic	  inauthentic.”	  Powers	  offers	  more	  questions	  
than	  answers	  but	  wonders	  whether	  authenticity	  (and	  possibly	  originality,	  which	  she	  
links	  with	  it)	  are	  endangered	  by	  the	  trend	  Gaga	  represents.	  When	  Powers	  argues	  
that	  earlier	  performers	  like	  Bowie	  and	  Jones	  had	  a	  more	  developed	  boundary	  
between	  their	  real	  selves	  and	  their	  personae,	  she	  is	  evoking	  reflexivity	  as	  well.	  	  
	   Fornäs	  speaks	  metaphorically	  about	  reflexivity	  as	  “hearing	  your	  own	  voice”;	  
just	  as	  a	  person	  must	  exist	  as	  something	  more	  than	  a	  voice	  in	  order	  to	  hear	  
themselves,	  a	  performer	  must	  have	  a	  self	  separate	  from	  their	  image	  in	  order	  to	  have	  
the	  self-­‐awareness	  to	  craft	  that	  image.	  Insofar	  as	  Powers	  does	  not	  see	  evidence	  of	  a	  
separate	  self	  for	  Gaga,	  she	  cannot	  assume	  a	  reflexive,	  intentional	  performance.	  
Insofar	  as	  Cho	  sees	  evidence	  of	  reflexivity,	  by	  implication	  there	  must	  be	  a	  self	  
behind	  the	  mask.	  
	  
Authenticity	  and	  Reflexivity	  of	  Reception	  
	   Much	  of	  my	  discussion	  so	  far	  has	  been	  focused	  on	  authenticity	  and	  reflexivity	  
as	  they	  are	  perceived	  to	  inhere	  in	  musical	  artists	  or	  their	  creations.	  I	  say	  “perceived”	  
because	  although	  the	  question	  may	  be	  whether	  a	  text	  or	  artist	  is	  authentic,	  as	  
Fornäs	  and	  Moore	  both	  demonstrate,	  this	  question	  can	  only	  be	  answered	  
subjectively	  by	  audience	  members.	  In	  other	  words,	  we	  can	  conceive	  of	  authenticity	  
as	  a	  valid	  concept	  but	  not	  if	  we	  hope	  to	  find	  evidence	  of	  its	  objective	  existence	  out	  in	  
the	  world;	  it	  is	  only	  by	  situating	  authenticity	  as	  a	  function	  of	  reception,	  one	  that	  is	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takes	  shape	  between	  listeners’	  subjective	  position	  and	  their	  perception	  of	  an	  artist’s,	  
that	  the	  concept	  makes	  sense.	  	  
	   Although	  the	  listener	  is	  the	  ultimate	  arbiter	  of	  authenticity,	  it	  is	  still	  possible	  
to	  recognize	  certain	  positions	  and	  strategies	  that	  tend	  to	  create	  the	  perception	  of	  
authenticity	  in	  certain	  audiences,	  such	  as	  Moore’s	  three	  categories.	  But	  what	  about	  
the	  authenticity	  of	  the	  listener?	  Just	  as	  artists	  can	  be	  self-­‐aware	  about	  their	  
performance,	  bringing	  a	  sense	  of	  reflexivity	  into	  their	  work	  that	  complicates	  but	  
ultimately	  (as	  Fornäs	  argues)	  shores	  up	  their	  authenticity,	  listeners	  and	  fans	  are	  
equally	  capable	  of	  self-­‐awareness,	  equally	  conscious	  in	  their	  production	  of	  an	  image	  
for	  themselves,	  in	  part	  through	  their	  music	  choices.	  	  
	   Wilson	  makes	  a	  point	  of	  arguing	  this	  in	  his	  book	  on	  Dion.	  He	  quotes	  
Bourdieu’s	  statement	  that	  “tastes	  are	  first	  and	  foremost	  distastes,	  disgusts	  provoked	  
by	  horror	  or	  visceral	  intolerance	  of	  the	  tastes	  of	  others,”	  putting	  this	  idea	  in	  his	  own	  
words	  by	  saying	  “not	  that	  people	  are	  only	  pretending	  to	  like	  or	  dislike	  the	  culture	  
they	  like	  and	  dislike,	  trying	  to	  con	  people	  into	  thinking	  highly	  of	  them.	  .	  .	  .	  At	  worst	  I	  
am	  conning	  myself,	  but	  to	  what	  I	  feel	  is	  my	  advantage.”89	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  he	  points	  
out	  recent	  studies	  that	  show	  that	  people	  react	  more	  favorably	  to	  music	  if	  they	  
believe	  it	  is	  liked	  by	  others	  and	  asserts	  that	  “the	  bias	  that	  ‘conformity’	  is	  a	  pejorative	  
has	  led	  .	  .	  .	  to	  underestimating	  the	  part	  mimesis—imitation—plays	  in	  taste.	  It’s	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89	  Wilson,	  Let’s	  Talk	  About	  Love,	  90-­‐91.	  
	  45	  
always	  other	  people	  following	  crowds,	  whereas	  my	  own	  taste	  reflects	  my	  
specialness.”90	  	  
	   Indeed,	  as	  I	  will	  discuss	  further,	  it	  is	  Wilson’s	  suspicion	  of	  dislikes,	  of	  
“distastes”	  and	  the	  “visceral	  intolerance”	  that	  he	  believes	  they	  represent,	  that	  
motivates	  his	  development	  of	  the	  “guilty	  displeasure”	  concept	  and	  his	  Céline	  project.	  
While	  I	  do	  believe	  that	  fans	  are	  capable	  of	  reflexivity	  and	  that	  their	  music	  choices	  
are	  influenced	  by	  the	  sort	  of	  person	  they	  think	  likes	  a	  certain	  type	  of	  music	  and	  the	  
sort	  of	  person	  they	  consider	  themselves	  (or	  would	  like	  to	  consider	  themselves),	  
Wilson	  takes	  this	  notion	  to	  an	  extreme,	  fueling	  a	  cynical	  approach	  that	  in	  the	  end,	  
leads	  potentially	  to	  eliminating	  value	  judgments	  entirely.	  	  
	   Tom	  Ewing,	  author	  of	  a	  series	  of	  columns	  called	  “Poptimist”	  (with	  a	  
questionable	  degree	  of	  irony)	  on	  the	  popular	  internet	  music	  site	  Pitchfork,	  brings	  up	  
similar	  points	  without	  the	  same	  degree	  of	  judgment.	  In	  “Poptimist	  #19:	  Fated	  to	  
Pretend”	  he	  writes,	  “The	  most	  upsetting	  thing	  you	  can	  say	  to	  a	  critic	  isn't	  that	  their	  
taste	  sucks,	  or	  even	  that	  they're	  unprofessional-­‐-­‐	  it's	  that	  they're	  being	  dishonest.	  
‘Pretending	  to	  like’	  is	  the	  ultimate	  dismissal	  .	  .	  .	  So	  it’s	  a	  non-­‐starter	  as	  an	  argument,	  
then?	  Not	  exactly:	  People	  do	  pretend	  to	  like	  things,	  all	  the	  time.”91	  He	  goes	  on	  to	  
describe	  a	  blatant	  example—a	  teenaged	  friend	  who	  boned	  up	  on	  Depeche	  Mode’s	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90	  Ibid.,	  79.	  
91	  Tom	  Ewing.	  “Poptimist	  #19:	  Fated	  to	  Pretend,”	  http://pitchfork.com/features/	  
poptimist/7549-­‐poptimist-­‐19/	  (accessed	  June	  13,	  2010).	  
	  46	  
discography	  to	  try	  to	  impress	  a	  girl—but	  compares	  this	  conscious	  fakery	  with	  what	  
he	  contends	  is	  a	  lesser	  degree	  of	  the	  same	  impulse	  at	  work	  in	  all	  taste	  decisions.92	  	  
	   Ewing	  refers	  to	  a	  recent	  marketing	  study	  on	  British	  teens	  in	  which	  they	  were	  
asked	  “a	  question	  about	  what	  factors	  led	  them	  to	  try	  something	  new.	  ‘Everyone	  else	  
likes	  it’	  was	  one	  option	  among	  many.	  ‘No	  one	  else	  likes	  it’	  was	  another.	  Older	  kids	  
picked	  both	  in	  roughly	  equal	  proportions:	  I	  suspect	  they	  were	  showing	  more	  
honesty	  and	  self-­‐knowledge	  than	  most	  adults	  would.”93	  While	  he	  acknowledges	  that	  
it	  would	  be	  easy	  to	  use	  the	  “reductive	  binary”	  of	  “everyone	  likes	  it	  /	  no	  one	  likes	  it”	  
to	  analyze	  people’s	  musical	  tastes	  “like	  the	  models	  biologists	  use	  to	  understand	  the	  
movement	  of	  birds	  in	  flocks.	  .	  .	  .	  This	  would	  be	  a	  world,	  incidentally,	  in	  which	  
‘pretending	  to	  like’	  is	  a	  founding	  principle—in	  which	  all	  taste	  decisions	  are	  socially	  
determined	  along	  crudely	  mechanistic	  lines.”94	  Yet	  “there’s	  a	  difference	  between	  a	  
sparrow	  and	  a	  music	  fan,”	  Ewing	  continues;	  sparrows	  may	  travel	  in	  flocks,	  but	  they	  
are	  not	  fully	  aware	  of	  one	  another,	  whereas	  music	  fans	  have	  access	  to	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  
information	  about	  the	  reception	  of	  musical	  texts	  (information	  like	  whether	  
everybody	  or	  nobody	  likes	  them,	  and	  which	  everybodies	  and/or	  nobodies	  they	  
are).95	  This	  self-­‐awareness	  implies	  a	  capacity	  for	  reflexivity	  that,	  as	  with	  artists,	  
both	  calls	  authenticity	  into	  question	  and	  potentially	  shores	  it	  up.	  	  






	   Ewing	  does	  not	  believe	  that	  reality	  is	  as	  “crudely	  mechanistic”	  as	  the	  model	  
he	  describes.	  A	  contemporary	  fan	  usually	  approaches	  a	  band	  already	  knowing	  
things	  like	  “where	  in	  the	  hype	  cycle	  they	  were	  and	  the	  kind	  of	  people	  who	  were	  
enjoying	  them,”	  and	  “surely	  in	  some	  cases”	  this	  affects	  their	  perception	  of	  them,	  
“though	  let’s	  give	  each	  other	  the	  benefit	  of	  the	  doubt	  and	  accept	  that	  such	  
background	  information	  can	  shift	  a	  personal	  judgment	  up	  or	  down	  a	  notch	  or	  two,	  
rather	  than	  determine	  it	  in	  the	  first	  place.”96	  
	   Critics,	  according	  to	  Ewing,	  are	  supposed	  to	  function	  as	  “a	  figure	  who	  can	  
step	  beyond	  the	  compromised	  mesh	  to	  .	  .	  .	  pronounce	  a	  more	  measured	  judgment,”	  
such	  that	  “to	  re-­‐enter	  the	  network,	  to	  submit	  to	  its	  social	  pull	  on	  your	  opinions	  is	  to	  
betray	  your	  critical	  integrity.”97	  But	  this	  notion	  of	  the	  critic	  is	  under	  stress	  now,	  
Ewing	  claims:	  “The	  critic’s	  role	  was	  as	  a	  kind	  of	  ideal	  consumer,	  making	  an	  informed	  
and	  expert	  judgment.”	  Yet	  with	  the	  advent	  of	  electronic	  music	  distribution	  and	  the	  
increase	  in	  social	  networking	  online,	  “the	  emphasis	  is	  increasingly	  on	  displaying	  and	  
performing	  your	  taste—sharing	  tracks	  .	  .	  .	  creating	  playlists	  .	  .	  .	  the	  social	  elements	  
are	  becoming	  hard-­‐coded	  into	  the	  format	  of	  music,”	  which	  may	  “leave	  the	  old-­‐style	  
critic	  .	  .	  .	  high	  and	  dry.”98	  But	  critics	  can	  still	  be	  an	  indicator	  of	  a	  certain	  kind	  of	  
“everybody,”	  “one	  triangulation	  point	  among	  many	  so	  fans	  can	  better	  make	  their	  
own,	  highly	  social,	  judgements	  about	  music”	  (I	  would	  argue	  that	  they	  have	  never	  





been	  anything	  more.)99	  Disappointingly,	  Ewing	  closes	  his	  piece	  by	  circling	  back	  to	  
his	  original	  statements	  on	  “pretending	  to	  like,”	  saying	  that	  it	  “will	  remain	  the	  
ultimate	  critical	  sin,”	  without	  owning	  up	  to	  the	  clear	  implications	  of	  the	  rest	  of	  his	  
article,	  which	  raises	  the	  implicit	  question	  of	  how	  honest	  anyone	  can	  be	  about	  liking	  
things	  when	  we	  are	  all	  so	  heavily	  embedded	  in	  a	  social	  system	  that	  loads	  our	  value	  
judgments	  of	  texts	  with	  baggage	  about	  identity	  and	  status.100	  It	  is	  a	  question	  that	  
applies	  equally	  to	  fans	  and	  critics	  but	  becomes	  all	  the	  more	  fraught	  when	  asked	  of	  
the	  latter,	  given	  that	  they	  are	  held	  to	  a	  higher	  standard	  of	  qualification	  while	  
potentially	  having	  more	  incentives	  to	  pretend	  (particularly	  the	  conflicting	  pressures	  
of	  maintaining	  a	  readership	  and	  staying	  on	  good	  terms	  with	  the	  music	  industry).	  	  
	   Taking	  another	  step	  back	  from	  this	  piece,	  what	  does	  it	  mean	  for	  a	  music	  critic	  
like	  Ewing	  to	  explore	  questions	  such	  as	  these?	  From	  this	  angle,	  another	  layer	  of	  self-­‐
awareness	  comes	  into	  play,	  another	  chance	  for	  reflexivity	  to	  reflect	  either	  a	  suspect	  
level	  of	  premeditation	  (for	  example,	  by	  asking	  questions	  about	  the	  relevance	  of	  
music	  writers,	  is	  Ewing	  making	  a	  bid	  to	  remain	  relevant	  himself?)	  or	  a	  degree	  of	  
reflexivity	  that	  supports	  a	  reading	  of	  Ewing	  as	  authentic	  (he	  shows	  openness	  by	  
choosing	  a	  frank	  discussion	  about	  these	  ideas	  over	  keeping	  his	  questions	  to	  himself	  
and	  putting	  up	  a	  self-­‐assured	  front;	  this	  could	  lend	  added	  credence	  to	  all	  of	  his	  
writing).	  	  
	   Fornäs	  makes	  a	  similar	  point	  to	  Ewing’s	  in	  “Listen	  to	  Your	  Voice!”:	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99	  Ibid.	  Ewing’s	  inconsistent	  spelling	  of	  “judgment”	  retained	  from	  original.	  	  
100	  Ibid.	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In	  the	  choice	  of	  genres	  to	  play	  in	  or	  listen	  to,	  people	  mirror	  and	  
confirm	  their	  identities,	  through	  various	  perceived	  homologies	  
between	  these	  identities	  and	  some	  musical,	  lyrical,	  and	  visual	  aspects	  
of	  the	  music.	  This	  choice	  seems	  to	  have	  become	  more	  and	  more	  
conscious	  and	  debated	  in	  late	  modernity,	  through	  a	  cultural	  release	  
from	  naturalizing	  traditions	  and	  a	  growth	  in	  the	  stock	  of	  available	  
stylistic	  tools.101	  
Another	  way	  of	  describing	  this	  increase	  in	  consciousness	  is	  to	  say	  that	  musical	  
identity-­‐building	  has	  become	  more	  reflexive.	  It	  makes	  sense	  that	  some	  of	  the	  most	  
soul-­‐searching	  examples	  of	  such	  reflection	  would	  originate	  from	  music	  journalists.	  	  
	   Wilson’s	  Céline	  project	  is	  the	  most	  exhaustive	  such	  exercise	  I	  have	  witnessed.	  
Wilson	  not	  only	  attempts	  to	  lay	  bare	  the	  reasons	  for	  his	  musical	  tastes,	  including	  
unflattering,	  cultural	  capital-­‐mongering	  motivations,	  he	  actually	  attempts	  to	  change	  
them.	  He	  recalls	  his	  early	  dislike	  for	  genres	  like	  disco	  and	  country,	  which	  seemed	  so	  
immediate	  and	  visceral	  (and	  hence	  uncalculated)	  at	  the	  time,	  so	  “clean”	  and	  “pure,”	  
but	  in	  retrospect	  seem	  motivated	  by	  the	  type	  of	  status-­‐seeking	  behavior	  that	  
Bourdieu	  describes.102	  	  
	   In	  keeping	  with	  this	  skepticism,	  Wilson	  views	  the	  process	  of	  musical	  identity-­‐
building	  with	  a	  rather	  jaundiced	  eye.	  “Musical	  subcultures	  exist,”	  he	  writes,	  “because	  
our	  guts	  tell	  us	  certain	  kinds	  of	  music	  are	  for	  certain	  kinds	  of	  people.	  The	  codes	  are	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
101	  Fornäs,	  “Listen	  to	  Your	  Voice!,”	  170.	  
102	  Wilson,	  Let’s	  Talk	  About	  Love,	  15-­‐16.	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not	  always	  transparent.	  .	  .	  .	  But	  it’s	  hard	  not	  to	  notice	  how	  often	  those	  processes	  
reflect	  and	  contribute	  to	  self-­‐definition,	  how	  often	  persona	  and	  musical	  taste	  
happen	  to	  jibe.”103	  Although	  he	  describes	  phenomena	  that	  Fornäs,	  Moore,	  and	  
others	  also	  report	  on	  without	  such	  negative	  connotations,	  he	  does	  so	  with	  a	  tone	  of	  
aversion—the	  sarcasm	  with	  which	  he	  writes	  about	  tastes	  and	  identities	  
“happen[ing]	  to	  jibe”	  is	  unmistakable.	  	  
	   Given	  his	  suspicion	  of	  musical	  “self-­‐definition,”	  it	  is	  no	  wonder	  that	  Wilson	  
seeks	  to	  root	  out	  such	  impulses	  within	  himself	  through	  an	  intense	  exercise	  in	  
reflexivity.	  Yet,	  in	  his	  interviews	  with	  Dion’s	  fans,	  he	  seems	  moved	  by	  their	  
innocence.	  104	  He	  emphasizes	  that	  one	  subject,	  a	  drag	  queen	  who	  performs	  as	  Céline,	  
“is	  a	  female	  impersonator,	  not	  a	  queer-­‐studies	  professor.”105	  And	  he	  quotes	  his	  last	  
interview	  subject,	  Stephanie	  Verge,	  “an	  arts-­‐listing	  editor	  at	  a	  prominent	  Toronto	  
magazine”	  who	  has	  both	  more	  hipster	  cred	  and	  more	  of	  an	  inclination	  to	  analyze	  her	  
own	  tastes	  than	  the	  other	  interviewees	  in	  the	  book,	  at	  length	  on	  the	  subject	  of	  
sincerity	  and	  cynicism:	  
I	  think	  we	  live	  in	  a	  society	  where	  people’s	  visceral	  responses	  or	  
emotional	  responses	  aren’t	  really	  respected.	  And	  I	  think	  they	  should	  
be.	  .	  .	  .	  Even	  if	  it’s	  not	  cool,	  even	  if	  it	  borders	  on	  the	  ridiculous	  in	  a	  lot	  
of	  ways,	  and	  you	  can’t	  imagine	  why	  people	  would	  ever	  cry	  to	  a	  Céline	  
Dion	  song,	  I	  think	  we	  should	  probably	  have	  more	  of	  a	  respect	  for	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  Ibid.,	  17.	  
104	  Ibid.,	  108–117.	  
105	  Ibid.,	  113.	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people’s	  lack	  of	  guile	  .	  .	  .	  I	  think	  it’s	  good	  to	  have	  things	  that	  you	  can’t	  
explain.106	  
Without	  explicitly	  agreeing	  with	  Verge,	  Wilson	  grants	  her	  interview	  special	  status,	  
quoting	  her	  at	  much	  greater	  length	  than	  any	  of	  his	  other	  interviewees	  and	  placing	  
her	  comments	  at	  the	  closing	  of	  his	  section	  on	  fan	  interviews.	  However,	  her	  
comments	  run	  directly	  counter	  to	  the	  message	  of	  most	  of	  Wilson’s	  book	  and,	  indeed,	  
of	  the	  Céline	  project	  itself.	  
	   Wilson’s	  contradictory	  attitude	  toward	  reflexivity	  is	  characteristic	  of	  
poptimist	  discourse	  on	  the	  topic.	  The	  Céline	  project	  is	  an	  exercise	  in	  intense	  
reflexivity,	  yet	  Wilson	  valorizes	  the	  guilelessness	  of	  Dion’s	  fans.	  His	  attitude	  toward	  
traditional	  notions	  of	  authenticity	  is	  equally	  mixed;	  he	  derides	  traditional	  notions	  of	  
the	  concept,	  yet	  presses	  them	  into	  service	  in	  his	  effort	  to	  portray	  Dion	  favorably.	  
Frank	  Kogan	  demonstrates	  a	  commendable	  awareness	  of	  the	  complexity	  of	  these	  
issues,	  but	  his	  subtle	  perspective	  is	  rather	  exceptional.	  For	  the	  most	  part,	  poptimist	  
discourse	  on	  the	  subject	  is	  either	  avoidant	  or	  oversimplified.	  	  
	   The	  interrelated	  terms	  of	  authenticity	  and	  reflexivity	  not	  only	  remain	  
relevant	  in	  contemporary	  popular	  music	  discourse	  but	  underlie	  the	  recent	  debates	  
over	  poptimism	  and	  rockism.	  As	  I	  have	  discussed,	  the	  significance	  of	  these	  ideas	  lies	  
in	  the	  way	  they	  delineate	  the	  complex	  relationships	  among	  human	  beings,	  their	  
constructed	  identities,	  and	  media	  texts.	  It	  is	  fitting,	  then,	  that	  my	  next	  chapter	  will	  
deal	  with	  identity	  and	  difference.
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  Ibid.,	  Verge	  quoted,	  117.	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Chapter	  Three:	  Identity	  and	  Difference	  
	   In	  April	  2006,	  the	  Experience	  Music	  Project	  (EMP)	  held	  the	  fifth	  annual	  Pop	  
Conference	  in	  Seattle,	  Washington.	  For	  most	  of	  us	  who	  were	  not	  in	  attendance	  (and	  
probably	  for	  many	  who	  were),	  the	  first	  sign	  that	  something	  controversial	  had	  
occurred	  was	  a	  blog	  entry	  by	  music	  writer	  Jessica	  Hopper	  posted	  on	  April	  28:	  
EMP	  Report:	  I	  did	  not	  have	  to	  ask	  Stephin	  Merrit	  of	  Magnetic	  Flds	  whether	  he	  
was	  racist,	  because	  his	  nice,	  long	  elucidating	  comment	  about	  his	  love,	  NAY,	  
obsession	  with	  racist	  cartoon,	  Song	  of	  The	  South,	  served	  as	  a	  pre-­‐emptive	  
answer.	  It's	  one	  thing	  to	  have	  ’Zippitty	  Doo	  Da’	  be	  your	  favorite	  song.	  It	  is	  
another	  to	  lay	  in	  for	  an	  Uncle	  Remus	  appreciation	  hour	  amidst	  a	  panel-­‐-­‐(‘I	  
love	  all	  of	  it,’	  he	  says).	  .	  .	  .	  sadly,	  we	  missed	  Merritt's	  entire	  theory	  about	  
melisma	  (the	  vocal	  technique)	  and	  how	  it	  related	  to	  his	  idea's	  of	  CELINE	  
DIONS	  BEING	  BLACK.	  Apparently,	  after	  a	  few	  minutes,	  someone	  kindly	  
informed	  him	  that	  Celine	  Dion	  is	  actually	  white,	  and	  Canadian	  at	  that.	  Celine	  
Dion	  is	  unblack	  as	  hell.107	  
Hopper	  posted	  an	  addendum	  the	  following	  day	  noting	  that	  “Mr.	  Merritt	  has	  offered	  
to	  provide	  a	  complete	  transcript	  of	  the	  keynote	  panel	  for	  my	  review,	  as	  he	  feels	  my	  
impression	  is	  not	  accurate”	  and	  that	  Hopper	  agreed	  to	  repost	  after	  reading	  it.108	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
107	  Jessica	  Hopper,	  “Celine	  Dion	  is	  Unblack	  as	  Hell,”	  tinyluckygenius	  aka	  the	  
Unicorn's	  tear,	  April	  28,	  2006,	  
http://tiny.abstractdynamics.org/archives/007723.html	  (accessed	  3/15/10).	  In	  
this,	  as	  in	  all	  other	  quotes	  by	  Hopper,	  all	  misspellings,	  grammatical	  errors,	  and	  
emphases	  are	  present	  in	  the	  original.	  	  
108	  Ibid.	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   If	  someone	  accesses	  this	  blog	  post	  now,	  they	  are	  directed	  to	  a	  couple	  of	  other	  
posts	  that	  are	  intended	  to	  clarify	  the	  issue.	  One	  is	  mildly	  apologetic:	  “I	  have	  gotten	  
the	  transcript	  of	  the	  Stephin	  Merritt	  panel	  I	  walked	  out	  on,	  and	  apparently	  missed	  
Merritt	  qualifying	  his	  thoughts	  on	  Song	  of	  The	  South	  .	  .	  .	  I	  retract	  my	  earlier	  
statements”:	  the	  other	  (archly	  titled	  “I	  Called	  Stephin	  Merritt	  a	  Racist	  and	  All	  I	  Got	  
Was	  This	  Lousy	  Blog	  Post”)	  is	  more	  defensive,	  even	  combative:	  “Would	  you	  say	  that	  
four	  posts	  in	  two	  years	  from	  me,	  and	  two	  from	  Sasha	  [Frere-­‐Jones]	  really	  qualify	  as	  
a	  vicious	  campaign	  against	  ‘tender’	  Stephin	  Merritt?	  I	  mean,	  I	  know	  I'm	  a	  zealot	  and	  
all,	  buuut	  really	  now	  .	  .	  .”109	  
	   Between	  Hopper’s	  initial	  posting	  and	  her	  defensive	  reply	  to	  the	  controversy	  
whose	  beginning	  it	  marked,	  a	  flurry	  of	  blog	  entries	  and	  online	  articles	  had	  sprung	  up	  
on	  Merritt’s	  EMP	  comments.	  But	  this	  was	  not	  the	  first	  time	  the	  idea	  of	  Merritt’s	  
musical	  taste	  reflecting	  racist	  attitudes	  had	  been	  floated.	  The	  aforementioned	  Frere-­‐
Jones,	  a	  music	  critic	  and	  columnist	  for	  The	  New	  Yorker,	  also	  spoke	  out	  against	  
Merritt	  on	  his	  blog	  in	  May	  2004.	  In	  a	  post	  called	  “Gerrymandering,	  on	  Ice,”	  Frere-­‐
Jones	  reacted	  to	  a	  guest	  column	  in	  The	  New	  York	  Times	  for	  which	  Merritt	  was	  asked	  
to	  provide	  a	  list	  of	  recommended	  songs	  with	  commentary,	  and	  all	  seven	  were	  
white.110	  “Let's	  watch	  Stephen	  Merritt	  swing	  a	  scythe	  through	  the	  fields	  of	  popular	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
109	  Jessica	  Hopper,	  “A	  Note,”	  and	  “I	  Called	  Stephin	  Merritt	  a	  Racist	  and	  All	  I	  Got	  Was	  
This	  Lousy	  Blog	  Post,”	  tinyluckygenius	  aka	  the	  Unicorn's	  tear,	  May	  05,	  2006	  and	  
May	  9,	  2006,	  http://tiny.abstractdynamics.org/archives/007743.html	  and	  http://	  
tiny.abstractdynamics.org/archives/007762.html	  (both	  accessed	  March	  15,	  2010).	  
110	  Sasha	  Frere-­‐Jones,	  “Gerrymandering,	  on	  Ice,”	  S/FJ,	  May	  16,	  2004,	  http://sfj	  
.abstractdynamics.org/archives/002900.html	  (accessed	  March	  15,	  2010).	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music	  with	  a	  blindfold	  on,”	  Frere-­‐Jones	  writes.	  “Huh!	  Seven	  ‘great’	  new	  pop	  records	  
and	  not	  a	  person	  of	  color	  involved	  in	  a	  single	  one.	  That's	  one	  magical,	  coincidence-­‐
prone	  scythe	  you	  got	  there,	  Stephen.”	  An	  imaginary	  respondent	  answers:	  “It's	  just	  
his	  taste,	  man.	  It	  doesn't	  mean	  anything.	  They	  had	  Usher	  in	  there	  a	  few	  weeks	  ago.	  
Lighten	  up.”111	  But	  Frere-­‐Jones	  is	  not	  buying	  this	  argument	  (hardly	  surprising	  since	  
it	  comes	  from	  his	  own	  internal	  straw	  man).	  He	  responds	  by	  referring	  to	  past	  
comments	  from	  Merritt	  that	  he	  found	  objectionable:	  
You	  could	  go	  back	  to	  the	  New	  York	  interview	  and	  note	  how	  eager	  Merritt	  is	  
to	  dismiss	  Beyoncé,	  OutKast,	  Britney	  [Spears]	  and	  Justin	  [Timberlake],	  not	  
just	  as	  singers	  and	  songwriters	  but	  as	  bearers	  of	  meaning.	  That's	  a	  bias.	  Two	  
women,	  three	  people	  of	  color	  and	  one	  white	  artist	  openly	  in	  love	  with	  black	  
American	  music.	  That's	  who	  he's	  biased	  against.	  You	  could	  say	  there's	  no	  
pattern	  here	  and	  that	  taste	  indicates	  nothing	  more	  than	  individual	  
psychology.	  You	  would	  then,	  hopefully,	  let	  me	  get	  a	  taste	  of	  whatever	  has	  
made	  you	  so	  HIGH.112	  	  
Hopper’s	  post	  was	  merely	  the	  most	  recent	  and	  most	  attention-­‐grabbing	  dig	  against	  
Merritt	  at	  the	  time	  that	  it	  ignited	  a	  passionate	  debate.	  Even	  so,	  this	  post,	  like	  so	  
many	  of	  Frere-­‐Jones’s	  and	  others,	  may	  only	  have	  garnered	  attention	  from	  a	  few	  
fellow	  music	  enthusiasts	  if	  musician	  and	  writer	  John	  Cook	  had	  not	  written	  a	  high-­‐
profile	  piece	  for	  the	  online	  magazine	  Slate	  called	  “Blacklisted:	  If	  you	  don’t	  like	  rap,	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are	  you	  a	  racist?’	  which	  detailed	  Hopper’s	  and	  Frere-­‐Jones’s	  criticism	  of	  Merritt	  and	  
the	  various	  interviews	  and	  reviews	  on	  which	  they	  based	  it.	  “I	  have	  never	  met	  
Merritt,	  and	  I	  have	  no	  idea	  whether	  or	  not	  he	  hates	  black	  people,”	  Cook	  writes.	  “But	  
neither	  do	  Sasha	  Frere-­‐Jones	  and	  Jessica	  Hopper.”	  As	  he	  sees	  things,	  	  
the	  whole	  of	  their	  sustained	  attack	  against	  Merritt	  is	  founded	  on	  the	  
dangerous	  and	  stupid	  notion	  that	  one's	  taste	  in	  music	  can	  be	  interrogated	  for	  
signs	  of	  racist	  intent	  the	  same	  way	  a	  university's	  admissions	  process	  can:	  If	  
the	  number	  of	  black	  artists	  in	  your	  iPod	  falls	  too	  far	  below	  12.5	  percent	  of	  
the	  total,	  then	  you	  are	  violating	  someone's	  civil	  rights.	  .	  .	  .	  The	  closest	  thing	  to	  
a	  coherent	  argument	  that	  can	  be	  gleaned	  from	  what	  Frere-­‐Jones	  and	  Hopper	  
are	  saying	  is	  that	  a	  genuine	  respect	  for	  our	  common	  dignity	  and	  humanity	  
requires	  that	  we	  enjoy	  listening	  to	  hip-­‐hop,	  and	  that	  we	  bend	  our	  intuitive	  
aesthetic	  judgments	  about	  music	  to	  a	  political	  will—like	  eating	  our	  
vegetables	  and	  avoiding	  dessert.113	  
Cook	  agrees	  that	  Merritt’s	  opinions	  seem	  to	  have	  a	  bias	  but	  sees	  this	  bias	  as	  one	  
based	  on	  commercialism	  rather	  than	  race.	  “A	  reasonable	  person,”	  he	  writes,	  “would	  
understand	  .	  .	  .	  from	  these	  comments	  .	  .	  .	  that	  Merritt	  believes	  contemporary	  popular	  
music,	  whether	  it's	  produced	  by	  white	  people	  (Timberlake	  and	  Spears),	  or	  black	  
people	  (Beyoncé),	  to	  be	  more	  concerned	  with	  selling	  an	  image	  than	  recording	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
113	  John	  Cook,	  “Blacklisted:	  Is	  Stephin	  Merrit	  a	  racist	  because	  he	  doesn’t	  like	  hip-­‐
hop?”	  Slate,	  May	  9,	  2006,	  http://www.slate.com/id/2141421.	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performing	  songs.”114	  If	  Cook’s	  interpretation	  is	  accurate,	  one	  could	  justifiably	  call	  
Merritt	  a	  rockist.	  But	  by	  this	  standard,	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  the	  difference	  between	  
being	  a	  rockist	  and	  a	  racist	  could	  be	  seen	  as	  nonexistent,	  or	  at	  least	  moot.	  
	   It	  is	  hard	  to	  justify	  this	  argument,	  which	  seems	  to	  be	  what	  Frere-­‐Jones’s	  and	  
Hopper’s	  critique	  boils	  down	  to	  (at	  least,	  as	  far	  as	  anyone	  can	  tell—there	  is	  a	  
frustrating	  lack	  of	  specificity	  to	  their	  commentary).	  Cook’s	  response	  is	  refreshingly	  
explicit	  compared	  to	  what	  he	  calls	  the	  “innuendo	  and	  implication”	  used	  by	  Merritt’s	  
detractors,	  and	  his	  argument	  against	  their	  assumptions	  is	  sound.	  But	  it	  also	  
forecloses	  some	  important	  questions	  raised	  by	  this	  controversy.	  If	  the	  answer	  to	  “if	  
you	  don’t	  like	  rap,	  are	  you	  a	  racist?”	  is	  “no,”	  or	  at	  least	  is	  not	  a	  clear	  “yes,”	  other	  
questions	  still	  remain.	  In	  other	  words,	  once	  we	  set	  aside	  what	  ethnocentric	  music	  
taste	  does	  not	  say	  about	  a	  person,	  the	  question	  remains:	  what	  does	  it	  say—not	  only	  
about	  the	  person	  whose	  taste	  is	  being	  interrogated	  but	  the	  social	  and	  historical	  
context	  that	  shapes	  their	  musical	  inclinations?	  
	   To	  answer	  such	  a	  question	  fully—even	  to	  attempt	  to	  do	  so—would	  take	  up	  
volumes.	  But	  I	  believe	  that	  exploring	  the	  discourse	  surrounding	  questions	  of	  
identity—not	  only	  racial	  identity	  but	  other	  dimensions	  such	  as	  class,	  gender,	  and	  
sexuality—in	  contemporary	  popular	  musical	  discourse	  can	  help	  to	  clarify	  how	  these	  
important	  ethical	  issues	  are	  manifesting	  themselves	  in	  popular	  culture	  today.	  It	  may	  
also	  help	  to	  determine	  whether	  strategies	  intended	  to	  minimize	  racism	  (or	  other	  
hegemonic	  cultural	  tendencies	  such	  as	  sexism	  and	  elitism)	  are	  effective	  or	  tenable.	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   In	  this	  chapter	  I	  will	  discuss	  how	  the	  controversy	  surrounding	  Merritt’s	  
comments	  is	  characteristic	  of	  poptimist	  attitudes	  toward	  identity	  politics.	  I	  will	  
explore	  the	  significance	  of	  a	  couple	  of	  trends	  in	  contemporary	  culture:	  an	  increase	  in	  
omnivorous	  reception,	  a	  state	  of	  affairs	  in	  which	  groups	  with	  high	  cultural	  capital	  
have	  become	  more	  likely	  to	  consume	  both	  highbrow	  and	  lowbrow	  media	  while	  
spurning	  the	  middlebrow,	  and	  an	  ambivalent	  attitude	  toward	  hybrid	  forms	  of	  
musical	  production	  that	  combine	  elements	  of	  genres	  associated	  with	  disparate	  
social	  groups.	  Poptimist	  attitudes	  toward	  both	  phenomena	  are	  significant	  to	  my	  
analysis.	  From	  there	  I	  will	  consider	  how	  highbrow	  reception	  differs	  from	  other	  
forms	  not	  only	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  media	  texts	  chosen,	  but	  also	  in	  the	  approach	  taken	  
toward	  chosen	  texts.	  I	  will	  demonstrate	  how	  poptimist	  critics	  tend	  to	  use	  highbrow	  
strategies	  such	  as	  intellectualization	  even	  when	  engaging	  with	  lowbrow	  texts.	  	  
	   I	  will	  also	  delve	  into	  the	  notion	  of	  identity	  itself.	  Poptimist	  writing	  that	  deals	  
with	  identity	  politics	  tends	  to	  oversimplify	  this	  complex	  concept,	  ignoring	  important	  
issues	  such	  as	  intersectionality	  (the	  interaction	  of	  multiple	  vectors	  of	  oppression).	  
From	  there,	  I	  will	  move	  on	  to	  other	  types	  of	  identity	  that	  come	  into	  play	  in	  poptimist	  
discourse.	  	  
	   Before	  I	  continue,	  I	  am	  going	  to	  digress	  for	  a	  moment	  to	  note	  some	  
differences	  between	  academic	  and	  journalistic	  writing	  that	  pertain	  to	  my	  discussion.	  
The	  goals	  of	  the	  music	  critics	  I	  am	  examining,	  whether	  they	  embrace	  the	  “poptimist”	  
label	  or	  not,	  are	  not	  always	  clearly	  stated.	  Academic	  writing	  has	  a	  reputation	  for	  
being	  dense,	  filled	  with	  jargon,	  and	  otherwise	  inaccessible	  to	  the	  average	  reader,	  a	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perception	  that	  has	  some	  degree	  of	  basis	  in	  reality.	  But	  one	  important	  advantage	  of	  
academic	  writing	  conventions	  is	  that	  they	  encourage	  authors	  to	  state	  their	  
investment	  in	  the	  topic,	  their	  goals,	  questions,	  and	  hypotheses	  and	  to	  apply	  rigorous	  
standards	  to	  any	  conclusions	  they	  might	  draw.	  These	  strictures	  do	  not	  apply	  to	  
music	  writers	  who	  work	  in	  the	  spheres	  of	  magazines,	  newspapers,	  web	  sites,	  and	  
blogs.	  	  
	   This	  has	  advantages	  and	  disadvantages	  for	  the	  effective	  exploration	  of	  
important	  ideas.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  the	  leeway	  journalists	  have	  to	  muse	  freely,	  refer	  
to	  assumptions	  as	  fact	  without	  citing	  evidence,	  use	  anecdotal	  information	  as	  a	  
starting	  point,	  quote	  academic	  sources	  out	  of	  context	  to	  support	  their	  views,	  and	  
otherwise	  say	  what	  is	  on	  their	  minds	  about	  all	  things	  music-­‐related	  allows	  them	  to	  
write	  things	  that	  an	  academic	  could	  not	  and	  to	  discuss	  subjects	  that	  an	  academic	  
would	  have	  to	  deal	  with	  in	  a	  much	  more	  careful,	  time-­‐consuming	  way.	  By	  the	  time	  
this	  thesis	  is	  finished,	  aspects	  of	  my	  discussion	  will	  be	  outdated	  simply	  by	  virtue	  of	  
the	  speed	  of	  cultural	  discourse.	  The	  factors	  that	  limit	  the	  speed	  with	  which	  I	  can	  
comment	  have	  a	  real	  impact	  on	  the	  relevancy	  of	  my	  work.	  	  
	   On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  checks	  and	  balances	  that	  slow	  down	  academic	  writing	  
result	  in	  greater	  rigor	  and	  clarity.	  That	  I	  am	  required	  to	  show	  some	  kind	  of	  proof	  for	  
my	  assertions,	  or	  at	  least	  to	  cite	  another	  writer	  who	  has	  made	  that	  assertion,	  makes	  
it	  more	  difficult	  for	  me	  to	  distort	  reality	  in	  support	  of	  my	  point	  of	  view.	  Since	  I	  must	  
demonstrate	  a	  thorough	  knowledge	  of	  any	  academic	  theory	  I	  quote,	  I	  am	  much	  less	  
likely	  to	  misrepresent	  it.	  Moreover,	  I	  must	  be	  explicit	  about	  what	  I	  am	  trying	  to	  do	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and	  why,	  which	  is	  also	  beneficial.	  The	  difficulty	  of	  stating	  with	  certainty	  who	  is	  or	  is	  
not	  a	  poptimist	  is	  a	  prime	  example	  of	  the	  vagueness	  that	  journalistic	  freedom	  can	  
propagate,	  but	  there	  are	  many	  other	  examples.	  Even	  Hopper	  and	  Frere-­‐Jones,	  who	  
are	  relatively	  direct	  in	  their	  criticism	  of	  Merritt,	  take	  advantage	  of	  their	  freedom	  to	  
be	  oblique.	  Frere-­‐Jones	  will	  only	  describe	  Merritt	  as	  “biased”	  while	  Hopper	  says	  she	  
“did	  not	  have	  to	  ask	  .	  .	  .	  whether	  he	  was	  racist”	  because	  his	  “Zip-­‐a-­‐Dee-­‐Doo-­‐Dah”	  
comment	  “served	  as	  a	  pre-­‐emptive	  answer.”115	  	  
	  
“Something	  Unappetizing”:	  Cultural	  “Borrowing”	  
	   After	  Cook’s	  piece	  in	  Slate,	  Hopper	  was	  deluged	  with	  critical	  email	  messages.	  
She	  responded	  in	  her	  “I	  Called	  Stephin	  Merritt	  a	  Racist”	  post	  by	  saying	  that	  “to	  
reduce	  the	  argument	  specific	  to	  the	  varying	  things	  either	  [I	  or	  Frere-­‐Jones]	  have	  
written	  about	  around	  SM	  (see	  also	  in	  those	  posts:	  rockism,	  playlist	  meme,	  SM's	  
unconcern	  for	  the	  last	  50	  years	  of	  black	  music)	  down	  to	  that	  I	  think	  dude's	  ish	  on	  
race	  and	  music	  is	  questionable	  because	  he	  doesn't	  like	  Beyonce	  is	  to	  miss	  the	  point	  
entirely.”116	  Cook’s	  description	  of	  both	  critics’	  arguments	  against	  Merritt	  was,	  
indeed,	  a	  bit	  caricatured.	  Yet	  it	  is	  true	  that	  Hopper’s	  and	  Frere-­‐Jones’s	  stated	  
critique	  did	  boil	  down	  to	  taking	  issue	  with	  Merritt’s	  disinterest	  in	  black	  music	  and	  
occasional	  dismissal	  of	  high-­‐profile	  black	  musicians.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
115	  Hopper,	  “Celine	  Dion	  is	  Unblack	  as	  Hell,”	  and	  Frere-­‐Jones,	  “Gerrymandering,	  on	  
Ice.”	  
116	  Hopper,	  “I	  Called	  Stephin	  Merritt	  a	  Racist.”	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   Carl	  Wilson,	  characteristically,	  viewed	  the	  situation	  in	  a	  more	  nuanced	  
fashion,	  becoming	  one	  of	  the	  few	  high-­‐profile	  music	  bloggers	  to	  discuss	  the	  
controversy	  without	  taking	  a	  side.	  On	  his	  blog,	  Zoilus,	  Wilson	  brought	  up	  an	  angle	  
on	  the	  story	  that	  was	  not	  raised	  elsewhere:	  how	  Merritt’s	  personal	  history	  
exemplifies	  the	  complexity	  of	  race	  issues	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  musical	  taste	  and	  
expression.	  In	  a	  post	  called	  “Merritt	  Postscript:	  Zip-­‐a-­‐dee-­‐doo-­‐Dad,”	  Wilson	  points	  
out	  how	  the	  musical	  career	  of	  Merritt’s	  biological	  father,	  Scott	  Fagan,	  may	  have	  
affected	  his	  son’s	  relationship	  to	  black	  music.117	  He	  describes	  Fagan	  as	  “a	  folksinger	  
in	  the	  '60s	  folk	  revival”	  whose	  “earliest	  demos,	  in	  1963,	  were	  full	  of	  Harry	  
Belfafonte-­‐ish	  numbers”	  and	  who	  “retreated	  home	  to	  the	  Virgin	  Islands,	  where	  he	  
had	  grown	  up”	  in	  the	  early	  1970s	  “and	  has	  stayed	  there	  doing	  music	  in	  a	  sort	  of	  
Jimmy	  Buffet	  vein	  ever	  since.”118	  According	  to	  Wilson’s	  information,	  “Merritt	  grew	  
up	  aware	  of	  Fagan	  while	  Fagan	  has	  only	  found	  out	  about	  Merritt	  fairly	  recently.”119	  
How	  might	  knowing	  Fagan	  was	  his	  father	  have	  affected	  Merritt?	  
If	  you	  grew	  up	  aware	  that	  your	  father	  is	  this	  sorta	  white-­‐rasta	  guy	  who	  sings	  
in	  dialect,	  not	  to	  mention	  a	  self-­‐styled	  musical	  genius	  who	  happened	  to	  leave	  
you	  and	  your	  hippie	  mom	  to	  fend	  for	  yourselves,	  perhaps	  you	  would	  feel	  
there's	  something	  unappetizing	  about	  white	  songwriters	  who	  piggyback	  on	  
black	  culture,	  and	  become	  inclined	  to	  look	  mostly	  elsewhere	  for	  inspiration?	  .	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  Carl	  Wilson,	  “Merritt	  Postscript:	  Zip-­‐A-­‐Dee-­‐Doo-­‐Dad,”	  Zoilus,	  http://www.zoilus	  




.	  .	  If	  we	  are	  critical	  of	  mainstream	  America	  for	  ripping	  off	  black	  culture	  as	  its	  
own	  (see	  "rock'n'roll"),	  why	  can	  a	  songwriter	  also	  get	  shit	  rained	  down	  on	  
him	  for	  scrupulously	  avoiding	  that	  move?	  Rip	  off	  black	  culture,	  and	  you're	  a	  
thief;	  don't,	  and	  you're	  a	  musical	  white	  supremacist.	  .	  .	  .	  the	  Scott	  Fagan	  factor	  
might	  at	  least	  suggest	  what	  Merritt	  is	  trying	  not	  to	  do,	  and	  why	  his	  
motivations	  may	  be	  far	  from	  the	  ones	  being	  imputed.	  	  
That	  one	  could	  also	  be	  criticized	  for	  liking	  black	  music	  too	  much	  or	  in	  the	  wrong	  
way	  is	  very	  salient	  here	  (particularly	  since	  in	  addition	  to	  Merritt,	  Hopper,	  Frere-­‐
Jones,	  Cook,	  and	  Wilson	  are	  all	  white).	  	  
	   As	  Jason	  Middleton	  and	  Roger	  Beebe	  point	  out	  in	  “The	  Racial	  Politics	  of	  
Hybridity	  and	  ‘Neo-­‐Eclecticism’	  in	  Contemporary	  Popular	  Music,”	  a	  piece	  on	  the	  rap-­‐
rock	  fusion	  trend	  of	  the	  late	  1990s/early	  2000s,	  “musical	  ‘borrowing’	  by	  white	  
culture	  from	  black	  is	  nothing	  new	  in	  popular	  music.”120	  From	  Elvis’s	  popularization	  
of	  songs	  by	  black	  artists	  to	  the	  Beastie	  Boys’	  suburban	  white	  boy	  take	  on	  hip-­‐hop	  
(not	  to	  mention	  earlier	  examples	  such	  as	  blackface	  minstrelsy),	  Middleton	  and	  
Beebe	  point	  out	  many	  “well	  scrutinised”	  precedents	  for	  this	  phenomenon.121	  Simon	  
Frith	  calls	  it	  “social	  and	  cultural	  ‘theft’”	  and	  quotes	  Eric	  Lott	  on	  blackface:	  “The	  
blackface	  performer	  .	  .	  .	  is	  in	  effect	  a	  perfect	  metaphor	  for	  one	  culture’s	  ventriloqual	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  Jason	  Middleton	  and	  Roger	  Beebe.	  “The	  Racial	  Politics	  of	  Hybridity	  and	  ‘Neo-­‐
Eclecticism’	  in	  Contemporary	  Popular	  Music.”	  Popular	  Music,	  21,	  no.	  2	  (2002):	  160.	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  Ibid.,	  160.	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self-­‐expression	  through	  the	  art	  forms	  of	  someone	  else’s.”122	  Indeed,	  the	  notions	  that	  
this	  phenomenon,	  whether	  it	  is	  called	  “borrowing”	  or	  “theft,”	  occurs	  and	  that	  it	  is	  
politically	  problematic	  are	  so	  widely	  acknowledged	  as	  to	  seem	  trite,	  too	  obvious	  to	  
bear	  mentioning.	  	  
	   Middleton	  and	  Beebe	  frame	  their	  discussion	  of	  the	  rap/rock	  trend	  as	  a	  
response	  to	  a	  perceived	  crisis	  in	  rock	  music	  after	  the	  “alternative”	  trend	  fizzled	  out	  
in	  the	  mid-­‐90s	  in	  which	  “a	  number	  of	  different	  strategies	  have	  been	  deployed	  (by	  
the	  record	  industry)	  and	  employed	  (by	  these	  consumers)	  which	  attempt	  to	  develop	  
new	  positions	  for	  these	  white	  suburbanites	  to	  occupy	  in	  the	  contemporary	  music	  
cultural	  terrain	  in	  order	  to	  reassert	  their	  hegemony	  as	  both	  producers	  and	  
consumers.”123	  The	  most	  notable	  of	  these	  strategies,	  they	  assert,	  are	  “on	  the	  
producer’s	  side	  .	  .	  .	  to	  develop	  hybrid	  forms	  which	  combine	  rock	  with	  the	  styles	  of	  its	  
music	  competitors—most	  notably,	  of	  hip-­‐hop	  music	  and	  culture”	  and	  “on	  the	  
consumer	  side	  .	  .	  .	  the	  emergence	  of	  a	  ‘neo-­‐eclectic’	  form	  of	  listening	  where	  a	  
number	  of	  formerly	  disparate	  or	  even	  hostile	  musical	  forms	  are	  consumed	  by	  a	  
single	  (white	  suburban)	  individual.”124	  	  
	   That	  high-­‐status	  groups	  who	  in	  the	  past	  might	  have	  expressed	  their	  status	  
through	  an	  engagement	  with	  “highbrow”	  culture	  have	  become	  increasingly	  
“omnivorous,”	  broadening	  their	  musical	  tastes	  to	  include	  more	  “lowbrow”	  genres,	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  Simon	  Frith.	  “Music	  and	  Identity,”	  in	  Questions	  of	  Cultural	  Identity,	  ed.	  Stuart	  Hall	  
and	  Paul	  du	  Gay,	  (Thousand	  Oaks,	  CA:	  Sage	  Publications,	  1996),	  122.	  	  
123	  Ibid.,	  160.	  
124	  Ibid.,	  160.	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has	  been	  thoroughly	  (and	  famously)	  demonstrated	  by	  Richard	  A.	  Peterson	  and	  
Roger	  M.	  Kern	  in	  their	  1996	  article,	  “Changing	  Highbrow	  Taste:	  From	  Snob	  to	  
Omnivore.”125	  As	  Peterson	  and	  Kern	  put	  it,	  	  
Dominant	  status	  groups	  have	  regularly	  defined	  popular	  culture	  in	  ways	  that	  
fit	  their	  own	  interests	  and	  have	  worked	  to	  render	  harmless	  subordinate	  
status-­‐group	  cultures.	  .	  .	  .	  One	  recurrent	  strategy	  is	  to	  define	  popular	  culture	  
as	  brutish	  and	  something	  to	  be	  suppressed	  or	  avoided	  .	  .	  .	  another	  is	  to	  
gentrify	  elements	  of	  popular	  culture	  and	  incorporate	  them	  into	  the	  dominant	  
status-­‐group	  culture.	  Our	  data	  suggest	  a	  major	  shift	  from	  the	  former	  strategy	  
to	  the	  latter	  strategy	  of	  status	  group	  politics.126	  
In	  addition	  to	  a	  number	  of	  other	  factors,	  including	  an	  increase	  in	  “cultural	  
relativism”	  and	  the	  greater	  accessibility	  of	  elite	  cultural	  forms	  via	  the	  mass	  media,	  
Peterson	  and	  Kern	  assert	  that	  “omnivorous	  inclusion	  seems	  better	  adapted	  to	  an	  
increasingly	  global	  world	  managed	  by	  those	  who	  make	  their	  way,	  in	  part,	  by	  
showing	  respect	  for	  the	  cultural	  expressions	  of	  others.”127	  It	  is	  important	  to	  
mention,	  though,	  that	  high-­‐status	  individuals	  who	  become	  more	  omnivorous	  may	  
widen	  the	  scope	  of	  their	  interests,	  but	  only	  within	  certain	  parameters;	  Peterson	  and	  
Kern	  make	  a	  point	  of	  “differentiat[ing]	  between	  middlebrow	  and	  lowbrow	  because	  
critical	  observers	  have	  suggested	  that	  when	  highbrows	  are	  open	  to	  non-­‐highbrow	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  Richard	  A.	  Peterson	  and	  Roger	  M.	  Kern.	  “Changing	  Highbrow	  Taste:	  From	  Snob	  to	  
Omnivore,”	  American	  Sociological	  Review,	  61,	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  (Washington,	  D.C.:	  American	  
Sociological	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  1996),	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  Ibid.,	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art	  forms,	  they	  seek	  out	  lowbrow	  forms	  created	  by	  socially	  marginal	  groups	  (Blacks,	  
youth,	  isolated	  rural	  folks)	  while	  still	  holding	  commercial	  middlebrow	  forms	  in	  
contempt.”128	  
	   Bethany	  Bryson	  is	  even	  more	  specific	  in	  her	  article	  “‘Anything	  But	  Heavy	  
Metal’:	  Symbolic	  Exclusion	  and	  Musical	  Dislikes.”129	  After	  a	  detailed	  sociological	  
study,	  Bryson	  finds	  that	  “highly	  educated	  people	  in	  the	  United	  States	  are	  more	  
musically	  tolerant,	  but	  not	  indiscriminately	  so,”	  adding	  that	  “class-­‐based	  exclusion”	  
is	  apparent	  “in	  that	  the	  genres	  most	  disliked	  by	  tolerant	  people	  are	  those	  
appreciated	  by	  people	  with	  the	  lowest	  levels	  of	  education.	  Therefore,	  I	  suggest	  that	  
cultural	  tolerance	  should	  not	  be	  conceptualized	  as	  an	  indiscriminate	  tendency	  to	  be	  
nonexclusive,	  but	  as	  a	  reordering	  of	  group	  boundaries	  that	  trades	  race	  for	  class.”130	  All	  
in	  all,	  Bryson’s	  results	  indicate	  that	  “cultural	  breadth	  has	  become	  a	  high-­‐status	  
signal	  that	  excluded	  low-­‐status	  cultural	  cues,”	  and	  thus	  suggests	  that	  “the	  
phenomenon	  be	  understood	  as	  multicultural	  capital.”131	  
	   Peterson	  and	  Kern	  pose	  omnivorousness	  in	  opposition	  to	  the	  alternative	  
strategy	  of	  portraying	  lowbrow	  culture	  as	  “something	  to	  be	  suppressed	  or	  avoided,”	  
but	  Middleton	  and	  Beebe	  point	  out	  that	  “borrowing”	  from	  lowbrow	  forms—whether	  
by	  copying	  or	  co-­‐opting—is	  also	  a	  possibility,	  one	  that	  “allows	  for	  engagement	  with	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
128	  Ibid.,	  901.	  
129	  Bethany	  Bryson.	  “‘Anything	  But	  Heavy	  Metal’:	  Symbolic	  Exclusion	  and	  Musical	  
Dislikes,”	  American	  Sociological	  Review,	  61,	  no.	  5,	  (Washington,	  D.C.:	  American	  
Sociological	  Association,	  1996),	  884-­‐99.	  
130	  Ibid.,	  895,	  emphasis	  in	  original.	  
131	  Ibid.,	  emphasis	  in	  original.	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different	  (i.e.	  non-­‐rock)	  musical	  forms	  while	  dissipating	  the	  cultural	  otherness	  of	  
these	  forms	  for	  the	  white	  listening	  audience”	  and	  which	  “offers	  white	  suburbanites	  
that	  perfect	  balance	  of	  familiarity	  and	  otherness.”	  132	  	  
	   The	  strategy	  of	  the	  artists	  that	  Middleton	  and	  Beebe	  examine	  in	  their	  article	  
(or,	  more	  accurately,	  the	  artists’	  record	  label	  representatives,	  marketers,	  and	  so	  
forth)	  is	  that	  of	  emulating	  a	  genre	  pioneered	  by	  and	  associated	  with	  African-­‐
Americans	  but	  “marketing	  performers	  who	  look	  like	  the	  [white]	  buyers,”	  in	  the	  
process	  claiming	  a	  vital	  genre	  for	  “privileged	  subjects”	  in	  order	  to	  “reassert	  their	  
hegemony.”133	  The	  authors	  also	  discuss	  the	  “consumer	  side”	  of	  this	  phenomenon	  by	  
examining	  specific	  examples	  of	  contemporary	  omnivorousness,	  which	  they	  term	  
“neo-­‐eclecticism.”134	  They	  assert	  that	  “in	  certain	  highly	  visible	  manifestations,	  the	  
neo-­‐eclectic	  apparatus	  functions	  to	  compensate	  for	  the	  becoming-­‐residual	  of	  the	  
classic	  rock	  formation	  and	  its	  attendant	  normalisation	  of	  a	  white	  middle-­‐class	  male	  
subject	  position,”	  and	  that	  “this	  compensation	  happens	  in	  such	  a	  way	  as	  to	  protect	  
the	  dominant	  listening/viewing	  subject	  position	  and	  to	  displace	  or	  erase	  problems	  
of	  racial	  difference.”135	  
	   Frere-­‐Jones	  points	  out	  the	  complexity	  of	  these	  issues	  in	  a	  piece	  for	  The	  New	  
Yorker	  called	  “A	  Paler	  Shade	  of	  White:	  How	  Indie	  Rock	  Lost	  Its	  Soul”	  inspired	  by	  his	  
experiences	  as	  a	  musician.	  “On	  and	  off	  since	  1990	  I’ve	  been	  a	  member	  of	  a	  funk	  band	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  Middleton	  and	  Beebe,	  “The	  Racial	  Politics	  of	  Hybridity	  and	  ‘Neo-­‐Eclecticism’	  in	  
Contemporary	  Popular	  Music,”	  161.	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  Ibid.,	  160,	  161.	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  Ibid.,	  160,	  169.	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  Ibid.,	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called	  Ui,”	  he	  writes.	  “We’ve	  had	  six	  members,	  all	  white,	  though	  most	  of	  the	  
musicians	  who	  inspire	  our	  sound	  are	  black	  .	  .	  .	  or	  are	  white	  bands	  heavily	  indebted	  
to	  black	  music.”136	  He	  describes	  how	  
most	  of	  our	  music	  didn’t	  require	  singing,	  but	  a	  few	  pieces	  needed	  the	  sound	  
of	  a	  human	  voice	  to	  round	  them	  out.	  Yet	  singing	  stumped	  me.	  .	  .	  .	  And	  the	  
problem	  was	  clearly	  related	  to	  race.	  It	  seemed	  silly	  to	  try	  to	  sound	  “black,”	  
but	  that	  is	  what	  happened,	  no	  matter	  how	  hard	  I	  tried	  not	  to.	  .	  .	  .	  Playing	  
black	  music	  never	  felt	  odd,	  but	  singing	  it—a	  more	  intimate	  gesture—seemed	  
insulting.	  By	  the	  time	  we	  recorded	  our	  last	  album,	  in	  2003,	  I	  had	  given	  up	  
singing	  altogether.137	  
Frere-­‐Jones	  details	  his	  personal	  experience	  in	  order	  to	  put	  his	  observations	  about	  
the	  pervasive	  whiteness	  of	  contemporary	  indie	  rock	  in	  perspective.	  He	  connects	  this	  
quality	  with	  an	  enervating	  dullness	  in	  this	  popular	  genre.	  He	  sees	  most	  indie	  
musicians	  as	  “retreating	  inward	  and	  settling	  for	  the	  lassitude	  and	  monotony	  that	  
[they]	  seem	  to	  confuse	  with	  authenticity	  and	  significance,”	  leaving	  critics	  like	  
himself	  “waiting	  in	  vain	  for	  vigor,	  for	  rhythm,	  for	  a	  musical	  effect	  that	  could	  justify	  
all	  the	  preciousness.”138	  	  
	   He	  cites	  a	  few	  possible	  reasons	  for	  this	  state	  of	  affairs,	  but	  in	  the	  end	  Frere-­‐
Jones	  concludes	  that	  “the	  most	  important	  reason	  for	  the	  decline	  of	  musical	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  






miscegenation	  .	  .	  .	  is	  social	  progress.	  Black	  musicians	  are	  now	  as	  visible	  and	  as	  
influential	  as	  white	  ones.	  .	  .	  .	  The	  uneasy,	  and	  sometimes	  inappropriate,	  borrowings	  
and	  imitations	  that	  set	  rock	  and	  roll	  in	  motion	  gave	  popular	  music	  a	  heat	  and	  an	  
intensity	  that	  can’t	  be	  duplicated	  today.”139	  Basically,	  while	  acknowledging	  that	  
“social	  progress”	  is	  positive,	  Frere-­‐Jones	  is	  lamenting	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  decreasing	  
acceptance	  of	  cultural	  “borrowing”	  that	  comes	  with	  it	  precludes	  a	  certain	  “intensity”	  
that	  he	  associates	  with	  the	  mixing	  of	  cultures.	  As	  Wilson	  noted	  in	  a	  response	  piece	  
for	  Slate,	  Frere-­‐Jones’s	  piece	  both	  “tends	  troublingly	  to	  reduce	  ‘black	  music’	  to	  
rhythm	  and	  sexuality,”	  an	  essentializing	  move	  that	  has	  the	  potential	  to	  reinscribe	  
racist	  stereotypes	  and	  “elide[s]	  the	  differences”	  between	  the	  influences	  of	  various	  
genres	  from	  the	  African	  diaspora.140	  
	   In	  the	  process	  of	  discussing	  this	  issue,	  Frere-­‐Jones	  touches	  on	  the	  question	  of	  
neo-­‐eclecticism.	  In	  arguing	  for	  the	  visibility	  of	  black	  artists,	  he	  asserts	  that	  “the	  
Internet,	  by	  democratizing	  access	  to	  music	  .	  .	  .	  has	  also	  made	  individual	  genres	  less	  
significant.	  Pop	  music	  is	  no	  longer	  made	  of	  just	  a	  few	  musical	  traditions;	  it’s	  a	  
profusion	  of	  strands,	  most	  of	  which	  don’t	  intersect,	  except,	  perhaps,	  when	  listeners	  
click	  ‘shuffle’	  on	  their	  iPods.”141	  	  
	   The	  phenomenon	  of	  co-­‐optation	  through	  media	  reception	  may	  not	  be	  as	  well-­‐
known	  (to	  the	  point	  of	  cliché)	  as	  that	  of	  white	  performers	  copying	  black	  performers,	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  Frere-­‐Jones,	  “A	  Paler	  Shade	  of	  White.”	  
140	  Carl	  Wilson,	  “The	  Trouble	  With	  Indie	  Rock,”	  Slate,	  October	  18,	  2007,	  http://www	  
.slate.com/id/2176187	  (accessed	  April	  8,	  2010).	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  Frere-­‐Jones,	  “A	  Paler	  Shade	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genres,	  and	  tropes,	  but	  it	  is	  nothing	  new.	  The	  point	  that	  Wilson	  makes	  in	  his	  
discussion	  of	  Merritt—that	  he	  might	  be	  subject	  to	  a	  different	  kind	  of	  criticism	  if	  his	  
music	  was	  too	  indebted	  to	  African-­‐American	  traditions,	  or	  the	  traditions	  of	  another	  
oppressed	  group—could	  be	  extended	  to	  cover	  reception	  and	  evaluation	  as	  well.	  As	  
Middleton	  and	  Beebe	  point	  out,	  neo-­‐eclectic	  reception	  practices	  can	  function	  as	  a	  
consumer	  strategy	  that	  parallels	  the	  producer	  strategy	  of	  “borrowing.”	  	  
	   Wilson	  seems	  to	  regard	  the	  notion	  that	  such	  “borrowing”	  is	  problematic	  as	  a	  
truism,	  and	  he	  correspondingly	  frames	  his	  discussion	  of	  Merritt	  in	  these	  terms,	  
while	  emphasizing	  Merritt’s	  role	  as	  a	  musician	  over	  his	  role	  as	  a	  fan,	  occasional	  
critic,	  and	  potential	  tastemaker.	  But	  an	  equally	  critical	  view	  could	  be	  taken	  of	  neo-­‐
eclecticism.	  If	  both	  borrowing	  and	  omnivorousness	  can	  function	  to	  “reassert	  
hegemony,”	  as	  Middleton	  and	  Beebe	  convincingly	  argue,	  then	  white	  critics	  who	  
endorse	  music	  by	  people	  of	  color	  (and	  male	  critics	  who	  endorse	  music	  by	  women,	  
straight	  critics	  who	  endorse	  music	  by	  queer	  artists,	  etc.)	  stand	  in	  danger	  of	  losing	  
their	  moral	  high	  ground.	  When	  privileged	  critics	  make	  claims	  on	  the	  work	  of	  a	  less	  
privileged	  artist,	  they	  could	  arguably	  be	  aiding	  hegemony,	  not	  combating	  it.	  This	  is	  
particularly	  true	  when	  critics	  like	  Wilson	  take	  music	  that	  appeals	  to	  a	  less	  privileged	  
audience	  (he	  takes	  great	  pains	  to	  prove	  Céline	  Dion’s	  fans	  fit	  into	  this	  category)	  and	  
create	  intellectual	  narratives	  around	  it	  as	  he	  does	  in	  Let’s	  Talk	  About	  Love.	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   I	  am	  reminded	  here	  of	  an	  entry	  music	  critic	  Alec	  Hanley	  Bemis	  contributed	  to	  
the	  Coolfer	  blog,	  “One	  View	  on	  the	  Chuck	  Eddy/Village	  Voice	  Situation,”	  on	  the	  
highly	  publicized	  firing	  of	  critic	  and	  music	  editor	  Chuck	  Eddy	  from	  the	  Village	  Voice	  
weekly.142	  Bemis	  writes	  that	  although	  the	  news	  is	  “a	  bummer	  on	  a	  personal	  level,”	  it	  
is	  “hard	  not	  to	  acknowledge	  Chuck’s	  departure	  from	  the	  Voice	  doesn’t	  come	  out	  of	  
left	  field.”143	  Bemis	  argues	  that	  Eddy	  “edited	  the	  section	  for	  himself	  and	  people	  like	  
him.	  Rock	  critics,	  geeks.	  An	  audience	  that	  gave	  a	  shit	  that	  he	  was	  a	  contrarian,	  or	  
even	  understood	  the	  dominant	  stream	  of	  thought	  &	  taste	  he	  was	  revolting	  
against.”144	  (It	  seems	  clear	  to	  me	  that	  the	  “dominant	  stream”	  Bemis	  is	  describing	  is	  
that	  of	  rockism	  and	  that	  Eddy’s	  “contrarian”	  position	  was	  a	  poptimist	  one.)	  “The	  
problem,”	  Bemis	  goes	  on	  to	  say,	  is	  that	  “a	  paper	  like	  the	  Voice	  needs	  to	  be	  read	  and	  
understood	  by	  regular	  people.	  That's	  how	  newspapers	  survive,	  folks.”145	  He	  goes	  on	  
to	  tell	  an	  instructive	  anecdote	  from	  a	  period	  when	  he	  taught	  a	  graduate	  course	  at	  
New	  York	  University	  called	  “Topics	  in	  Cultural	  Journalism:	  Youth	  Culture.”146	  
About	  1/4	  of	  the	  students	  were	  aspiring	  music/culture	  writers.	  The	  other	  
3/4	  couldn't	  give	  a	  shit	  about	  any	  musician	  not	  in	  the	  top	  40.	  I	  had	  them	  read	  
some	  Voice	  stuff	  and	  could	  tell	  from	  their	  reactions	  that	  the	  section	  was	  in	  
trouble.	  The	  aspiring	  music/culture	  writers	  hated	  it	  because	  it	  covered	  Toby	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  Hanley	  Bemis,	  “Guest	  Blogger:	  One	  View	  on	  the	  Chuck	  Eddy/Village	  Voice	  
Situation,”	  Coolfer,	  April	  25,	  2006,	  http://www.coolfer.com/blog/archives/2006/	  






Keith	  and	  random	  boogie	  rock,	  while	  ignoring	  or	  underplaying	  lots	  of	  cult	  
music	  faves.	  The	  other	  3/4	  of	  the	  class	  were	  mainstream	  "non-­‐music"	  people.	  
Normally	  they	  might	  be	  interested	  in	  a	  story	  about	  artists	  who	  shifted	  units	  
(a	  mainstream	  country	  or	  rap	  musician,	  John	  Meyer	  [sic]).	  Unfortunately,	  the	  
section	  was	  equally	  inaccessible	  to	  them	  because	  of	  its	  dense	  thickets	  of	  self-­‐
referential	  prose.147	  
Basically,	  the	  problem	  as	  Bemis	  describes	  it	  boils	  down	  to	  a	  radical	  disparity	  
between,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  the	  tone	  of	  Eddy’s	  writing,	  its	  baroque	  complexity	  and	  
intellectual	  references,	  and,	  on	  the	  other,	  the	  genres	  and	  artists	  that	  he	  covered,	  
which	  are	  associated	  with	  lowbrow	  fan	  bases	  of	  various	  stripes.	  The	  average	  fan	  of	  
this	  music	  would	  not	  find	  Eddy’s	  writing	  style	  appealing,	  and	  the	  kind	  of	  reader	  who	  
would	  appreciate	  his	  style	  is	  more	  likely	  to	  want	  to	  read	  about	  genres	  that	  are	  
higher	  in	  cultural	  capital	  (like	  “cult	  faves”).	  	  
	   Wilson	  does	  something	  similar	  in	  his	  study	  of	  Céline	  Dion.	  In	  his	  chapter	  
about	  Dion’s	  fans,	  he	  emphasizes	  their	  subaltern	  qualities	  and	  lack	  of	  cultural	  
capital—one	  fan	  is	  an	  immigrant	  from	  Cambodia,	  another	  a	  high-­‐school	  dropout,	  
another	  a	  drag	  queen.148	  About	  the	  latter,	  he	  pointedly	  writes,	  “Alex	  is	  a	  female	  
impersonator,	  not	  a	  queer	  studies	  professor.”149	  Yet	  Wilson’s	  book	  on	  Dion	  seems	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  Ibid.	  
148	  Carl	  Wilson.	  Céline	  Dion’s	  Let’s	  Talk	  About	  Love:	  A	  Journey	  to	  the	  End	  of	  Taste.	  
(New	  York:	  Continuum	  Publishing	  Group,	  2007),	  108-­‐114.	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  Ibid.,	  113.	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unlikely	  to	  appeal	  to	  such	  people—it	  is	  littered	  with	  references	  to	  Kant	  and	  
Bourdieu	  and	  is	  published	  by	  a	  boutique	  press	  geared	  toward	  music	  geeks.	  	  
	   This	  is	  not	  as	  uncommon	  as	  one	  might	  think;	  taking	  lowbrow	  genres	  and	  
appreciating	  them	  in	  highly	  intellectualized	  ways	  is	  highly	  characteristic	  of	  
contemporary	  omnivorousness.	  As	  Peterson	  and	  Kern	  point	  out,	  “several	  studies	  
have	  shown	  that	  criteria	  of	  distinction,	  of	  which	  omnivorousness	  is	  one	  expression,	  
must	  center	  not	  on	  what	  one	  consumes	  but	  on	  the	  way	  items	  of	  consumption	  are	  
understood.	  Bourdieu	  .	  .	  .	  for	  example,	  contrasts	  unreflective	  consumption	  for	  
personal	  enjoyment	  with	  intellectualized	  interpretation.”	  150	  They	  contend	  that	  
while	  Bourdieu	  originally	  made	  this	  observation	  about	  “a	  monolithic	  cultural	  
landscape	  appropriate	  to	  the	  era	  of	  the	  elitist	  snob,”	  it	  is	  “also	  amenable	  to	  a	  
discriminating	  omnivorousness	  if	  the	  ethnocentrism	  central	  to	  snobbish	  elitism	  is	  
replaced	  by	  cultural	  relativism.”151	  
	   Simon	  Frith	  finds	  even	  earlier	  antecedents	  for	  this	  phenomenon	  in	  a	  piece	  
titled	  “Music	  and	  Identity.”	  He	  argues	  that	  “the	  high/low	  distinction	  doesn’t	  really	  
concern	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  art	  object,	  or	  how	  it	  is	  produced,	  but	  refers	  to	  different	  
modes	  of	  perception.”	  152	  He	  traces	  this	  viewpoint	  “back	  to	  the	  eighteenth-­‐century	  
debates	  about	  musical	  meaning,	  and	  to	  the	  origins	  of	  the	  Romantic	  view	  of	  art	  that	  
underpins	  high	  cultural	  arguments	  (	  .	  .	  .	  which	  was	  duly	  appropriated	  by	  .	  .	  .	  rock	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  and	  Kern.	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  Highbrow	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  904.	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  Ibid.	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  Frith,	  “Music	  and	  Identity,”	  114.	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musicians).”153	  In	  a	  description	  that	  closely	  resembles	  Peterson	  and	  Kern’s,	  he	  
writes	  that	  “the	  crucial	  high/low	  distinction	  is	  that	  between	  .	  .	  .	  intellectual	  and	  
sensual	  appreciation	  .	  .	  .	  To	  add	  low	  cultural	  goods	  to	  lists	  of	  ‘art’	  objects	  available	  
for	  intellectual	  .	  .	  .	  appreciation	  .	  .	  .	  is	  not,	  then,	  to	  get	  rid	  of	  the	  traditional	  
boundaries	  between	  the	  high	  and	  the	  low.”154	  
	   Wilson	  himself	  makes	  a	  similar	  point	  in	  his	  discussion	  of	  Bourdieu,	  noting	  
that	  
his	  original	  survey	  did	  not	  reflect	  the	  relatively	  recent	  shakeup	  in	  taste	  
categories,	  the	  seeming	  collapse	  of	  high	  and	  low	  culture	  into	  a	  No-­‐Brow	  
society	  in	  which	  an	  in-­‐depth	  knowledge	  of	  Buffy	  the	  Vampire	  Slayer,	  
Japanese	  ganguro	  fashions	  and	  the	  latest	  graffiti	  artists	  may	  carry	  more	  
cachet	  than	  a	  conversance	  with	  Molière,	  Schoenberg	  and	  Donald	  Judd.	  .	  .	  .	  For	  
Bourdieu,	  it	  doesn’t	  matter	  what	  the	  objects	  of	  good	  taste	  are	  at	  any	  moment.	  
Change	  the	  value	  of	  x	  and	  the	  equations	  stays	  the	  same.	  	  
In	  other	  words,	  while	  omnivorousness	  may	  seem	  at	  first	  glance	  to	  undermine	  the	  
competition	  for	  cultural	  capital,	  it	  merely	  changes	  the	  terms	  of	  the	  struggle.	  	  
	   I	  differ	  with	  Wilson	  on	  a	  couple	  of	  points,	  though.	  First:	  it	  is	  not	  merely	  a	  
matter	  of	  replacing	  the	  “x”	  factor	  in	  an	  equation,	  substituting	  one	  media,	  genre,	  
artist,	  etc.	  for	  another.	  As	  the	  scholars	  I	  have	  discussed	  have	  shown,	  the	  shift	  in	  
media	  consumption	  strategies	  that	  created	  neo-­‐eclecticism	  are	  a	  great	  deal	  more	  




complex	  than	  simply	  placing	  new	  media	  objects	  in	  the	  canon.	  And	  second,	  if	  
Peterson	  and	  Kern’s	  data	  is	  to	  be	  believed,	  it	  is	  not	  so	  much	  that	  the	  cultural	  
landscape	  has	  become	  “No-­‐Brow,”	  making	  highbrow	  and	  lowbrow	  categories	  
meaningless;	  rather,	  consumers	  who	  might	  have	  had	  highbrow	  taste	  in	  the	  past	  now	  
display	  a	  specific	  type	  of	  omnivorousness	  which	  includes	  highbrow	  and	  lowbrow	  
forms	  while,	  as	  Peterson	  and	  Kern	  put	  it,	  “holding	  commercial	  middlebrow	  forms	  in	  
contempt.”155	  	  
	   In	  my	  reading	  of	  work	  by	  poptimist	  critics,	  this	  is	  also	  the	  type	  of	  
omnivorousness	  they	  tend	  to	  practice.	  For	  example,	  in	  best-­‐of-­‐the-­‐year	  lists	  for	  the	  
last	  few	  years	  on	  his	  blog,	  Frere-­‐Jones	  includes	  artists	  from	  highbrow	  genres	  like	  
indie	  rock,	  indie	  pop,	  and	  experimental	  music,	  including	  Dirty	  Projectors,	  
Skullflower,	  Vampire	  Weekend,	  Beach	  House,	  No	  Age,	  and	  even,	  surprisingly,	  
Merritt’s	  band	  the	  Magnetic	  Fields.	  He	  also	  includes	  many	  commercial	  pop	  acts	  and	  
other	  artists	  from	  lowbrow	  genres	  associated	  with	  what	  Peterson	  and	  Kern	  might	  
call	  “socially	  marginal	  groups”:	  hip-­‐hop	  artists	  like	  Big	  Boi,	  Busta	  Rhymes,	  and	  Lil’	  
Wayne	  (associated	  with	  African-­‐American	  audiences)	  and	  artists	  associated	  with	  
the	  working	  class,	  such	  as	  the	  metal	  band	  Mastodon	  and	  two	  American	  Idol	  alumni,	  
Kelly	  Clarkson	  and	  Jordin	  Sparks.156	  But	  there	  is	  little,	  if	  anything,	  that	  falls	  in	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  Peterson	  and	  Kern,	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  901.	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between—in	  that	  no-­‐man’s-­‐land,	  so	  difficult	  to	  pin	  down,	  that	  we	  call	  middlebrow.	  
And	  it’s	  notable	  that	  the	  former	  category	  is	  mostly	  white	  and	  majority	  male	  while	  
the	  latter	  is	  where	  you’ll	  find	  most	  of	  the	  women	  and	  people	  of	  color.	  	  
	   In	  a	  February	  2009	  blog	  entry	  for	  the	  Guardian,	  critic	  (and	  frequent	  target	  of	  
poptimist	  ire)	  Simon	  Reynolds	  identifies	  a	  shift	  in	  middlebrow	  music	  culture	  
through	  an	  exploration	  of	  reactions	  to	  Animal	  Collective’s	  immensely	  popular	  album	  
Merriweather	  Post	  Pavilion.	  He	  argues	  that	  “what’s	  really	  at	  issue”	  in	  debates	  about	  
the	  album	  is	  “the	  status	  and	  function	  in	  our	  culture	  of	  ‘middlebrow.’	  With	  
Merriweather,	  almost	  everyone	  is	  either	  castigating	  or	  applauding	  Animal	  Collective	  
for	  their	  tentative	  steps	  into	  the	  middling	  regions	  of	  pop	  culture:	  that	  Kid	  A	  zone”	  
(here	  he	  references	  Radiohead’s	  influential	  2000	  album)	  “where	  mild	  
experimentalism	  meets	  not-­‐too-­‐obvious	  melodicism.”157	  Reynolds	  points	  out	  that	  
“there’s	  little	  cultural	  capital	  to	  be	  had	  from	  sticking	  up	  for	  middlebrow.	  .	  .	  .	  There’s	  
two	  obvious	  and	  immediately	  satisfying	  ways	  of	  responding	  to	  [its]	  existence.	  .	  .	  .	  
One	  is	  the	  elitist	  path.	  .	  .	  .	  the	  other	  angle,	  equally	  rewarding,	  is	  the	  populist	  
stance.”158	  In	  other	  words,	  cultural	  capital	  can	  be	  gained	  from	  affiliating	  oneself	  with	  
highly	  popular	  music	  or	  with	  obscure	  genres,	  but	  not	  with	  the	  music	  that	  falls	  in	  
between.	  Reynolds	  champions	  the	  idea	  of	  “a	  strong	  middlebrow	  culture”	  that	  would	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
http://www.sashafrerejones.com/2009/11/best_of_2010_1.html	  (all	  accessed	  April	  
6,	  2010).	  
157	  Simon	  Reynolds,	  “Stuck	  in	  the	  middle	  with	  you:	  between	  pop	  and	  pretension,”	  
Guardian	  Music	  Blog,	  February	  6,	  2009,	  http://www.guardian.co.uk/music/	  




include	  records	  like	  Merriweather	  Post	  Pavilion;	  the	  alternative—“abandoning	  
middlebrow	  to	  the	  Coldplays	  and	  Elbows	  of	  this	  world”—Reynolds	  views	  as	  
“cowardly.”	  Reynolds	  is	  addressing	  music	  fans	  generally,	  but	  I	  think	  his	  message	  is	  
also	  aimed	  at	  fellow	  critics	  because	  he	  realizes	  that	  they	  have	  a	  substantial	  anti-­‐
middlebrow	  bias.	  	  
	   Peterson	  and	  Kern’s	  discussion	  centers	  around	  fans,	  not	  critics,	  but	  the	  
politics	  of	  neo-­‐eclecticism	  are	  the	  same	  in	  either	  case—except	  that	  the	  influence	  
critics	  wield	  give	  the	  political	  implications	  of	  their	  tastes	  added	  importance.	  Given	  
the	  critique	  of	  omnivorousness	  I	  have	  outlined,	  one	  could	  argue	  that	  white	  critics	  
who	  champion	  music	  by	  African-­‐American	  artists,	  or	  any	  critic	  who	  advocates	  for	  
lowbrow	  music	  or	  music	  by	  individuals	  less	  privileged	  than	  themselves,	  is	  
participating	  in	  a	  process	  of	  appropriation	  that	  is	  ultimately	  politically	  regressive.	  At	  
the	  very	  least,	  the	  omnivorous	  strategies	  are	  clearly	  no	  guarantee	  of	  
progressiveness.	  While	  their	  potential	  populism	  is	  readily	  apparent,	  it	  is	  undercut	  
by	  the	  dynamics	  of	  highbrow	  reception,	  with	  its	  tendency	  to	  appropriate	  lowbrow	  
genres	  and	  texts	  in	  potentially	  problematic	  ways.	  	  
	   Critics	  who	  advocate	  omnivorousness	  are,	  in	  some	  respects,	  reminiscent	  of	  
the	  white	  hipsters	  examined	  by	  Ingrid	  Monson	  in	  her	  article	  “The	  Problem	  With	  
White	  Hipness:	  Race,	  Gender,	  and	  Cultural	  Conceptions	  in	  Jazz	  Historical	  Discourse.”	  
In	  this	  piece,	  Monson	  outlines	  “the	  function	  of	  African	  Americans	  as	  a	  symbol	  of	  
social	  conscience,	  sexual	  freedom,	  and	  resistance	  to	  the	  dominant	  order	  in	  the	  
imagination	  of	  liberal	  white	  Americans,”	  asserting	  that	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to	  the	  extent	  that	  well-­‐meaning	  white	  Americans	  have	  confused	  the	  most	  
“transgressive”	  aspects	  of	  African	  American	  culture	  with	  its	  true	  character,	  
they	  fall	  into	  the	  trap	  of	  viewing	  blackness	  as	  absence.	  Whether	  conceived	  as	  
an	  absence	  of	  morality	  or	  of	  bourgeois	  pretensions,	  this	  view	  of	  blackness,	  
paradoxically,	  buys	  into	  the	  historical	  legacy	  of	  primitivism	  and	  its	  
concomitant	  exoticism	  of	  the	  “Other.”159	  
She	  goes	  on	  to	  paraphrase	  James	  Baldwin,	  writing	  that	  “admiration	  and	  the	  
reinforcement	  of	  stereotype	  .	  .	  .	  are	  often	  not	  far	  apart.”160	  In	  a	  sense,	  the	  mid-­‐
twentieth-­‐century	  hipsters	  Munson	  discusses	  were	  vanguards	  of	  present-­‐day	  
omnivorousness	  and	  the	  decreased	  ethnocentrism	  that	  underpins	  it,	  with	  parallels	  
to	  poptimist	  critics,	  who	  could	  also	  be	  described	  as	  “liberal”	  and	  “well-­‐meaning”	  and	  
who,	  if	  Peterson	  and	  Kern’s	  assertions	  about	  neo-­‐eclecticism	  hold	  true,	  also	  create	  
paradoxical	  effects	  when	  they	  embrace	  black	  culture	  and	  its	  perceived	  
transgressiveness.	  
	   But	  taking	  this	  argument	  to	  this	  potential	  conclusion	  is	  just	  as	  absurd	  as	  the	  
conclusion	  Cook	  tackles	  in	  his	  Slate	  piece.	  Versions	  of	  both	  points	  of	  view	  hold	  merit.	  
It	  makes	  sense	  that	  ethnocentric	  musical	  taste	  (or	  any	  privileging	  of	  work	  by	  
privileged	  classes)	  should	  be	  queried	  for	  signs	  of	  racism	  (or	  other	  hegemonic	  
biases).	  However,	  the	  argument	  that	  advocating	  for	  a	  more	  diverse	  groups	  of	  artists	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  Ingrid	  Monson,	  “The	  Problem	  with	  White	  Hipness:	  Race,	  Gender,	  and	  Cultural	  
Conceptions	  in	  Jazz	  Historical	  Discourse”	  in	  “Music	  Anthropologies	  and	  Music	  
Histories,”	  special	  issue,	  Journal	  of	  the	  American	  Musicological	  Society,	  48,	  no.	  3,	  
(1995):	  398.	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  Ibid.,	  402.	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is	  not	  automatically,	  unequivocally	  subversive,	  but	  could	  actually	  contribute	  to	  
hegemonic	  co-­‐optation,	  is	  also	  quite	  sound.	  Yet	  both	  of	  these	  positions	  can	  be	  taken	  
too	  far	  when	  they	  are	  considered	  separately.	  	  
	   The	  solution,	  I	  think,	  is	  to	  hold	  them	  both	  in	  tension.	  Tolerating	  elitism	  
clearly	  is	  not	  going	  to	  lead	  to	  progress,	  but	  mandatory	  diversity	  (under	  pain	  of	  
censure	  like	  that	  suffered	  by	  Merritt)—even	  optional	  diversity—is	  not	  always	  and	  
necessarily	  progressive	  either.	  Keeping	  in	  mind	  that	  these	  strategies	  cut	  both	  ways	  




What	  is	  Identity,	  Anyway?	  
	   The	  politics	  of	  identity	  in	  music	  criticism	  are	  complicated	  enough	  given	  the	  
terms	  I	  have	  been	  using	  so	  far.	  But	  identity—whether	  it	  is	  racial	  or	  ethnic	  identity	  or	  
any	  of	  the	  multitude	  of	  dimensions	  of	  identity	  as	  it	  is	  popularly	  conceived	  in	  
contemporary	  culture—is	  not	  as	  simple	  as	  it	  seems	  on	  the	  surface.	  Noted	  music	  
scholar	  Frith	  believes	  that	  music	  itself	  has	  a	  way	  of	  destabilizing	  categories.	  “Anti-­‐
essentialism	  is	  a	  necessary	  part	  of	  musical	  experience,”	  he	  claims,	  “a	  necessary	  
consequence	  of	  music’s	  failure	  to	  register	  the	  separations	  of	  body	  and	  mind	  on	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which	  such	  ‘essential’	  differences	  (between	  black	  and	  white,	  female	  and	  male,	  gay	  
and	  straight,	  nation	  and	  nation)	  depend.”161	  
	   Whether	  or	  not	  one	  finds	  this	  argument	  convincing,	  there	  remain	  a	  multitude	  
of	  problems	  with	  the	  oversimplified,	  superficial	  view	  of	  identity	  promulgated	  in	  
most	  contemporary	  discourse.	  A	  more	  critical	  approach	  originated	  with	  the	  work	  of	  
Antonio	  Gramsci,	  whose	  writings	  have	  been	  fruitfully	  expanded	  upon	  by	  scholars	  
like	  Stuart	  Hall.	  Hall	  quotes	  Gramsci	  as	  saying,	  “the	  personality	  is	  strangely	  
composite”	  and	  goes	  on	  to	  explain	  that	  his	  “thinking	  on	  this	  question	  encompasses	  
novel	  and	  radical	  ways	  of	  conceptualizing	  the	  subjects	  of	  ideology.”162	  
He	  recognizes	  the	  “plurality”	  of	  selves	  or	  identities	  of	  which	  the	  so-­‐called	  
“subject”	  of	  thought	  and	  ideas	  is	  composed.	  He	  argues	  that	  this	  multi-­‐faceted	  
nature	  of	  consciousness	  is	  not	  an	  individual	  but	  a	  collective	  phenomenon,	  a	  
consequence	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  “the	  self”	  and	  the	  ideological	  
discourses	  which	  compose	  the	  cultural	  terrain	  of	  society.163	  
Included	  in	  this	  view,	  Hall	  writes,	  is	  that	  Gramsci	  “refuses	  any	  idea	  of	  a	  pre-­‐given	  
unified	  ideological	  subject—for	  example,	  the	  proletarian	  with	  its	  ‘correct’	  
revolutionary	  thoughts	  or	  blacks	  with	  their	  already	  guaranteed	  current	  anti-­‐racist	  
consciousness.”164	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  Frith,	  “Music	  and	  Identity,”	  122.	  
162	  Stuart	  Hall.	  “Gramsci's	  Relevance	  for	  the	  Study	  of	  Race	  and	  Ethnicity,”	  in	  Stuart	  
Hall:	  Critical	  dialogues	  in	  cultural	  studies,	  ed.	  David	  Morley	  and	  Kuan-­‐Hsing	  Chen,	  




	   Hall	  discusses	  a	  specific	  example	  involving	  race	  in	  his	  article	  “New	  
Ethnicities.”165	  He	  writes	  about	  “a	  significant	  shift	  that	  has	  been	  going	  on	  (and	  is	  still	  
going	  on)	  in	  black	  cultural	  politics”	  in	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  at	  the	  time	  the	  piece	  was	  
written	  in	  1996,	  one	  that	  had	  “two	  discernable	  phases.”166	  First	  came	  “the	  moment	  
when	  the	  term	  ‘black’	  was	  coined	  as	  a	  way	  of	  referencing	  the	  common	  experience	  of	  
racism	  and	  marginalization	  in	  Britain”	  and	  a	  “critique”	  was	  developed	  which	  had	  as	  
“its	  two	  principal	  objects	  .	  .	  .	  first	  the	  question	  of	  access	  to	  the	  rights	  of	  
representation	  by	  black	  artists	  and	  black	  cultural	  workers	  themselves.	  .	  .	  .	  second,	  
the	  contestation	  of	  the	  marginality,	  the	  stereotypical	  quality	  and	  the	  fetishized	  
nature	  of	  images	  of	  blacks,	  by	  the	  counter-­‐position	  of	  a	  ‘positive’	  black	  imagery.”167	  
Following	  that	  period,	  Hall	  writes,	  “I	  have	  a	  distinct	  sense	  that	  .	  .	  .	  we	  are	  entering	  a	  
new	  phase”	  in	  which,	  “as	  the	  struggle	  moves	  forward	  and	  assumes	  new	  forms,	  it	  
does	  to	  some	  degree	  displace,	  reorganize	  and	  reposition	  the	  different	  cultural	  
strategies	  in	  relation	  to	  one	  another”;	  specifically,	  it	  is	  “best	  thought	  of	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  
change	  from	  a	  struggle	  over	  the	  relations	  of	  representation	  to	  a	  politics	  of	  
representation	  itself.”168	  The	  advent	  of	  this	  phase	  	  
marks	  what	  I	  can	  only	  call	  ‘the	  end	  of	  innocence’,	  or	  the	  end	  of	  the	  innocent	  
notion	  of	  the	  essential	  black	  subject.	  .	  .	  .	  What	  is	  at	  issue	  here	  is	  the	  
recognition	  of	  the	  extraordinary	  diversity	  of	  subjective	  positions,	  social	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experiences	  and	  cultural	  identities	  which	  compose	  the	  category	  ‘black’;	  that	  
is,	  the	  recognition	  that	  ‘black’	  is	  essentially	  a	  politically	  and	  culturally	  
constructed	  category.	  .	  .	  .	  What	  this	  brings	  into	  play	  is	  the	  recognition	  of	  the	  
immense	  diversity	  and	  differentiation	  of	  the	  historical	  and	  cultural	  
experience	  of	  black	  subjects.	  The	  inevitably	  entails	  a	  weakening	  or	  fading	  of	  
the	  notion	  that	  ‘race’	  or	  some	  composite	  notion	  of	  race	  around	  the	  term	  black	  
will	  either	  guarantee	  the	  effectivity	  of	  any	  cultural	  practice	  or	  determine	  in	  
any	  final	  sense	  its	  aesthetic	  value.169	  	  
In	  light	  of	  this	  “end	  of	  innocence,”	  one	  “can	  no	  longer	  conduct	  black	  politics	  through	  
the	  strategy	  of	  a	  simple	  set	  of	  reversals,	  putting	  in	  the	  place	  of	  the	  bad	  old	  essential	  
white	  subject,	  the	  new	  essentially	  good	  black	  subject.”170	  	  
	   This	  leaves	  a	  void	  where	  this	  more	  simplistic	  approach	  used	  to	  be.	  Although	  
it	  is	  difficult,	  Hall	  writes,	  “to	  conceive	  of	  how	  a	  politics	  can	  be	  constructed	  which	  
works	  with	  and	  through	  difference,	  which	  is	  able	  to	  build	  those	  forms	  of	  solidarity	  
and	  identification	  which	  make	  common	  struggle	  and	  resistance	  possible	  but	  without	  
suppressing	  the	  real	  heterogeneity	  of	  interests	  and	  identities,”	  nevertheless,	  this	  
“does	  not	  absolve	  us	  of	  the	  task	  of	  developing	  such	  a	  politics.”171	  	  
	   In	  a	  piece	  called	  “Who	  Needs	  Identity?”	  Hall	  develops	  his	  approach	  to	  
identity	  in	  more	  detail.	  He	  distinguishes	  the	  “deconstruction”	  of	  “the	  notion	  of	  an	  
integral,	  originary	  and	  unified	  identity”	  as	  a	  specific	  type	  of	  critique	  which	  “unlike	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those	  forms	  of	  critique	  which	  aim	  to	  supplant	  inadequate	  concepts	  with	  ‘truer’	  
ones”	  instead	  “puts	  key	  concepts	  ‘under	  erasure,’”	  which	  means	  that	  while	  “they	  are	  
no	  longer	  serviceable—‘good	  to	  think	  with’—in	  their	  .	  .	  .	  unreconstructed	  form,”	  at	  
the	  same	  time	  “they	  have	  not	  been	  superseded	  dialectically,	  and	  there	  are	  no	  other,	  
entirely	  different	  concepts	  with	  which	  to	  replace	  them”	  so	  that	  “there	  is	  nothing	  to	  
do	  but	  to	  continue	  to	  think	  with	  them—albeit	  now	  in	  their	  detotalized	  or	  
deconstructed	  forms.”172	  The	  old	  ideas	  live	  on	  in	  the	  form	  of	  a	  kind	  of	  stopgap	  
approximation,	  the	  closest	  thing	  to	  a	  legitimate	  idea	  that	  we	  can	  currently	  access.	  	  
	   But	  even	  before	  old	  ideas	  about	  identity	  became	  politically	  and	  theoretically	  
suspect,	  Hall	  asserts	  that	  they	  were	  more	  tenuous	  than	  generally	  supposed.	  
“Identification	  is	  in	  the	  end	  conditional,”	  he	  writes,	  “lodged	  in	  contingency.	  Once	  
secured,	  it	  does	  not	  obliterate	  difference.	  The	  total	  merging	  it	  suggests	  is,	  in	  fact,	  a	  
fantasy	  of	  incorporation.	  .	  .	  .	  Identification	  is,	  then,	  a	  process	  of	  articulation,	  a	  
suturing,	  an	  over-­‐determination	  not	  a	  subsumption.	  There	  is	  always	  ‘too	  much’	  or	  
‘too	  little’—an	  over-­‐determination	  or	  a	  lack,	  but	  never	  a	  proper	  fit,	  a	  totality.”173	  	  
	   Hall’s	  conception	  of	  identity	  “accepts	  that	  identities	  are	  never	  unified	  and,	  in	  
late	  modern	  times,	  increasingly	  fragmented	  and	  fractured;	  never	  singular	  but	  
multiply	  constructed	  across	  different,	  often	  intersecting	  and	  antagonistic,	  
discourses,	  practices	  and	  positions.	  They	  are	  subject	  to	  a	  radical	  historicization,	  and	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are	  constantly	  in	  the	  process	  of	  change	  and	  transformation.”174	  This	  is	  closely	  
related	  to	  his	  assertion,	  in	  the	  “New	  Ethnicities”	  essay,	  that	  “the	  end	  of	  the	  essential	  
black	  subject	  also	  entails	  a	  recognition	  that	  the	  central	  issues	  of	  race	  always	  appear	  
historically	  in	  articulation,	  in	  a	  formation,	  with	  other	  categories	  and	  divisions”	  and	  
thus	  that	  “the	  question	  of	  the	  black	  subject	  cannot	  be	  represented	  without	  reference	  
to	  the	  dimensions	  of	  class,	  gender,	  sexuality	  and	  ethnicity.”175	  Without	  naming	  it	  in	  
so	  many	  words,	  in	  this	  statement	  Hall	  provides	  a	  definition	  of	  intersectionality,	  the	  
idea	  that	  different	  forms	  of	  oppression	  cannot	  be	  understood	  in	  isolation	  but	  must	  
be	  viewed	  in	  context	  with	  one	  another.	  	  
	   Perhaps	  most	  importantly,	  Hall	  argues	  that	  “contrary	  to	  the	  form	  in	  which	  
they	  are	  constantly	  invoked,	  identities	  are	  constructed	  through,	  not	  outside,	  
difference”;	  thus,	  “it	  is	  only	  through	  the	  relation	  to	  the	  Other	  .	  .	  .	  to	  what	  has	  been	  
called	  its	  constitutive	  outside	  that	  the	  ‘positive’	  meaning	  of	  any	  term—and	  thus	  its	  
‘identity’—can	  be	  constructed.”176	  According	  to	  this	  scheme,	  identities	  only	  
“function	  .	  .	  .	  because	  of	  their	  capacity	  to	  exclude,	  to	  leave	  out,	  to	  render	  ‘outside,’	  
abjected.”177	  This	  argument	  may	  sound	  familiar	  given	  my	  earlier	  discussion	  of	  
Wilson’s	  Bourdieu-­‐esque	  analysis	  of	  Dion’s	  reception	  and	  Ewing’s	  musings	  about	  
marketing	  data.	  Similar	  dynamics	  are	  at	  work	  in	  the	  ways	  that,	  according	  to	  both	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writers,	  people	  use	  musical	  taste	  to	  differentiate	  themselves	  through	  their	  musical	  
taste.	  
	   Frith	  has	  yet	  another	  perspective	  on	  the	  relationship	  between	  musical	  taste	  
and	  identity.	  Frith	  writes	  that	  he	  wants	  “to	  reverse	  the	  usual	  academic	  and	  critical	  
argument:	  the	  issue	  is	  not	  how	  a	  particular	  piece	  of	  music	  or	  a	  performance	  reflects	  
the	  people,	  but	  how	  it	  produces	  them,	  how	  it	  creates	  and	  constructs	  an	  experience	  .	  .	  
.	  that	  we	  can	  only	  make	  sense	  of	  by	  taking	  on	  both	  a	  subjective	  and	  a	  collective	  
identity.”178	  Frith	  sees	  music	  as	  an	  experience	  that	  “means	  experiencing	  ourselves	  
(not	  just	  the	  world)	  in	  a	  different	  way,”	  identity	  as	  “mobile,	  a	  process	  not	  a	  thing,	  a	  
becoming	  not	  a	  being,”	  and	  music	  as	  “best	  understood	  as	  an	  experience	  of	  this	  self-­
in-­process,”	  particular	  given	  music’s	  unique	  ability	  to	  evoke	  “a	  sense	  of	  both	  self	  and	  
others,	  of	  the	  subjective	  in	  the	  collective.”179	  (If	  this	  sounds	  reminiscent	  of	  Frank	  
Kogan’s	  comment,	  quoted	  in	  my	  second	  chapter,	  that	  rockism	  is	  not	  “some	  foreign	  
body”	  to	  be	  rooted	  out	  but	  a	  set	  of	  “cultural	  processes	  that	  we	  participate	  in,”	  it’s	  
probably	  no	  coincidence—Kogan	  and	  Frith	  are	  friends	  who,	  despite	  major	  
differences	  in	  some	  areas,	  quote	  one	  another	  frequently.)	  
	   I	  would	  argue	  that	  the	  antiracist	  political	  strivings	  of	  poptimist	  music	  critics	  
are	  more	  in	  line	  with	  the	  first	  phase	  Hall	  discusses	  in	  his	  piece	  which	  emphasized	  
empowering	  black	  “cultural	  workers”	  and	  advocating	  for	  “positive”	  portrayals	  of	  
blacks	  but	  was	  based	  on	  a	  relatively	  naïve	  concept	  of	  identity	  which	  posits	  a	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mythical	  black	  subject	  that	  is	  “essentially	  good”	  and	  progress	  through	  a	  “simple	  set	  
of	  reversals.”	  	  
	   “We	  think	  about	  identification	  usually	  as	  a	  simple	  process,	  structured	  around	  
fixed	  ‘selves’	  which	  we	  either	  are	  or	  are	  not,”	  Hall	  goes	  on	  to	  write.	  Yet	  not	  only	  is	  
the	  subject	  discursively	  produced,	  as	  Gramsci	  pointed	  out	  but	  Hall	  describes	  how	  in	  
the	  case	  of	  race,	  a	  complex	  interplay	  of	  “identification	  and	  desire”	  is	  present.180	  
The	  play	  of	  identity	  and	  difference	  which	  constructs	  racism	  is	  powered	  not	  
only	  by	  the	  positioning	  of	  blacks	  as	  the	  inferior	  species	  but	  also,	  and	  at	  the	  
same	  time,	  by	  an	  inexpressible	  envy	  and	  desire;	  and	  this	  is	  something	  the	  
recognition	  of	  which	  fundamentally	  displaces	  many	  of	  our	  hitherto	  stable	  
political	  categories,	  since	  it	  implies	  a	  process	  of	  identification	  and	  otherness	  
which	  is	  more	  complex	  than	  we	  had	  hitherto	  imagined.181	  	  
Hall	  is	  quick	  to	  point	  out	  that	  these	  dynamics	  are	  made	  even	  more	  complex	  because	  
of	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  they	  intersect	  with	  other	  components	  of	  identity	  such	  as	  
gender	  and	  class.182	  	  
	   Up	  to	  this	  point	  I	  have	  mainly	  focused	  on	  the	  racial	  component	  of	  identity	  to	  
the	  exclusion	  of	  other	  aspects.	  This	  is	  in	  large	  part	  because,	  as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  
Merritt	  controversy,	  race	  issues	  tend	  to	  dominate	  poptimist	  discussions	  of	  identity	  
issues.	  One	  critic	  who	  touches	  on	  other	  aspects	  of	  identity	  with	  some	  frequency	  is	  
Wilson.	  In	  his	  response	  to	  Frere-­‐Jones’s	  “Paler	  Shade	  of	  White,”	  Wilson	  notes	  this	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racial	  emphasis	  and	  counters	  it	  with	  an	  argument	  that,	  as	  the	  subtitle	  of	  his	  piece	  
“The	  Trouble	  With	  Indie	  Rock”	  states,	  “It’s	  not	  just	  race.	  It’s	  class.”	  As	  I	  mentioned	  
earlier,	  Wilson	  charges	  Frere-­‐Jones	  with	  the	  classic	  essentializing	  move	  of	  
“reduc[ing]	  black	  music	  to	  rhythm	  and	  sexuality.”183	  It	  is	  possible	  to	  see	  how	  such	  a	  
move	  not	  only	  reinscribes	  racist	  ideas	  about	  African-­‐Americans	  but	  also	  plays	  into	  
the	  interplay	  of	  identification	  and	  desire	  mentioned	  by	  Hall.	  
	   Wilson	  reframes	  the	  discussion	  in	  terms	  of	  not	  only	  race	  but	  class,	  writing	  
that	  “ultimately	  .	  .	  .	  the	  ‘trouble	  with	  indie	  rock’	  may	  have	  far	  more	  to	  do	  with	  
another	  post-­‐Reagan	  social	  shift,	  one	  with	  even	  less	  upside	  than	  the	  black-­‐white	  
story,	  and	  that’s	  the	  widening	  gap	  between	  rich	  and	  poor.”184	  He	  asserts	  that	  
“among	  at	  least	  a	  subset	  of	  (the	  younger)	  musicians	  and	  fans,	  this	  class	  separation	  
has	  made	  indie	  more	  openly	  snobbish	  and	  narrow-­‐minded”	  and	  that	  indie	  rock	  has	  
an	  “elite	  status	  and	  media	  sway	  .	  .	  .	  disproportionate	  to	  its	  popularity”	  which	  is	  “one	  
reason	  the	  cultural	  politics	  of	  indie	  musicians	  and	  fans	  require	  discussion	  in	  the	  first	  
place.”185	  
	   Wilson	  also	  uses	  Dion’s	  class	  status	  (she	  comes	  from	  a	  working-­‐class	  
Canadian	  family)	  to	  make	  a	  case	  for	  her	  work	  in	  Let’s	  Talk	  About	  Love.	  He	  refers	  to	  
her	  as	  “the	  poor	  girl	  from	  Charlemagne”	  and	  links	  origin	  with	  ethnicity	  when	  he	  
posits	  a	  “link	  between	  the	  nègres	  blancs	  of	  Quebec	  and	  the	  Creole	  Blacks	  of	  New	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




Orleans.”186	  Wilson’s	  willingness	  to	  explore	  other	  factors	  besides	  race	  in	  his	  
discussions	  of	  the	  politics	  of	  music	  hints	  at	  an	  understanding	  of	  the	  complex	  nature	  
of	  intersectionality	  referred	  to	  by	  Hall.	  	  
	   But	  he	  forecloses	  this	  potential	  complexity	  by	  simply	  replacing	  the	  race	  
discussion	  with	  one	  that	  privileges	  class,	  missing	  an	  opportunity	  for	  a	  truly	  
intersectional	  analysis,	  then	  going	  on	  to	  rely	  on	  other	  oversimplified,	  outdated	  ideas	  
in	  his	  defense	  of	  Dion.	  By	  implicitly	  treating	  her	  lower-­‐class	  origins	  and	  the	  
relatively	  underprivileged	  status	  of	  her	  ethnic	  background	  as	  proof	  positive	  that	  
Dion	  is	  a	  worthwhile	  performer,	  Wilson	  performs	  another	  version	  of	  the	  “simple	  set	  
of	  reversals”	  Hall	  describes	  in	  which	  a	  subject	  is	  presented	  as	  “essentially	  good”	  by	  
virtue	  of	  their	  race,	  class	  status,	  or	  some	  other	  subaltern	  characteristic.	  I	  am	  also	  
reminded	  here	  of	  Hall’s	  discussion	  of	  Gramsci	  and	  his	  critique,	  in	  the	  tradition	  of	  
Gramsci,	  of	  the	  notion	  that	  working-­‐class	  people	  have	  “‘correct’	  revolutionary	  
thoughts”	  or	  that	  blacks	  have	  an	  “already	  guaranteed	  current	  anti-­‐racist	  
consciousness.”	  	  
	   This	  is	  not	  as	  damning	  an	  assessment	  as	  it	  may	  sound.	  Hall	  is	  widely	  
acknowledged	  to	  be	  a	  shrewd	  observer	  of	  the	  politics	  of	  hegemony	  and	  was	  
probably	  well	  ahead	  of	  the	  curve	  when	  it	  came	  to	  acknowledging	  the	  complexity	  of	  
identity.	  But	  even	  Hall,	  while	  pointing	  out	  that	  previous	  ways	  of	  looking	  at	  these	  
issues	  had	  become	  outmoded,	  did	  not	  pose	  a	  clear	  and	  easy-­‐to-­‐recognize	  alternative.	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  Wilson,	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  About	  Love,	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   There	  are	  other	  types	  of	  identity	  and	  other	  forms	  of	  difference	  than	  those	  
that	  interpellate	  us	  into	  more	  or	  less	  privileged	  classes	  of	  people	  through	  categories	  
such	  as	  race,	  class,	  gender,	  ethnicity,	  sexuality,	  whether	  or	  not	  we	  are	  disabled,	  
whether	  we	  are	  cisgender187	  or	  trans,	  and	  so	  on.	  Within	  the	  intersection	  of	  such	  
identities	  where	  each	  of	  us	  finds	  ourselves,	  we	  can	  either	  distinguish	  ourselves	  from	  
others	  (both	  those	  who	  share	  our	  intersectional	  position	  and	  those	  who	  do	  not)	  or	  
join	  with	  them	  in	  sharing	  characteristics,	  practices	  and	  viewpoints.	  	  
	   Although	  it	  is	  an	  incredibly	  rich	  area	  of	  analysis,	  the	  significance	  of	  identity	  
and	  difference	  for	  music	  reception	  extends	  beyond	  the	  identity	  politics	  into	  a	  
multitude	  of	  other	  dimensions	  through	  which	  we	  conceptualize	  the	  self.	  After	  all,	  
even	  among	  the	  straight,	  white,	  cisgender,	  non-­‐disabled	  men	  that	  make	  up	  the	  
majority	  of	  music	  critics,	  aesthetic	  and	  ideological	  turf	  wars	  are	  commonplace.	  
These	  critics,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  fans	  who	  identify	  with	  them,	  often	  define	  themselves	  in	  
contrast	  to	  one	  another	  despite	  the	  characteristics	  they	  share.	  	  
	   In	  one	  of	  the	  more	  notorious	  bits	  of	  poptimist	  criticism	  to	  appear	  in	  recent	  
years,	  a	  2007	  blog	  entry	  called	  “Paris	  is	  Our	  Vietnam,”	  Frank	  Kogan	  explains	  how	  he	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
187	  T-­‐Vox,	  a	  website	  on	  transsexual,	  intersex,	  and	  genderqueer	  issues,	  defines	  
cisgender	  as	  “‘not	  [t]ransgender,’	  that	  is,	  a	  gender	  identity	  or	  performance	  in	  a	  
gender	  role	  that	  society	  considers	  to	  match	  or	  be	  appropriate	  for	  one’s	  sex.”	  Naming	  
cisgender	  specifically	  rather	  than	  simply	  saying	  “non-­‐transgender”	  helps	  to	  prevent	  
trans	  people	  from	  being	  labeled	  as	  exceptional,	  abnormal,	  or	  deviant.	  Using	  a	  
specific	  term	  for	  the	  condition	  of	  being	  cisgender	  denaturalizes	  it	  and	  provides	  
greater	  opportunities	  for	  examining	  and	  combating	  cisgender	  privilege.	  It	  also	  
avoids	  inaccuracies	  that	  come	  up	  when	  people	  are	  referred	  to	  as	  “naturally”	  or	  
“genetically”	  male	  or	  female	  or	  as	  having	  been	  “born”	  male	  or	  female.	  	  
“Cisgender,”	  T-­‐Vox,	  http://www.t-­‐vox.org/index.php?title=Cisgender	  (accessed	  
August	  10,	  2010).	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distinguishes	  himself	  from	  other	  listeners	  neither	  through	  old	  codes	  of	  cultural	  
capital	  nor	  the	  new	  “multicultural	  capital”	  but	  by	  opposing	  himself	  to	  elitism.	  Kogan	  
was	  widely	  criticized	  for	  the	  headline	  of	  this	  piece,	  which	  seemed	  to	  compare	  the	  
significance	  of	  the	  debate	  over	  Paris	  Hilton	  to	  the	  Vietnam	  War.	  This	  struck	  some	  as	  
especially	  problematic	  at	  a	  time	  when	  the	  United	  States	  was	  embroiled	  in	  another	  
controversial	  overseas	  quagmire.	  But	  further	  inspection	  shows	  that	  Kogan’s	  
Vietnam	  reference	  has	  a	  specific	  significance	  for	  him.	  He	  describes	  how	  his	  
understanding	  of	  the	  Vietnam	  War	  shifted	  from	  supporting	  the	  war	  in	  1966	  at	  age	  
12,	  “believing	  that	  we	  were	  defending	  freedom	  against	  communist	  aggression”	  to	  
opposing	  the	  war	  two	  years	  later	  at	  14.188	  	  
The	  reasons	  for	  the	  switch	  were	  complicated.	  .	  .	  .	  But	  there	  was	  an	  early	  
incident	  in	  1966	  that	  helped	  make	  me	  amenable	  to	  being	  turned:	  I	  heard	  a	  
radio	  report	  about	  an	  antiwar	  demonstration	  where	  the	  peaceful	  
demonstrators	  were	  attacked	  by	  a	  stone-­‐throwing	  mob.	  .	  .	  .	  this	  incident	  with	  
the	  Vietnam	  protesters	  created	  a	  rip	  in	  my	  understanding	  of	  the	  world.	  I	  
thought	  we	  were	  the	  good	  guys	  in	  Vietnam	  (defending	  the	  South	  Vietnamese	  
against	  communist	  aggression),	  and	  it	  didn’t	  compute	  that	  the	  bad	  guys	  at	  
home	  seemed	  to	  be	  on	  the	  good	  side	  and	  that	  the	  peaceful	  demonstrators	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
188	  Frank	  Kogan,	  “Rules	  Of	  The	  Game	  Followup	  #2:	  Paris	  Is	  Our	  Vietnam,”	  Las	  Vegas	  
Weekly	  News	  Blog,	  June	  29,	  2007,	  http://www.lasvegasweekly.com/news/archive/	  
2007/jun/11/rules-­‐of-­‐the-­‐game-­‐followup-­‐2-­‐paris-­‐is-­‐our-­‐vietnam	  (accessed	  May	  26,	  
2010).	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seemed	  to	  be	  on	  the	  bad.	  My	  feeling	  was	  that	  I	  didn’t	  want	  to	  be	  on	  the	  side	  of	  
the	  stone-­‐throwers.	  So	  I	  had	  to	  realign	  my	  thinking	  .	  .	  .189	  
Kogan	  explains	  that	  although	  there	  were	  a	  number	  of	  reasons	  for	  the	  change	  in	  his	  
position,	  this	  experience	  was	  a	  powerful	  part	  of	  the	  process,	  and	  he	  finds	  himself	  
reacting	  in	  a	  similar	  way	  to	  the	  flood	  of	  negative	  sentiment	  that	  accompanied	  
Hilton’s	  2007	  arrest	  for	  probation	  violation.190	  “I	  totally	  want	  to	  be	  on	  Paris’s	  side,”	  
Kogan	  writes,	  “and	  this	  isn’t	  so	  much	  because	  I	  know	  all	  that	  much	  about	  Paris	  
(despite	  loving	  her	  album)	  but	  because	  I	  can’t	  stand	  the	  people	  who	  vociferously	  
dislike	  her.	  .	  .	  .	  The	  point	  here	  is	  that	  the	  haters	  stimulate	  me	  to	  want	  to	  like	  Paris’s	  
music.	  I	  want	  to	  like	  her	  because	  I	  don’t	  like	  her	  enemies.”191	  	  
	   Kogan	  is	  careful	  to	  point	  out	  that	  hearing	  about	  pro-­‐war	  demonstrators	  
hurting	  Vietnam	  War	  protesters	  was	  just	  a	  component	  of	  his	  changing	  perspective	  
on	  the	  war	  and	  just	  as	  careful	  to	  mention	  that	  he	  liked	  Hilton’s	  album	  before	  the	  
intensity	  of	  popular	  criticism	  spurred	  him	  to	  a	  greater	  identification	  with	  her.	  He	  
also	  points	  out	  that	  “of	  course,	  over	  the	  years	  the	  antiwar	  people	  themselves	  heaved	  
plenty	  of	  rocks,	  literal	  and	  verbal,	  and	  so	  did	  I	  (and	  I’ve	  liked	  plenty	  of	  musical	  stone	  
throwers,	  from	  the	  Stones	  through	  the	  Stooges	  and	  Sex	  Pistols	  and	  Contortions),	  so	  
things	  never	  quite	  righted	  themselves	  into	  good	  guys	  versus	  bad	  guys”	  after	  his	  
youthful	  idealization	  of	  U.S.	  foreign	  policy.192	  Kogan	  acknowledges	  that	  the	  “good	  






guys”	  vs.	  “bad	  guys”	  model	  is	  insufficient	  and	  that	  these	  allegiances	  are	  complicated	  
but	  nevertheless	  asserts	  their	  importance.	  	  
	   Kogan	  showed	  an	  interest	  in	  these	  themes	  year	  before	  “Paris	  is	  Our	  
Vietnam,”	  such	  as	  in	  a	  piece	  called	  “How	  Music	  Creates	  Ideas”	  in	  the	  fourth	  issue	  of	  
Why	  Music	  Sucks,	  a	  zine	  he	  published	  in	  the	  late	  1980s.	  He	  wrote	  the	  piece	  in	  
response	  to	  friend	  John	  Wójtowicz’s	  contention	  that	  when	  he	  first	  heard	  John	  
Coltrane’s	  “Ascension”	  he	  was	  not	  thinking	  about	  what	  kind	  of	  person	  it	  would	  make	  
him,	  calling	  into	  question	  Kogan’s	  assertions	  about	  music	  and	  identity.193	  “So	  what	  if	  
you	  began	  listening	  to	  ‘Ascension’	  without	  thinking	  what	  kind	  of	  person	  you	  could	  
consider	  yourself	  to	  be	  after	  hearing	  it?”	  Kogan	  wrote	  in	  reply.194	  He	  illustrates	  his	  
point	  through	  a	  discussion	  of	  his	  own	  introduction	  to	  the	  Ohio	  Express,	  insisting	  
that	  “there	  was	  an	  unconscious	  socioreasoning	  process	  that	  underlay	  my	  
‘spontaneous’	  ‘gut-­‐level’	  reaction	  to	  ‘Yummy	  Yummy	  Yummy.’”195	  Similarly,	  he	  tells	  
Wójtowicz,	  
When	  you	  listened	  to	  “Ascension”	  you	  weren’t	  consciously	  thinking	  about	  
what	  sort	  of	  person	  you	  were,	  you	  were	  being	  that	  sort	  of	  person—or	  
perhaps	  changing	  yourself	  into	  that	  person!	  .	  .	  .	  So	  even	  if	  “legitimacy	  vs.	  
illegitimacy”	  and	  “what	  sort	  of	  person	  does	  this	  make	  me?”	  don’t	  start	  off	  as	  
issues	  for	  you,	  they	  become	  issues	  soon	  enough—as	  soon	  as	  listening	  to	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Coltrane	  intersects	  with	  your	  environment	  (which	  is	  probably	  as	  soon	  as	  it	  
hits	  your	  ears,	  given	  internalization).196	  
Kogan	  refers	  throughout	  this	  piece	  to	  “Us”	  and	  “Them,”	  with	  Wójtowicz	  quoted	  as	  
wanting	  to	  “redefine	  ‘them’	  to	  refer	  to	  the	  candyass	  whitebread	  anglo	  sexless	  
protestants	  who	  go	  to	  parties	  and	  don’t	  drink	  or	  dance	  or	  smoke	  dope.”197	  Kogan	  
writes	  that	  while	  there	  is	  more	  to	  Wójtowicz’s	  enjoyment	  of	  “Ascension”	  than	  
posturing	  (as	  he	  puts	  it,	  he’s	  careful	  not	  to	  “reduce	  ‘Ascension’	  to	  hairstyle”),	  his	  
friend	  cannot	  negate	  his	  awareness	  of	  identity	  issues	  or	  the	  “unconscious	  
socioreasoning”	  that	  stems	  from	  it.198	  He	  asserts	  that	  it	  is	  Wójtowicz’s	  ability	  to	  hear	  
“Ascension”	  not	  only	  “as	  hairstyle”	  but	  also	  “as	  music”	  and	  to	  hear	  it	  in	  relation	  to	  all	  
the	  other	  music	  he	  likes	  (“World	  Saxophone	  Quartet,	  and	  Ornette	  Coleman,	  and	  also	  
Teena	  Marie,	  Velvet	  Underground,	  Metallica”)	  that	  distinguishes	  you	  from	  ‘them.’”199	  
Just	  as	  in	  his	  later	  piece	  Kogan	  seeks	  to	  distinguish	  himself	  from	  the	  anti-­‐Paris	  camp,	  
in	  this	  one	  he	  allied	  himself	  with	  his	  friend	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  distinguish	  themselves	  
from	  “Them.”	  However,	  in	  both	  cases,	  he	  acknowledges	  his	  own	  vested	  interest	  in	  
seeing	  himself	  in	  a	  certain	  light,	  including	  an	  interest	  that	  is	  at	  times	  unconscious.	  	  
	   Wilson	  is	  referring	  to	  something	  related	  when	  he	  talks	  about	  trying	  to	  
overcome	  his	  biases	  through	  the	  Céline	  project—he	  does	  not	  want	  to	  be	  the	  kind	  of	  
person	  who	  would	  dislike	  music	  for	  the	  wrong	  reasons,	  which	  is	  why	  he	  must	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attempt	  to	  like	  music	  for	  the	  right	  reasons.	  He	  recalls	  that	  when	  Let’s	  Talk	  About	  
Love,	  the	  album,	  first	  came	  out	  “I	  assumed	  that	  it	  was	  shallow,	  that	  it	  was	  beneath	  
me.	  A	  decade	  later	  I	  don’t	  see	  the	  advantage	  of	  holding	  yourself	  above	  things.”200	  In	  
response	  to	  objections	  people	  have	  made	  to	  the	  project,	  he	  writes:	  
A	  few	  people	  have	  asked	  me,	  isn’t	  life	  too	  short	  to	  waste	  time	  on	  art	  you	  
dislike?	  But	  lately	  I	  feel	  like	  life	  is	  too	  short	  not	  to.	  I	  began	  this	  experiment	  
with	  abstract	  questions	  about	  how	  taste	  functions,	  but	  I’ve	  come	  to	  see	  that	  it	  
was	  more	  personal:	  I	  am	  nearing	  my	  fortieth	  birthday,	  half-­‐willingly	  being	  
carried	  out	  the	  exit	  of	  youth	  culture,	  and	  I’ve	  begun	  to	  wonder	  what	  kind	  of	  
person	  that	  will	  make	  me.	  I	  cringe	  when	  I	  think	  what	  a	  subcultural	  snob	  I	  was	  
five	  or	  ten	  years	  ago,	  and	  worse	  in	  my	  teens	  and	  twenties,	  how	  vigilant	  I	  was	  
about	  being	  taken	  in—unaware	  that	  I	  was	  also	  refusing	  an	  invitation	  out.	  .	  .	  .	  
For	  me,	  adulthood	  is	  turning	  out	  to	  be	  about	  becoming	  democratic.201	  
Although	  this	  admission	  comes	  only	  near	  the	  end	  of	  Wilson’s	  book,	  it	  colors	  the	  
entirety	  of	  his	  analysis.	  Like	  Kogan,	  Wilson	  does	  not	  want	  to	  be	  the	  kind	  of	  person	  
who	  dislikes	  a	  given	  thing	  so	  he	  is	  motivated	  to	  like	  it.	  	  
	   Wilson	  also	  distinguishes	  himself	  from	  other	  types	  of	  people,	  most	  notably	  
academics.	  In	  a	  caricatured	  portrayal	  of	  academic	  discourse,	  he	  writes	  that	  “even	  in	  
the	  ostensibly	  more	  serious	  realm	  of	  academia,	  notably	  Cultural	  Studies,	  the	  idea	  of	  
‘resistant’	  reading—that	  audiences	  make	  self-­‐empowering,	  anti-­‐establishment	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reinterpretations	  of	  mainstream	  culture—can	  be	  merely	  a	  reverse	  justification	  of	  
personal	  taste,”	  claiming	  that	  academics	  simply	  ascribe	  “subversive”	  messages	  to	  
music	  and	  artists	  that	  they	  personally	  prefer.202	  If,	  Wilson	  writes,	  “as	  Bourdieu	  
believed,	  aesthetics	  are	  mostly	  a	  disguise	  for	  political	  relationships”	  then	  “to	  .	  .	  .	  use	  
politics	  as	  a	  further	  disguise	  for	  your	  aesthetics	  is	  to	  build	  a	  hall	  of	  mirrors.	  Since	  
power	  is	  a	  dynamic	  that	  permeates	  even	  the	  most	  microscopic	  interactions,	  you	  can	  
find	  submission	  or	  resistance	  in	  any	  cultural	  figure	  or	  artifact	  if	  you	  look,	  but	  it	  can	  
be	  misleading	  to	  do	  so	  selectively,	  and	  break	  pop	  culture	  down	  into	  quiescent	  
versus	  subversive	  blocs.”203	  	  
	   This	  is,	  of	  course,	  a	  baseless	  accusation	  to	  make	  of	  the	  Cultural	  Studies	  field	  
and	  of	  academia	  more	  generally.	  Certainly,	  bad	  scholarship	  of	  the	  sort	  Wilson	  
describes	  exists,	  but	  it	  is	  not	  representative	  of	  quality	  academic	  work	  on	  popular	  
media.	  “Why,	  finally,	  should	  subversion	  be	  the	  sine	  qua	  non?”	  Wilson	  adds.	  “Fans,	  
after	  all,	  are	  not	  always	  busy	  resisting	  and	  recontextualizing	  their	  idols—they	  also	  
support,	  defend	  and	  identify	  with	  them.”204	  Unfortunately,	  ideas	  such	  as	  Wilson’s	  
perception	  that	  cultural	  studies	  “break[s]	  pop	  culture	  into	  quiescent	  versus	  
subversive	  blocs”	  and	  views	  resistance	  as	  “the	  sine	  qua	  non”	  are	  not	  uncommon,	  but	  
they	  are	  inaccurate.	  	  
	   In	  a	  2009	  piece	  for	  The	  Chronicle	  of	  Higher	  Education,	  Michael	  Bérubé	  writes	  
about	  the	  mixed	  legacy	  of	  cultural	  studies	  scholarship,	  focusing	  largely	  on	  the	  ways	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it	  has	  been	  misunderstood	  and	  its	  insights	  (particularly	  of	  the	  political	  variety)	  
ignored.205	  Cultural	  studies,	  he	  writes,	  “has	  been	  understood,	  which	  is	  to	  say	  
misunderstood,	  as	  coextensive	  with	  the	  study	  of	  popular	  culture.	  .	  .	  .	  The	  result	  is	  
that	  cultural	  studies	  now	  means	  everything	  and	  nothing;	  it	  has	  effectively	  been	  
conflated	  with	  ‘cultural	  criticism’	  in	  general,	  and	  associated	  with	  a	  cheery	  ‘Pop	  
culture	  is	  fun!’	  approach.”206	  But	  even	  more	  importantly	  for	  Bérubé,	  “cultural	  
studies	  has	  had	  negligible	  impact	  on	  the	  American	  academic	  left	  in	  a	  political	  sense”	  
because	  “much	  of	  the	  American	  academic	  left	  continues	  to	  subscribe	  to	  the	  
‘manufacturing	  consent’	  model,	  in	  which	  people	  are	  led	  to	  misidentify	  their	  real	  
interests	  by	  the	  machinations	  of	  the	  corporate	  mass	  media.”207	  
	   In	  contrast,	  Bérubé	  writes,	  “cultural	  studies	  has	  taught	  us—or	  has	  tried	  to	  
teach	  us—that	  you	  don’t	  know	  the	  meaning	  of	  a	  mass-­‐cultural	  artifact	  until	  you	  find	  
out	  what	  those	  masses	  of	  people	  actually	  do	  with	  it.”208	  He	  elaborates	  with	  a	  quote	  
from	  Hall:	  
It	  is	  a	  highly	  unstable	  theory	  about	  the	  world	  which	  has	  to	  assume	  that	  vast	  
numbers	  of	  ordinary	  people,	  mentally	  equipped	  in	  much	  the	  same	  way	  as	  
you	  or	  I,	  can	  simply	  be	  thoroughly	  and	  systematically	  duped	  into	  
misrecognizing	  entirely	  where	  their	  real	  interests	  lie.	  Even	  less	  acceptable	  is	  
the	  position	  that,	  whereas	  “they”—the	  masses—are	  the	  dupes	  of	  history,	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“we”—the	  privileged—are	  somehow	  without	  a	  trace	  of	  illusion	  and	  can	  see,	  
transitively,	  right	  through	  into	  the	  truth,	  the	  essence,	  of	  a	  situation.209	  
This	  argument	  can	  easily	  be	  adjusted	  to	  suit	  a	  discussion	  of	  popular	  music	  
aesthetics.	  Indeed,	  changing	  a	  few	  terms	  might	  make	  it	  sound	  like	  something	  Wilson	  
would	  say	  himself.	  Through	  this	  statement,	  Hall	  places	  himself	  in	  opposition	  to	  an	  
elitist	  stance	  that	  portrays	  the	  “masses”	  as	  misguided	  dupes,	  much	  as	  Wilson	  seeks	  
to	  oppose	  himself	  to	  elitist	  popular	  music	  discourse.	  The	  danger	  of	  this	  sort	  of	  
theorizing,	  though,	  is	  that	  in	  trying	  to	  point	  out	  a	  crucial	  perspective	  one	  runs	  the	  
risk	  of,	  in	  effect,	  claiming	  access	  to	  the	  “truth”	  or	  “essence”	  of	  reality	  in	  the	  process.	  	  
	   However,	  Wilson	  uses	  another	  opposition	  to	  define	  himself—that	  of	  
contrasting	  himself	  to	  academics,	  whose	  positions	  he	  caricatures	  while	  at	  the	  same	  
time	  shoring	  up	  his	  own	  argument	  with	  quotes	  from	  scholars	  like	  Bourdieu.	  In	  the	  
process,	  Wilson’s	  dilettantism	  creates	  a	  distorted	  view	  of	  academic	  theory	  for	  a	  
multitude	  of	  readers.	  His	  suspicion	  of	  contemporary	  scholarship	  seems	  to	  stem	  from	  
a	  common	  stereotypical	  view	  of	  academia	  as	  a	  haven	  of	  elitism,	  evidenced	  when	  he	  
writes	  things	  like	  this:	  “An	  academic	  might	  be	  able	  to	  dismiss	  public	  taste	  
completely	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  weird	  and	  challenging,	  but	  a	  working	  pop	  critic	  who	  did	  
so	  would	  be	  (rightly)	  out	  of	  a	  job	  in	  the	  long	  run”;	  and	  “academics,	  as	  the	  studies	  
themselves	  show	  [tellingly,	  Wilson	  has	  no	  references	  to	  back	  up	  this	  assertion],	  are	  
nearly	  the	  only	  group	  in	  contemporary	  society	  that	  still	  pays	  most	  of	  its	  attention	  to	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high	  culture.”210	  Beginning	  with	  such	  suppositions,	  it	  is	  no	  wonder	  Wilson	  finds	  little	  
to	  endorse	  in	  academic	  work	  on	  his	  topic	  of	  study.	  Yet	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  he	  banks	  on	  
the	  legitimacy	  that	  his	  references	  to	  academic	  theory	  afford	  him.	  As	  always,	  the	  
oppositions	  through	  which	  we	  intend	  to	  shore	  up	  certain	  identities	  for	  ourselves	  
tend	  to	  cut	  both	  ways.	  	  
	   The	  poptimist	  critics	  I	  have	  discussed	  tailor	  their	  approaches	  to	  support	  a	  
certain	  type	  of	  identity	  for	  themselves,	  either	  by	  forming	  alliances	  with	  or	  placing	  
themselves	  in	  opposition	  to	  different	  groups.	  Frere-­‐Jones	  and	  Hopper	  cast	  
themselves	  as	  anti-­‐racist	  crusaders,	  Wilson	  attempts	  to	  shed	  his	  snobbishness	  and	  
become	  a	  populist,	  and	  Kogan	  distinguishes	  himself	  from	  rock-­‐throwing	  
counterprotestors	  and	  Hilton	  haters	  by	  embracing	  what	  they	  condemn.	  In	  the	  
process,	  they	  engage	  with	  contemporary	  discourses	  of	  identity	  and	  difference	  in	  
complex	  ways.	  Their	  goals	  are	  commendable,	  but	  their	  tendency	  toward	  
oversimplification	  prevents	  them	  from	  coming	  to	  a	  more	  profound	  understanding	  of	  
these	  issues.	  	  
	   Throughout	  my	  exploration	  of	  poptimist	  discourse,	  I	  have	  found	  that	  despite	  
its	  ostensible	  populist	  ideals,	  it	  is	  structured	  by	  traditions	  associated	  with	  social	  
groups	  that	  possess	  a	  degree	  of	  high	  cultural	  capital.	  Basically,	  it	  attempts	  to	  employ	  
highbrow	  strategies	  in	  the	  service	  of	  populism	  with	  questionable	  results.	  Whether	  
knowingly	  or	  unknowingly,	  by	  using	  strategies	  like	  intellectualization	  and	  
omnivorousness	  that	  excludes	  the	  middlebrow,	  poptimist	  critics	  play	  it	  safe,	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maintaining	  their	  cultural	  capital	  according	  to	  traditional	  standards	  and	  
undermining	  their	  admirable	  goals.	  	  
	  
	  99	  
Chapter	  Four:	  Value	  and	  Emotion	  
	   This	  chapter	  will	  focus	  on	  a	  couple	  of	  aspects	  of	  musical	  taste	  that	  I	  have	  
neglected	  up	  to	  this	  point,	  but	  which	  underlie	  much	  of	  what	  I	  have	  already	  covered.	  
One	  is	  the	  question	  of	  value	  judgments.	  They	  are	  ostensibly	  the	  raison	  d’être	  of	  
music	  journalists	  (who	  are	  known	  to	  the	  general	  public	  mostly	  as	  writers	  of	  album	  
reviews),	  but	  like	  the	  other	  factors	  I	  have	  discussed	  so	  far,	  making	  value	  judgments	  
is	  a	  much	  more	  complex	  matter	  than	  it	  might	  seem	  on	  the	  surface.	  To	  this	  end,	  I	  will	  
discuss	  a	  number	  of	  music	  genres	  widely	  labeled	  as	  “bad,”	  including	  country,	  heavy	  
metal,	  and	  “sob	  pop,”	  and	  a	  number	  of	  qualities	  often	  attributed	  to	  “bad	  music,”	  
variations	  on	  ineptitude	  and	  the	  self-­‐indulgence.	  
	   The	  other	  topic	  I	  will	  focus	  on	  is	  the	  role	  of	  emotion.	  I	  have	  already	  touched	  
on	  a	  number	  of	  intensely	  fraught	  areas	  in	  which	  it	  plays	  a	  role,	  such	  as	  questions	  of	  
identity.	  Emotion	  is	  at	  the	  center	  of	  many	  of	  the	  central	  ideas	  of	  poptimism,	  such	  as	  
the	  guilty	  emotions	  that	  poptimism	  (by	  definition)	  rejects	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  “guilty	  
pleasure”	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  but	  which,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  Wilson	  suggests	  cultivating	  
when	  he	  advocates	  the	  “guilty	  displeasure.”	  I	  will	  talk	  about	  the	  politics	  of	  emotional	  
reactions	  and	  how	  this	  pertains	  to	  poptimist	  musical	  aesthetics	  and	  look	  into	  what	  
contemporary	  music	  critics	  have	  to	  say	  about	  emotions.	  These	  emotional	  issues	  are	  
particularly	  significant	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  value	  judgments,	  as	  I	  will	  outline	  in	  more	  
detail.	  In	  my	  conclusion,	  I	  will	  then	  explain	  how	  these	  variables	  interact	  with	  the	  
other	  terms	  of	  my	  analysis	  so	  far	  and	  sum	  up	  my	  thoughts	  on	  the	  poptimist	  project.	  	  
	  
	  100	  
Value	  judgments:	  Avoidance	  in	  the	  Classroom,	  a	  Brawl	  in	  the	  Hallway	  
	   As	  I	  described	  in	  chapters	  two	  and	  three,	  a	  number	  of	  complications	  that	  can	  
arise	  when	  one	  seeks	  to	  make	  value	  judgments	  about	  popular	  music,	  most	  
significantly	  around	  identity	  and	  authenticity.	  But	  even	  aside	  from	  these	  concerns,	  
the	  very	  act	  of	  making	  judgments	  of	  textual	  value	  is	  itself	  a	  very	  complex	  matter.	  	  
	   Simon	  Frith	  explains	  this	  in	  his	  book	  Performing	  Rites.	  One	  of	  the	  strongest	  
portions	  of	  his	  chapter	  on	  value	  is	  its	  exploration	  of	  academics’	  resistance	  to	  value	  
judgments.	  “The	  importance	  of	  value	  judgment	  for	  popular	  culture	  .	  .	  .	  seems	  
obvious,	  but	  it	  has	  been	  quite	  neglected	  in	  academic	  cultural	  studies,”	  Frith	  
writes.211	  He	  admits	  that	  he	  has	  experienced	  this	  difficulty	  as	  well:	  “I	  may	  have	  
spent	  the	  last	  twenty	  years	  writing	  pop	  and	  rock	  criticism,	  judging	  records	  for	  a	  
living,	  but	  I	  have	  tended	  to	  keep	  such	  arguments	  (plunging	  assertively	  into	  fan	  talk	  
at	  the	  bar	  and	  in	  the	  record	  store)	  out	  of	  my	  academic	  work.”212	  	  
	   This	  results	  in	  a	  state	  of	  affairs	  in	  which,	  according	  to	  Frith,	  while	  
“contemporary	  popular	  culture	  may	  now	  be	  a	  familiar	  topic	  on	  the	  curriculum,	  in	  
being	  constituted	  as	  a	  fit	  object	  for	  study	  it	  has	  become	  an	  oddly	  bloodless	  affair—
the	  aesthetics	  of	  the	  popular	  continues	  to	  be	  at	  best	  neglected	  and	  at	  worst	  
dismissed.”	  213	  He	  goes	  on	  to	  explain:	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One	  obvious	  reason	  for	  neglect	  is	  that	  cultural	  studies	  emerged	  from	  
disciplines	  in	  which	  questions	  of	  taste	  and	  judgment	  were	  already	  kept	  well	  
away	  from	  issues	  of	  academic	  analysis	  and	  assessment.	  Sociologists,	  
anthropologists,	  and	  social	  and	  cultural	  historians	  have	  always	  been	  wary	  of	  
proclaiming	  the	  activities	  they	  study	  as	  good	  or	  bad	  (such	  judgments	  are	  not	  
their	  business);	  perhaps	  more	  surprisingly,	  ‘evaluation,’	  as	  Barbara	  
Herrnstein	  Smith	  suggests,	  was	  also	  long	  ago	  apparently	  ‘exiled’	  from	  literary	  
criticism.	  
In	  other	  words,	  according	  Frith,	  scholars	  who	  study	  popular	  culture	  have	  reasons	  
for	  avoiding	  evaluation	  that	  are	  influenced	  by	  the	  disciplinary	  heritage	  of	  cultural	  
studies.	  However,	  other	  factors	  support	  their	  reluctance.	  Frith	  describes	  an	  
epiphany	  he	  had	  during	  a	  seminar	  discussion	  about	  this	  issue:	  “what	  became	  clear	  
to	  me	  was	  that	  the	  issue	  wasn’t	  really	  value	  but	  authority:	  the	  question	  was	  not	  
whether	  Barbara	  Cartland	  (or	  the	  Pet	  Shop	  Boys)	  are	  any	  good	  or	  not,	  but	  who	  has	  
the	  authority	  to	  say	  so.”214	  Frith	  seems	  to	  imply	  here,	  as	  I	  would	  argue	  explicitly,	  
that	  these	  concerns	  about	  authority	  are	  warranted.	  Given	  cultural	  studies	  scholars’	  
critical	  attitude	  toward	  hegemony,	  it	  is	  understandable	  that	  they	  would	  be	  loath	  to	  
mobilize	  the	  cultural	  capital	  inherent	  in	  the	  academy	  to	  champion	  their	  preferred	  
texts.	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   Frith	  points	  out	  some	  problems	  with	  this	  stance,	  including	  the	  fact	  that	  no	  
matter	  how	  much	  one	  might	  avoid	  value	  judgments	  in	  professional	  spaces,	  they	  
seem	  to	  pop	  up	  elsewhere;	  	  
there	  is	  still	  a	  split	  between	  what	  Frank	  Kogan	  describes	  as	  the	  discourse	  of	  
the	  classroom	  (with	  its	  focus	  on	  a	  subject	  matter)	  and	  the	  discourse	  of	  the	  
hallway	  (with	  its	  focus	  on	  oneself	  and	  one’s	  opinions	  about	  a	  subject	  matter	  
and	  one’s	  opinions	  about	  other	  people’s	  opinions	  about	  a	  subject	  matter	  and	  
one’s	  opinions	  about	  other	  people).215	  
This	  split	  causes	  Frith	  some	  cognitive	  dissonance:	  “If,	  in	  my	  own	  cultural	  practice,	  I	  
prefer”	  certain	  things	  to	  others,	  he	  writes,	  “shouldn’t	  I	  be	  prepared	  to	  argue	  the	  case	  
for	  my	  values?	  .	  .	  .	  Shouldn’t	  I	  be	  able	  to	  persuade	  [others]	  with	  classroom	  as	  well	  as	  
hallway	  arguments?”216	  
	   To	  digress	  for	  a	  moment,	  another	  aspect	  of	  Frith’s	  analysis	  of	  value	  
judgments	  in	  academia	  is	  pertinent	  to	  my	  discussion	  of	  poptimism.	  He	  points	  out	  a	  
strain	  of	  populism	  within	  cultural	  studies	  that	  looks	  for	  value	  in	  texts	  that	  are	  well-­‐
loved	  by	  large	  numbers	  of	  consumers	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  “deny	  (or	  reverse)	  the	  usual	  
high/low	  cultural	  hierarchy.”217	  This	  tendency	  closely	  resembles	  Carl	  Wilson’s	  anti-­‐
elitist	  goals.	  As	  Frith	  contends,	  when	  practiced	  in	  a	  scholarly	  setting	  this	  approach	  is	  
problematic	  not	  politically,	  but	  sociologically.218	  “The	  populist	  position	  is	  that	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whatever	  our	  (class-­‐bound)	  personal	  tastes	  and	  values	  may	  be,	  we	  have	  to	  accept	  
that	  sales	  figures,	  box	  office	  returns,	  and	  record	  charts	  tell	  us	  what	  ‘the	  people’	  
want,”	  Frith	  writes,	  but	  he	  finds,	  upon	  closer	  examination,	  that	  “the	  equation	  of	  
popular	  culture	  with	  market	  choice	  is	  problematic.”219	  He	  points	  out	  that	  “[e]ven	  if	  
such	  figures	  were	  accurate	  (which	  is	  doubtful),	  they	  provide	  no	  evidence	  as	  to	  why	  
such	  goods	  are	  chosen	  by	  their	  consumers	  nor	  whether	  they	  are	  actually	  enjoyed	  or	  
valued	  by	  them.”220	  Putting	  it	  another	  way,	  he	  sums	  up	  his	  qualms	  about	  this	  
approach	  with	  the	  question,	  “Are	  market	  choices	  (as	  measured	  somewhat	  
inaccurately	  by	  culture	  industries’	  own	  research	  devices)	  really	  all	  we	  mean	  by	  ‘the	  
popular’?”221	  If	  this	  is	  indeed	  our	  operating	  assumption,	  he	  writes,	  the	  end	  result	  is	  
that	  “the	  more	  celebratory	  the	  populist	  study,	  the	  more	  patronizing	  its	  tone.”222	  This	  
argument’s	  relevance	  to	  Wilson’s	  work	  on	  Céline	  Dion	  is	  readily	  apparent.	  If	  
Wilson’s	  choice	  of	  Dion	  as	  a	  subject	  is	  motivated	  by	  a	  desire	  to	  reconcile	  her	  
popularity	  with	  his	  own	  dislike,	  as	  he	  writes,	  it	  is	  crucial	  to	  understand	  whether	  her	  
sales	  figures	  denote	  a	  true	  popularity,	  a	  meaningful	  place	  in	  the	  lives	  of	  consumers,	  
or	  not.	  But	  this	  question	  never	  comes	  up	  for	  Wilson.	  
	   Now	  I	  would	  like	  to	  return	  to	  the	  question	  of	  hallway	  and	  classroom	  
discourses.	  Jason	  Mittell	  covers	  some	  similar	  territory	  in	  a	  recent	  blog	  post	  which	  
includes	  the	  current	  draft	  of	  a	  chapter	  in	  process.	  The	  piece,	  intended	  for	  an	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anthology	  on	  the	  series	  Mad	  Men,	  is	  about	  Mittell’s	  personal	  dislike	  of	  the	  show,	  and	  
this	  topic	  lends	  itself	  to	  an	  exploration	  of	  how	  personal	  taste	  and	  academic	  study	  
intersect.	  He	  points	  out	  that	  “[h]umanities	  scholars	  don’t	  typically	  brand	  ourselves	  
as	  fans	  of	  our	  objects	  of	  research”	  even	  though	  “our	  practices	  .	  .	  .	  are	  often	  quite	  
fannish.”223	  However,	  there	  has	  been	  a	  shift,	  he	  writes,	  in	  this	  respect:	  “many	  
scholars	  of	  contemporary	  popular	  culture	  have	  followed	  Henry	  Jenkins’s	  lead	  by	  
self-­‐proclaiming	  our	  allegiances	  as	  ‘aca-­‐fans,’	  a	  hybrid	  of	  academic	  and	  fan	  critics	  
that	  acknowledges	  and	  interweaves	  both	  intellectual	  and	  emotional	  cultural	  
engagements.”224	  And	  since	  emotional	  engagements	  influence	  intellectual	  ones,	  
Mittell	  shows,	  the	  sort	  of	  material	  that	  dominates	  media	  studies	  shows	  that	  “taste	  
structures	  what	  we	  choose	  to	  write	  about.”225	  	  
While	  media	  scholars	  do	  not	  solely	  write	  about	  what	  we	  like,	  the	  prevalence	  
of	  books	  focused	  on	  “quality	  television”	  shows	  that	  appeal	  to	  academics	  
like	  Buffy	  the	  Vampire	  Slayer,	  The	  Sopranos,	  and	  now	  Mad	  Men	  –	  especially	  
when	  compared	  to	  the	  lack	  of	  similar	  volumes	  or	  essays	  about	  more	  
lowbrow	  or	  mainstream	  programs	  –	  suggests	  that	  taste	  is	  often	  more	  of	  a	  
motivating	  factor	  for	  our	  scholarship	  than	  we	  admit.226	  	  
These	  emotional	  engagements	  are	  the	  stuff	  of	  Frith’s	  hallway	  talk,	  whereas	  
classroom	  talk	  has	  traditionally	  been	  confined	  to	  more	  intellectual	  arguments	  (even	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when	  these	  intellectual	  arguments	  are,	  in	  effect,	  a	  smokescreen	  for	  or	  an	  
afterthought	  to	  emotional	  ones).	  	  
	   Part	  of	  the	  reason	  Frith	  chafes	  at	  not	  to	  be	  able	  to	  use	  classroom	  ideas	  in	  
hallway	  arguments	  is	  that	  he	  believes	  that	  arguments	  about	  value	  are	  a	  crucial	  part	  
of	  our	  enjoyment	  of	  music	  fandom.	  He	  writes,	  “[p]art	  of	  the	  pleasure	  of	  popular	  
culture	  is	  talking	  about	  it;	  part	  of	  its	  meaning	  is	  this	  talk,	  talk	  which	  is	  run	  through	  
with	  value	  judgments.	  To	  be	  engaged	  with	  popular	  culture	  is	  to	  be	  discriminating	  .	  .	  .	  
‘Good’	  and	  ‘bad’	  or	  their	  vernacular	  versions	  (‘brilliant,’	  ‘crap’)	  are	  the	  most	  frequent	  
terms	  in	  everyday	  cultural	  conversation.	  “227	  Frith	  goes	  on	  to	  add	  that,	  specifically,	  
the	  value	  judgments	  made	  in	  this	  kind	  of	  talk	  are	  not	  just	  about	  stating	  value	  but	  
explicitly	  aimed	  at	  convincing	  others:	  “[v]alue	  arguments,	  in	  other	  words,	  aren’t	  
simply	  rituals	  of	  ‘I	  like/you	  like’	  .	  .	  .	  they	  are	  based	  in	  reason,	  evidence,	  
persuasion.”228	  He	  quotes	  Frank	  Kogan	  from	  their	  personal	  correspondence	  on	  pop	  
culture	  arguments	  as	  an	  enjoyable	  “brawl”:	  “we	  continually	  change	  our	  minds	  about	  
what	  is	  good	  or	  bad,	  relevant	  or	  irrelevant,	  ‘awesome’	  or	  ‘trivial’	  .	  .	  .	  but	  we	  never	  
cease	  to	  believe	  that	  such	  distinctions	  are	  necessary	  ‘social	  pressure	  points,	  
gathering	  spots	  for	  a	  brawl	  over	  how	  we	  use	  our	  terms.	  If	  our	  comparisons	  stood	  
still,	  how	  could	  we	  have	  our	  brawl?’”229	  	  
	   Assigning	  value	  would	  seem	  to	  be	  a	  simpler	  matter	  for	  music	  journalists.	  
After	  all,	  people	  who	  are	  paid	  to	  evaluate	  albums	  (particularly	  if	  they	  write	  reviews	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for	  a	  publication	  or	  web	  site	  that	  assigns	  different	  releases	  numerical	  scores,	  like	  
Pitchfork	  Media’s	  famous	  ten-­‐point	  scale	  with	  decimal	  points)	  can	  hardly	  claim	  that	  
a	  taboo	  prevents	  them	  them	  from	  expressing	  likes	  and	  dislikes.	  Yet,	  as	  I	  have	  argued	  
in	  previous	  chapters,	  music	  journalists’	  choices	  about	  what	  to	  like	  and	  dislike	  and	  
what	  arguments	  to	  employ	  in	  the	  “brawl”	  of	  music	  fandom	  are	  full	  of	  personal	  and	  
political	  implications	  of	  which	  many	  (not	  all,	  perhaps,	  but	  those	  whom	  I	  have	  
discussed	  so	  far)	  are	  acutely	  aware.	  As	  the	  populist	  strivings	  of	  poptimism	  clearly	  
demonstrate,	  these	  implications	  include	  concerns	  about	  authority	  and	  cultural	  
capital	  that	  are	  not	  entirely	  dissimilar	  from	  the	  concerns	  that	  constrain	  academics.	  
But	  unlike	  academics,	  music	  critics	  cannot	  readily	  avoid	  value	  judgments.	  
Assessments	  of	  value	  are	  inextricable	  from	  critics’	  work,	  not	  only	  when	  they	  are	  
explicit,	  as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  album	  reviews,	  but	  also	  when	  they	  are	  implicit	  (such	  as	  the	  
endorsement	  that	  is	  implied	  when	  a	  journalist	  interviews	  a	  musician)	  or	  interwoven	  




Bad	  genres	  and	  bad	  musicians	  
	   The	  conflict	  between	  the	  imperative	  to	  use	  value	  judgments	  and	  a	  discomfort	  
with	  their	  implications	  seems	  to	  be	  quite	  a	  recent	  development	  and	  not	  a	  universal	  
one.	  In	  her	  article	  “Rock	  Critics	  Need	  Bad	  Music,”	  Deena	  Weinstein	  describes	  a	  very	  
different	  dynamic	  among	  music	  journalists—or	  at	  least	  it	  seems	  so	  at	  first.	  “I	  like	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metal,”	  Weinstein	  writes,	  “[a]nd	  most	  mainstream	  rock	  critics	  have	  labeled	  metal	  as	  
Bad	  Music.”230	  She	  describes	  observing	  a	  “nearly	  blanket	  dismissal”	  of	  her	  favorite	  
genre,	  “a	  form	  of	  music	  that	  I	  appreciate	  not	  only	  viscerally	  but	  reflectively,”	  which	  
motivated	  her	  to	  explore	  the	  reasons	  for	  critics’	  near-­‐unanimous	  disapproval	  of	  
metal.231	  	  
	   Weinstein	  finds	  a	  number	  of	  reasons	  for	  critics’	  antipathy	  that	  will	  sound	  
familiar	  to	  readers	  of	  this	  thesis.	  She	  notes,	  using	  examples,	  that	  “the	  most	  frequent	  
attacks	  on	  metal	  .	  .	  .	  have	  nothing	  to	  do	  with	  music	  or	  elements	  of	  performance	  .	  .	  .	  
but	  with	  metal’s	  audience.	  The	  critics	  seem	  to	  grasp	  the	  genre	  through	  its	  fans	  and	  
they	  definitely	  don’t	  identify	  with	  these	  folk.”232	  She	  points	  out	  that	  “metal	  fans	  were	  
radically	  Other	  to	  the	  critics	  in	  several	  ways,”	  including	  an	  “age	  gap”	  and	  “an	  
education	  divide”	  with	  a	  corresponding	  class	  disparity.233	  Metal	  also	  does	  not	  
conform	  to	  rock	  critics’	  standards	  of	  authenticity.234	  
	   However,	  she	  concludes	  that	  the	  primary	  reason	  for	  critics’	  uniform	  dislike	  of	  
metal	  is	  simply	  that	  they	  needed	  a	  “bête	  noire,”	  an	  explanation	  that	  became	  clear	  to	  
her	  when	  metal	  declined	  in	  popularity	  and	  critics	  had	  to	  find	  new	  genres	  to	  serve	  
the	  same	  function.235	  They	  need	  such	  a	  “bête	  noire”	  because,	  according	  to	  Weinstein,	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popular	  music	  journalists	  “are	  adversarial	  critics;	  they	  seem	  to	  need	  an	  Other	  to	  
detract	  from	  and	  are	  not	  content	  with	  either	  sympathetic	  appreciation	  or	  passionate	  
advocacy,”	  unlike	  other	  critical	  traditions	  that	  are	  not	  so	  deeply	  oppositional.236	  One	  
reason	  for	  this,	  Weinstein	  contends,	  is	  that	  because	  “rock	  originated	  as	  youth	  music”	  
it	  still	  “carries	  the	  stench	  of	  the	  high	  school	  lunchroom”	  and	  the	  “normal	  status	  
anxieties	  of	  adolescence”	  live	  on	  in	  music	  critics’	  insecurity.237	  	  
	   Yet	  she	  sees	  the	  main	  source	  of	  this	  adversarial	  stance	  in	  defensiveness	  
about	  aesthetic	  problems	  within	  rock	  criticism:	  not	  only	  is	  rock	  music’s	  low-­‐culture	  
pedigree	  at	  odds	  with	  critics’	  “bid	  to	  be	  taken	  seriously,”	  but	  more	  importantly,	  
“rock	  criticism	  has	  never	  developed	  self-­‐conscious	  and	  reflexive	  standards	  defining	  
the	  characteristics	  of	  good	  music.”238	  She	  sees	  rock	  critics	  as	  experiencing	  “acute	  
anxiety	  about	  making	  independent	  judgments	  about	  new	  music”	  because	  of	  “the	  
absence	  of	  a	  tradition	  and	  a	  discourse	  of	  cultural	  theory”	  and	  finds	  that	  “in	  place	  of	  
consensual	  or	  contested	  standards,	  they	  try	  to	  anticipate	  what	  their	  colleagues	  will	  
esteem,	  setting	  off	  a	  ceaseless	  quest	  to	  tap	  into	  the	  ‘buzz.’”239	  In	  this	  context,	  
Weinstein	  says,	  it	  is	  much	  easier	  to	  find	  consensus	  about	  bad	  music	  than	  it	  is	  to	  
make	  positive	  judgments	  with	  assurance:	  	  
In	  the	  throes	  of	  anxious	  anticipation,	  rock	  critics	  find	  some	  safety	  in	  being	  
able	  to	  use	  bad	  music	  as	  a	  negation	  of	  whatever	  they	  decide	  to	  call	  good;	  at	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least	  they	  can	  all	  agree	  on	  something	  and	  be	  sure	  of	  corroboration	  .	  .	  .	  .	  Rock	  
critics	  also	  want	  their	  audience	  to	  take	  them	  seriously.	  In	  light	  of	  their	  root	  
insecurity	  about	  their	  affirmative	  judgments,	  they	  rely	  on	  bashing	  bad	  music	  
to	  ingratiate	  themselves	  with	  their	  readers.240	  
Frith	  backs	  Weinstein’s	  assertions	  up	  to	  a	  certain	  extent.	  “For	  most	  rock	  critics,”	  he	  
writes,	  “(this	  was	  certainly	  my	  experience),	  the	  issue	  in	  the	  end	  isn’t	  so	  much	  
representing	  music	  to	  the	  public”	  as	  it	  is	  “orchestrating	  a	  collusion	  between	  selected	  
musicians	  and	  an	  equally	  select	  part	  of	  the	  public—select	  in	  its	  superiority	  to	  the	  
ordinary,	  undiscriminating	  pop	  consumer.”241	  
	   In	  sum,	  the	  state	  of	  affairs	  Weinstein	  describes	  both	  corresponds	  and	  fails	  to	  
correspond	  with	  what	  I	  have	  observed	  about	  contemporary	  music	  criticism.	  Clearly,	  
given	  that	  efforts	  like	  Wilson’s	  Céline	  project	  not	  only	  occur	  but	  generate	  a	  high	  
degree	  of	  interest	  in	  the	  music	  community	  (as	  Wilson’s	  EMP	  paper	  and	  the	  resulting	  
book	  indeed	  did),	  “bashing	  bad	  music”	  is	  not	  a	  universally	  accepted	  strategy	  for	  
attaining	  legitimacy	  as	  a	  music	  critic.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  anxiety	  about	  value	  
judgments	  she	  describes	  is	  apparent	  in	  Wilson’s	  project	  and	  other	  poptimist	  
tendencies,	  not	  on	  the	  affirmative	  side	  but	  the	  negative;	  this	  puts	  added	  weight	  
behind	  Weinstein’s	  claims	  about	  a	  lack	  of	  communal	  standards	  in	  music	  criticism.	  
	   Aaron	  A.	  Fox	  talks	  about	  another	  “bad”	  genre,	  country,	  in	  “White	  Trash	  
Alchemies	  of	  the	  Abject	  Sublime:	  Country	  as	  ‘Bad’	  Music.”	  Just	  as	  Weinstein	  relates	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critical	  dislike	  of	  metal	  to	  attitudes	  toward	  the	  genre’s	  fan	  base,	  Fox	  attributes	  
country’s	  “bad”	  status	  in	  part	  to	  its	  implications	  for	  identity—Weinstein’s	  critics	  
express	  distaste	  for	  metal	  fans,	  while	  according	  to	  Fox,	  “country	  frequently	  stands	  
for	  the	  cultural	  badness	  of	  its	  adherents.”242	  In	  addition	  to	  its	  working-­‐class	  
associations,	  “for	  many	  cosmopolitan	  Americans,	  especially,”	  he	  writes,	  “country	  is	  
‘bad’	  music	  precisely	  because	  it	  is	  widely	  understood	  to	  signify	  an	  explicit	  claim	  to	  
whiteness,	  not	  as	  an	  unmarked,	  neutral	  condition	  of	  lacking	  (or	  trying	  to	  shed)	  race,	  
but	  as	  a	  marked,	  foregrounded	  claim	  of	  cultural	  identity—a	  bad	  whiteness	  .	  .	  .	  .”243	  
But	  country’s	  “badness”	  has	  a	  paradoxical	  potential;	  it	  “is	  also	  available	  as	  the	  
engine	  of	  a	  powerful	  ironic	  nostalgia	  characteristic	  of	  so	  many	  postmodern	  
appropriations	  of	  country”	  which	  either	  “shade	  toward	  gleeful	  deconstruction	  of	  
‘roots’	  mythologies”	  or	  “toward	  the	  reverent	  nostalgic	  cultivation	  of	  these	  same	  
mythologies	  within	  a	  cosmopolitan	  sensibility.”244	  	  
	   If	  country	  can	  be	  appropriated	  in	  such	  an	  intricate,	  mediated	  way,	  what	  does	  
that	  say	  about	  more	  typical,	  lowbrow	  country	  texts	  and	  their	  reception?	  Fox	  sees	  a	  
greater	  degree	  of	  complexity	  than	  just	  a	  simple,	  unproblematic	  identification	  with	  
the	  genre,	  which	  he	  explains	  by	  use	  of	  an	  intriguing	  metaphor:	  
Like	  a	  cigarette,	  a	  country	  song	  (bad	  or	  good,	  canonical	  or	  disposable)	  arrives	  
in	  the	  form	  of	  a	  consumable	  commodity—with	  a	  price.	  It	  is	  consumed	  in	  a	  fit	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of	  self-­‐assertion	  mixed	  with	  self-­‐loathing.	  With	  a	  passion	  for	  pain	  as	  a	  feeling	  
one	  can	  at	  least	  inflict	  sometimes	  on	  oneself,	  at	  a	  moment	  and	  under	  
conditions	  of	  one’s	  own	  choosing	  .	  .	  .	  245	  
In	  other	  words,	  as	  he	  goes	  on	  to	  write,	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  country	  music,	  “[i]t’s	  all	  
good	  because	  it’s	  all	  bad.”246	  Fox	  sees	  “badness”	  as	  a	  “cultural	  logic,	  determined	  by	  
social	  relations	  structured	  in	  hegemonic	  dominance	  and	  resistance,	  ease	  and	  
abjection,”	  and	  concludes	  that	  it	  is	  thus	  “a	  futile	  task	  to	  theorize	  badness	  as	  a	  
condition	  of	  style,	  as	  an	  effect	  of	  mass	  production,	  or	  as	  an	  entailment	  of	  mass	  
consumption.”247	  
	   Yet	  another	  scholar,	  Leslie	  M.	  Meier,	  notes	  similar	  dynamics	  at	  work	  in	  
critical	  disapproval	  of	  music	  that	  is	  seen	  as	  excessively	  emotional.	  Like	  Fox	  and	  
Weinstein,	  Meier	  notes	  in	  her	  article	  “In	  Excess?	  Body	  Genres,	  ‘Bad’	  Music,	  and	  the	  
Judgment	  of	  Audiences”	  that	  “certain	  performers	  stand	  in	  for	  certain	  audiences,	  and,	  
hence,	  cultural	  values	  and	  practices.	  The	  question	  becomes	  which	  audiences	  and	  
values	  are	  valorized	  or	  dismissed	  and	  why.”248	  Meier’s	  article	  focuses	  on	  two	  groups	  
of	  music	  labeled	  as	  “bad”:	  the	  “Filthy	  Fifteen,”	  “a	  listing	  of	  ‘objectionable’	  songs”	  
collected	  by	  the	  Parents	  Music	  Resource	  Center	  (or	  PMRC)	  and	  a	  2004	  article	  in	  
Blender	  magazine	  called	  “Run	  for	  Your	  Life:	  It’s	  the	  50	  Worst	  Songs	  Ever!”249	  Her	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examination	  of	  the	  Blender	  piece	  is	  most	  pertinent	  to	  my	  discussion	  since	  it	  is	  an	  
index	  of	  critical	  rather	  than	  parental	  distaste.	  	  
	   Meier	  uses	  the	  term	  “sob	  pop”	  to	  describe	  “music	  that	  targets	  females	  (and	  
sometimes	  males)	  in	  the	  role	  of	  love	  interest,	  often	  triggering	  ‘irrational’	  displays	  of	  
emotion.”250	  She	  specifically	  mentions	  Céline	  Dion	  as	  an	  example	  of	  a	  “sob	  pop”	  
performer,	  one	  whose	  songs	  “express	  excessive	  portrayals	  of	  love,	  loss,	  and	  
sacrifice,	  and	  cater	  to	  the	  sensational	  body.”251	  After	  a	  survey	  of	  both	  sets	  of	  songs,	  
Meier	  concludes:	  “while	  excessive	  sex	  and	  violence	  are	  deemed	  ‘bad’	  by	  concerned	  
parents,	  excessive	  sentimentality	  is	  considered	  a	  sign	  of	  ‘bad’	  music	  to	  the	  critic.”252	  
Specifically,	  she	  connects	  critical	  dislike	  of	  “sob	  pop”	  to	  its	  perceived	  appeal	  to	  
women	  and	  associations	  with	  stereotypically	  feminine	  traits:	  “[i]f	  the	  distinction	  
between	  good	  and	  bad	  is	  largely	  a	  matter	  of	  who	  listens,	  it	  is	  significant	  that	  the	  
cultural	  authorities	  who	  help	  determine	  authentic	  popular	  music	  are	  primarily	  men	  
with	  an	  interest	  in	  rock—or	  women	  who	  have	  to	  enact	  a	  type	  of	  ‘journalistic	  drag’	  to	  
get	  published.”253	  	  
	   On	  a	  related	  note,	  as	  I	  mentioned	  in	  my	  first	  chapter,	  Wilson	  notes	  the	  
negative	  connotations	  sentimentality	  has	  with	  many	  critics	  and	  fans	  in	  his	  
discussion	  of	  Dion.	  He	  connects	  this	  to	  concerns	  about	  authenticity,	  noting	  protests	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
250	  Ibid.,	  250–1.	  
251	  Ibid,	  251.	  
252	  Ibid.,	  255.	  
253	  Ibid.,	  246.	  
	  113	  
that	  sentimental	  music	  is	  “manipulative”	  and	  “phony,”	  criticisms	  he	  dismisses.254	  He	  
shows	  in	  the	  process	  that	  sob	  pop’s	  perceived	  lack	  of	  authenticity	  is	  a	  significant	  
factor	  in	  its	  abject	  status.	  	  
	   All	  three	  of	  these	  analyses	  of	  “bad”	  music	  contend	  that	  at	  least	  to	  some	  
degree,	  the	  abjection	  of	  a	  genre	  reflects	  negative	  associations	  with	  its	  perceived	  
audience,	  which	  in	  every	  case	  is	  made	  up	  of	  members	  of	  an	  oppressed	  group	  (the	  
working	  class,	  the	  rural	  poor,	  and	  women).	  Correspondingly,	  each	  one	  relies	  on	  the	  
idea	  of	  musical	  taste	  as	  structuring	  identity	  through	  the	  mobilization	  of	  difference.	  	  
	   In	  other	  respects,	  the	  three	  articles	  differ	  significantly.	  Weinstein	  emphasizes	  
music	  criticism’s	  lack	  of	  shared	  aesthetic	  standards	  as	  causing	  its	  reliance	  on	  an	  
adversarial	  critical	  stance	  while	  Fox	  and	  Meier	  do	  not	  address	  the	  potential	  
motivations	  of	  music	  critics.	  Fox,	  however,	  goes	  into	  greater	  detail	  than	  either	  
Weinstein	  or	  Meier	  about	  the	  experience	  of	  “bad”	  genre	  fans.	  Yet,	  by	  cobbling	  a	  
picture	  together	  from	  all	  three	  perspectives,	  one	  can	  arrive	  at	  a	  useful	  model	  of	  
value	  judgments	  toward	  abject	  genres.	  Clearly,	  identity	  is	  a	  major	  factor,	  given	  the	  
class	  and	  gender	  differences	  noted	  in	  each	  of	  these	  three	  abject	  genres.	  While	  many	  
genres	  associated	  with	  oppressed	  groups	  are	  readily	  coopted	  by	  high-­‐status	  
consumers,	  some	  are	  not.	  	  
	   How	  do	  these	  ideas	  square	  with	  the	  populist	  tendencies	  of	  poptimist	  critics?	  
Certainly,	  their	  interest	  in	  lowbrow	  genres	  distinguishes	  them	  from	  the	  critics	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
254	  Carl	  Wilson.	  Céline	  Dion’s	  Let’s	  Talk	  About	  Love:	  A	  Journey	  to	  the	  End	  of	  Taste.	  
(New	  York:	  Continuum	  Publishing	  Group,	  2007),	  123.	  
	  114	  
portrayed	  in	  Weinstein	  and	  Meier’s	  articles	  or	  the	  “cosmopolitan”	  types	  Fox	  
describes.	  Wilson’s	  Céline	  project	  is	  an	  attempt	  to	  cultivate	  an	  appreciation	  for	  the	  
archetypal	  “sob	  pop”	  chanteuse.	  Alec	  Hanley	  Bemis	  references	  Chuck	  Eddy’s	  
penchant	  for	  Toby	  Keith	  as	  a	  topic	  for	  his	  intellectual	  musings,	  so	  country	  music	  has	  
not	  been	  ignored	  either.	  	  
	   As	  for	  heavy	  metal,	  its	  position	  with	  critics	  has	  undergone	  a	  radical	  change.	  It	  
has	  gained	  currency	  among	  contemporary	  hipsters;	  as	  Brandon	  Stosuy	  wrote	  in	  a	  
Slate	  piece	  in	  August	  2005	  titled	  Heavy	  Metal:	  It’s	  alive	  and	  flourishing,	  metal	  
“recently	  conquered	  a	  new	  frontier,	  making	  an	  unexpected	  crossover	  into	  the	  realm	  
of	  hipsterdom.	  .	  .	  .	  The	  current	  revival	  seems	  to	  be	  a	  natural	  mutation	  from	  the	  
hipster	  fascination	  with	  post-­‐punk,	  noise,	  and	  no	  wave.”255	  Its	  position	  has	  shifted	  
so	  greatly	  that	  even	  the	  most	  elitist	  critic	  would	  not	  find	  fault	  with	  it.	  But	  taking	  an	  
interest	  in	  lowbrow	  genres	  is,	  as	  I	  have	  already	  discussed,	  a	  well-­‐established	  
practice	  within	  privileged	  omnivorous	  consumption,	  and	  hardly	  a	  guaranteed	  
strategy	  for	  avoiding	  elitism.	  It	  is	  not	  surprising	  that	  hipsters	  mobilized	  this	  strategy	  
in	  the	  case	  of	  heavy	  metal,	  and	  similarly,	  it	  remains	  a	  favorite	  strategy	  for	  
poptimists.	  	  
	   If	  I	  may	  digress	  for	  a	  moment,	  it	  is	  worth	  noting	  that	  heavy	  metal’s	  rise	  
among	  the	  hipster	  audience	  is	  not	  only	  consistent	  with	  omnivorous	  highbrow	  
reception	  practices,	  it	  is	  also	  just	  one	  of	  a	  long	  list	  of	  genres	  to	  be	  appropriated	  in	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this	  fashion.	  Wilson	  points	  to	  “cycles	  of	  revisionism”	  in	  the	  music	  critic	  community	  
that	  go	  hand	  in	  hand	  with	  this	  dynamic.256	  He	  attributes	  the	  practice,	  in	  part,	  to	  
efforts	  at	  self-­‐advancement,	  writing	  that	  “one	  way	  a	  critic	  often	  can	  get	  noticed	  is	  by	  
arguing	  that	  some	  music	  everyone	  has	  trashed	  is	  in	  fact	  genius”	  and	  that	  the	  
cumulative	  effect	  of	  numbers	  of	  critics	  making	  such	  arguments	  is	  that	  “over	  the	  
years	  that	  process	  has	  ‘reclaimed’	  genres	  from	  metal	  to	  disco	  to	  lounge	  exotica	  and	  
prog	  rock,	  and	  artists	  from	  ABBA	  to	  Motorhead.”257	  Tellingly,	  it	  is	  this	  very	  process	  
that	  Wilson	  says	  inspires	  his	  doubts	  about	  music	  critics’	  value	  judgments	  in	  the	  
present,	  particularly	  when	  it	  came	  to	  mainstream	  pop.	  “This	  epidemic	  of	  second	  
thought	  made	  critical	  scorn	  generally	  seem	  a	  tad	  shady:	  If	  critics	  were	  so	  wrong	  
about	  disco	  in	  the	  1970s,	  why	  not	  about	  Britney	  Spears	  now?	  Why	  did	  pop	  music	  
have	  to	  get	  old	  before	  getting	  a	  fair	  shake?”258	  
	   Fox’s	  notion	  of	  the	  so-­‐bad-­‐it’s-­‐good	  appeal	  of	  country	  music	  also	  has	  
interesting	  implications	  for	  an	  analysis	  of	  poptimism	  and	  omnivorous	  consumption.	  
Efforts	  such	  as	  Wilson’s,	  which	  are	  aimed	  at	  finding	  value	  in	  music	  that	  is	  
appreciated	  by	  a	  wide	  audience	  in	  order	  to	  combat	  elitism,	  take	  on	  a	  different	  cast	  
considering	  Fox’s	  argument	  that	  an	  essential	  part	  of	  what	  country	  fans	  enjoy	  about	  
the	  genre	  is	  its	  very	  abjectness.	  On	  a	  similar	  note,	  if	  the	  end	  result	  of	  efforts	  like	  
Wilson’s	  is	  reaching	  a	  consensus	  about	  the	  value	  of	  popular	  genres,	  this	  would	  
prevent	  fans	  from	  engaging	  in	  the	  sort	  of	  pleasurable	  aesthetic	  “brawl”	  that	  Frith	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and	  Kogan	  contend	  is	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  much	  of	  contemporary	  social	  music	  practices.	  
In	  both	  respects,	  the	  success	  of	  an	  undertaking	  like	  the	  Céline	  project	  could	  result	  in	  
the	  foreclosure	  of	  listener’s	  pleasures.	  	  
	   In	  addition	  to	  “bad”	  genres,	  there	  are	  other	  conventional	  notions	  of	  
“badness.”	  Frith	  asserts	  that	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  musicians	  and	  many	  fans,	  “bad	  music	  
seems	  to	  fall	  into	  two	  broad	  categories.”259	  The	  first	  is	  “incompetent	  music,”	  which	  is	  
generally	  attributed	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  a	  musician	  is	  “untutored	  (which	  may	  mean	  .	  .	  .	  
that	  they	  are	  simply	  unable	  to	  do	  certain	  things	  because	  they	  haven’t	  been	  taught	  
how	  to)	  .	  .	  .	  or	  that	  they	  are	  unprofessional	  (they’re	  unwilling	  to	  learn	  proper	  
techniques).”260	  The	  second	  category	  belongs	  to	  music	  that	  is	  “self-­indulgent”:	  
this	  criticism	  .	  .	  .	  seems	  to	  conflate	  at	  least	  three	  different	  sorts	  of	  description:	  
.	  .	  .	  selfishness:	  bad	  musicians	  forget	  that	  ‘good	  music’	  is	  a	  collective	  practice,	  
and	  use	  performance	  to	  show	  off	  their	  own	  virtuosity	  or	  character	  .	  .	  .	  
emptiness:	  bad	  musicians	  indulge	  in	  form	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  content.	  .	  .	  .	  such	  
musicians	  play	  something	  only	  to	  show	  that	  they	  can.	  .	  .	  .	  incomprehensibility:	  
bad	  musicians	  play	  in	  a	  completely	  introverted	  way	  .	  .	  .	  .	  Their	  music	  is	  not	  
communicative;	  it	  does	  not	  acknowledge	  or	  address	  an	  audience.	  261	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He	  concludes	  that	  given	  these	  standards	  of	  bad	  music,	  it	  is	  apparent	  that	  for	  those	  
who	  adhere	  to	  them,	  “‘creativity’	  cannot	  be	  judged	  in	  abstraction;	  it	  has	  to	  be	  
defined	  in	  terms	  of	  music’s	  perceived	  social	  and	  communicative	  functions.”262	  	  
	   Frith	  then	  adds,	  shifting	  the	  subject	  slightly,	  that	  “when	  musicians	  talk	  about	  
good	  and	  bad	  music	  they	  reveal	  an	  aesthetic	  as	  strongly	  rooted	  in	  ethical	  values	  and	  
a	  sense	  of	  responsibility	  (to	  each	  other,	  to	  ideal	  listeners)	  as	  in	  technical	  values,”	  a	  
point	  he	  clarifies	  further	  when	  he	  writes:	  “Critical	  musical	  judgments	  .	  .	  .	  are	  almost	  
always	  entangled	  with	  social	  explanations	  of	  why	  the	  music	  is	  good	  or	  bad,	  and	  
much	  of	  our	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  argument	  about	  music	  is	  conducted	  in	  just	  this	  way:	  
aesthetic	  judgments	  are	  tangled	  up	  with	  ethical	  judgments.”263	  	  
	   The	  idea	  that	  critics’	  standards	  have	  an	  ethical	  component	  should	  come	  as	  no	  
surprise	  given	  my	  discussion	  thus	  far.	  The	  critique	  of	  rockism	  is	  primarily	  a	  critique	  
of	  its	  ethical	  foundations,	  such	  as	  beliefs	  about	  authenticity	  (notable	  for	  their	  
simplicity	  and	  failure	  to	  account	  for	  reflexivity,	  critiqued	  as	  outmoded)	  and	  a	  
tendency	  to	  valorize	  left-­‐wing	  political	  content	  and	  countercultural	  trappings	  (also	  
an	  approach	  that	  is	  seen	  as	  reflecting	  an	  outdated	  political	  position).	  Poptimists	  and	  
other	  critics	  of	  rockism	  have	  their	  own	  ethical	  preoccupations,	  from	  Hopper’s	  and	  
Frere-­‐Jones’s	  concerns	  about	  race	  to	  Wilson’s	  concerns	  about	  elitism	  and	  classism.	  	  
	   Frith	  goes	  on	  to	  connect	  this	  ethical	  dimension	  with	  his	  belief	  in	  the	  necessity	  
of	  musical	  disagreement	  and	  with	  my	  other	  topic	  for	  this	  chapter,	  emotion.	  “The	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marking	  off	  of	  some	  tracks	  and	  genres	  and	  artists	  as	  ‘good’	  and	  others	  as	  ‘bad’	  
seems	  to	  be	  a	  necessary	  part	  of	  popular	  music	  pleasure	  and	  use,”	  he	  writes.	  “And	  
‘good’	  and	  ‘bad’	  are	  key	  words	  because	  they	  suggest	  that	  aesthetic	  and	  ethical	  
judgments	  are	  tied	  together:	  not	  to	  like	  a	  record	  is	  not	  just	  a	  matter	  of	  taste;	  it	  is	  also	  
a	  matter	  of	  morality.”264	  But	  he	  sees	  another	  factor	  underlying	  the	  others:	  that	  of	  
emotion.	  He	  writes	  that	  although	  he	  has	  “translated	  this	  evaluative	  process	  into	  .	  .	  .	  a	  
matter	  of	  discourse,	  what’s	  really	  at	  issue	  is	  feeling.”265	  
In	  the	  end,	  ‘bad	  music’	  describes	  an	  emotional	  rather	  than	  an	  ideological	  
judgment.	  We	  don’t	  like	  a	  record;	  we	  then	  seek	  to	  account	  for	  that	  dislike	  (we	  
don’t,	  on	  the	  whole,	  arm	  ourselves	  with	  a	  grid	  of	  ideological	  consistency	  
through	  which	  everything	  must	  pass	  before	  we	  feel	  it).	  Feelings,	  particularly	  
feelings	  of	  like	  or	  dislike—for	  music,	  for	  people—are	  often	  surprising,	  
contradictory,	  and	  disruptive;	  they	  go	  against	  what	  we’re	  supposed	  to	  feel,	  
what	  we’d	  like	  to	  feel.	  The	  important	  point	  here	  is	  not	  that	  critical	  judgment	  
is	  always	  a	  process	  of	  justification	  (and	  not	  really	  explanation),	  but	  that	  the	  
feelings	  it	  describes	  are	  real	  (and	  not	  just	  discursive).	  	  
	   Frith’s	  views	  on	  the	  primacy	  of	  emotion	  are	  compelling,	  but	  many	  scholars	  
would	  question	  the	  idea	  that	  something	  as	  socially	  determined	  (arguably,	  
overdetermined)	  as	  aesthetic	  taste	  could	  possibly	  begin	  with	  a	  pure	  emotional	  
component	  or	  that	  the	  role	  of	  discourse	  is	  only	  to	  facilitate	  after-­‐the-­‐fact	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rationalizations	  of	  visceral	  reactions.	  This	  difficult	  question—how	  reason	  and	  
emotion	  interact	  in	  the	  formation	  of	  aesthetic	  judgments—is	  at	  the	  crux	  of	  many	  of	  
the	  most	  significant	  debates	  in	  contemporary	  music	  criticism,	  including	  the	  Céline	  
project	  and	  the	  controversy	  over	  Stephin	  Merritt’s	  EMP	  comments.	  	  
	  
Reexamining	  the	  Significance	  of	  Emotion	  
	   In	  her	  article	  “Reason	  and	  Emotion,”	  Miranda	  Fricker	  explores	  the	  
relationship	  between	  these	  two	  terms	  and	  the	  political	  significance	  of	  our	  approach	  
to	  them.	  She	  begins	  her	  exploration	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  resolve	  “an	  apparent	  conflict	  
between	  the	  implicit	  teachings	  of	  Western	  philosophy	  and	  feminism,”	  caused	  by	  the	  
fact	  that	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  “philosophy	  advises	  that	  we	  should	  place	  our	  trust,	  if	  
anywhere,	  in	  reason,”	  but	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  “feminism	  has	  learned	  that	  it	  is	  a	  
political	  imperative	  to	  acknowledge,	  share	  and	  thereby	  validate	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  
women’s	  emotions	  may	  conflict	  with	  accepted	  modes	  of	  reasoning.”266	  	  
	   As	  a	  feminist	  philosopher,	  Fricker	  feels	  a	  need	  to	  resolve	  this	  seeming	  
contradiction.	  She	  begins	  by	  noting	  that	  placing	  emotion	  and	  reason	  in	  conflict	  in	  
the	  first	  place	  means	  “perpetuat[ing]	  the	  Cartesian	  dualism	  of	  mind	  and	  body,	  
reason	  and	  emotion,	  contributing	  to	  a	  false	  polarization”	  which	  “should	  be	  
abandoned	  for	  an	  interactive	  model	  in	  which	  neither	  partner	  dominates.”267	  Rather	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than	  viewing	  reason	  and	  emotion	  as	  separable	  or	  viewing	  either	  as	  primary,	  she	  
concludes	  that	  the	  two	  are	  “interdependent	  and	  mutually	  constitutive.”268	  	  
	   Neither	  term,	  she	  points	  out,	  makes	  sense	  without	  reference	  to	  the	  other.	  
“Reason	  presupposed	  emotion,	  since	  what	  is	  rational	  depends	  on	  emotional	  
preferences	  about	  different	  possible	  conclusions	  or	  outcomes;	  and	  emotion	  
presupposed	  reason	  since	  our	  emotions	  require	  rational	  interpretation	  if	  they	  are	  to	  
come	  above	  ground.”269	  How	  can	  one	  of	  these	  terms	  claim	  primacy	  or	  supremacy	  if	  
each	  is	  so	  indispensable	  in	  constituting	  the	  other?	  	  
	   The	  political	  significance	  of	  this	  argument	  becomes	  clear	  when	  Fricker	  
addresses	  the	  question	  of	  the	  cultural	  limitations	  placed	  on	  both	  emotion	  and	  
reason.	  She	  asserts	  that	  “sensation	  and	  judgement	  acquire	  their	  form	  from	  the	  same	  
mold,”	  the	  “learning	  place”	  of	  our	  sociohistorical	  context.270	  More	  specifically,	  
“emotions	  are	  inextricably	  linked	  to	  beliefs,	  beliefs	  which	  presuppose	  linguistic	  
concepts	  and	  rational	  structures,”	  such	  that	  “perhaps	  emotions	  are	  as	  deeply	  
entrenched	  in	  patriarchal	  conceptual	  organisations	  as	  are	  the	  reasoning	  processes	  
which	  structure	  belief.”271	  As	  a	  feminist,	  Fricker’s	  emphasis	  here	  is	  on	  the	  
patriarchal	  nature	  of	  our	  learned	  cultural	  assumptions,	  but	  it	  is	  a	  simple	  matter	  to	  
extend	  her	  formulation	  to	  cover	  all	  sorts	  of	  hegemonic	  influences.	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   Fricker	  demonstrates	  that	  a	  “cultural	  filter”	  fraught	  with	  ideological	  
implications	  structures	  our	  ability	  not	  only	  to	  reason	  but	  to	  form	  beliefs	  and	  
experience	  feelings,	  “open[ing]	  up	  difficult	  questions	  about	  the	  ‘freedom’	  of	  our	  
emotions.”272	  Yet	  she	  finds	  a	  special	  potential	  in	  emotions	  that	  are	  “’subterranean,’	  
not	  yet	  reasoned	  or	  articulated,”	  those	  which	  “are	  not	  yet	  sanctioned	  and	  codified	  by	  
accepted	  rationality.”273	  Drawing	  from	  the	  powerful	  impact	  of	  consciousness-­‐raising	  
groups	  in	  the	  women’s	  movement,	  Fricker	  gives	  emotions	  a	  special	  role	  as	  a	  
“potentially	  subversive	  force,”	  asserting	  that	  they	  have	  a	  kind	  of	  “partial	  
autonomy.”274	  She	  argues,	  “our	  emotions	  bear	  a	  looser	  and	  more	  flexible	  relation	  to	  
the	  dominant	  ideology	  than	  does	  our	  reason	  since,	  while	  rationality	  can	  be	  moulded	  
to	  serve	  the	  interests	  of	  a	  certain	  group,	  emotions	  cannot	  be	  wholly	  determined	  by	  
those	  interests.”275	  
	   This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  emotion	  is	  to	  be	  trusted	  above	  reason	  in	  all	  cases	  
(Fricker	  has	  already	  shown	  that	  position	  to	  be	  untenable).	  “Of	  course	  reason	  must	  
regulate	  wayward	  emotions	  and	  prejudicial	  feelings,	  but	  equally	  emotion	  must	  
regulate	  reason	  in	  order	  that	  accepted	  forms	  of	  interpretation	  and	  rationality	  do	  not	  
brutalise	  and	  deny	  people’s	  emotions,	  forbidding	  them	  their	  due	  interpretation,	  
their	  meaning,	  and	  their	  political	  significance.”276	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   Fricker’s	  model	  provides	  some	  useful	  insights	  into	  poptimist	  discourse.	  Anti-­‐
rockist	  critics	  approach	  emotion	  in	  different	  ways	  depending	  on	  the	  context.	  For	  
example,	  Wilson	  takes	  two	  different	  approaches	  to	  emotion	  in	  his	  study	  of	  Dion.	  
Wilson	  regards	  some	  emotions	  with	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  suspicion.	  In	  one	  passage	  he	  
decries	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  guilty	  pleasure	  but	  in	  the	  same	  breath,	  calls	  into	  question	  the	  
legitimacy	  of	  musical	  pleasure:	  “Why	  not	  just	  follow	  your	  own	  enjoyment?	  Unless	  
you	  have	  a	  thing	  for	  white-­‐power	  anthems,	  the	  claim	  now	  goes,	  there	  is	  no	  reason	  
ever	  to	  feel	  guilty	  or	  ashamed	  about	  what	  you	  like.	  And	  I	  agree,	  though	  it’s	  curious	  
how	  often	  critics’	  ‘own	  enjoyment’	  still	  takes	  us	  all	  down	  similar	  paths	  at	  once.”277	  
He	  considers	  suspect	  both	  the	  guilt	  of	  the	  guilty	  pleasure	  and	  enjoyment	  derived	  
from	  more	  socially	  acceptable	  music.	  	  
	   But	  shame	  is	  not	  always	  a	  bad	  thing	  in	  Wilson’s	  eyes.	  He	  writes	  about	  the	  
shame	  he	  experienced	  when	  his	  neighbors	  overheard	  him	  playing	  Dion’s	  album	  Let’s	  
Talk	  About	  Love	  over	  and	  over	  again	  (and	  the	  shame	  he	  felt	  about	  feeling	  ashamed)	  
as	  an	  illuminating	  experience.278	  “Shame	  has	  a	  way	  of	  throwing	  you	  back	  upon	  your	  
own	  existence	  .	  .	  .	  [w]hich	  immediately	  makes	  the	  self	  feel	  incomplete,	  unjustified,	  a	  
chasm	  of	  lack.	  It’s	  the	  reverse	  of	  the	  sense	  of	  self-­‐extension	  that	  having	  likes	  and	  
dislikes	  usually	  provides.	  It	  is	  humbling.”279	  This	  is	  the	  sort	  of	  sentiment	  that	  fellow	  
critic	  Simon	  Reynolds	  has	  in	  mind	  when	  he	  writes	  that	  “these	  days	  it	  seems	  the	  only	  
thing	  you	  should	  feel	  guilty	  about	  is	  your	  own	  feelings	  of	  guilt	  about	  liking	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anything—or	  worse,	  guilt-­‐tripping	  others	  with	  your	  value	  judgements	  and	  taste-­‐
stances.”280	  As	  I	  mentioned	  in	  my	  introduction,	  Reynolds	  goes	  on	  to	  say	  that	  “[a]ll	  of	  
this	  has	  a	  slight	  air	  of	  the	  Maoist	  self–criticism	  session	  about	  it.”281	  
	   Wilson	  experiences	  a	  different	  kind	  of	  emotion	  when	  he	  sees	  Dion	  perform	  
live	  in	  Las	  Vegas.	  This	  moment	  is	  the	  apotheosis	  of	  his	  exploration	  of	  her	  work,	  the	  
closest	  he	  comes	  to	  really	  understanding	  how	  someone	  could	  love	  her	  music.	  It	  
comes	  at	  a	  time	  when	  Wilson	  is	  feeling	  depressed	  about	  his	  recent	  divorce.282	  
For	  a	  moment	  .	  .	  .	  Céline	  helped	  me	  feel	  that	  big,	  dumb	  emotion	  on	  a	  gut	  level.	  
My	  usual,	  more	  ‘sophisticated’	  listening	  can	  help	  me	  reflect	  on	  such	  feelings,	  
to	  scrutinize	  them	  from	  all	  angles,	  but	  I’m	  fine	  at	  that	  kind	  of	  analysis	  on	  my	  
own.	  I	  am	  probably	  less	  skilled	  at	  just	  feeling	  an	  emotion	  without	  wanting	  to	  
mess	  with	  it	  and	  craft	  it,	  to	  bargain	  with	  it	  until	  it	  becomes	  something	  else.	  
Feeling	  emotions	  fully,	  bodily,	  as	  they	  are,	  may	  be	  sentimentality’s	  promise,	  
one	  too	  readily	  mistaken	  for	  a	  threat.283	  	  
This	  is	  rather	  reminiscent	  of	  Meier’s	  discussion	  of	  sob	  pop	  and	  gender,	  as	  he	  
mentions	  not	  only	  the	  excessive	  emotion	  brought	  out	  by	  Dion’s	  performance	  (with	  
its	  traditionally	  feminine	  associations)	  but	  also	  the	  “bodily”	  aspect	  of	  that	  emotion,	  
the	  physicality	  of	  which	  has	  still	  more	  connections	  to	  stereotypical	  femininity.	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Unfortunately,	  Wilson	  was	  disappointed	  to	  find	  that	  he	  could	  not	  reconnect	  with	  
this	  feeling	  when	  he	  returned	  home	  and	  put	  on	  recordings	  of	  Dion’s	  music,	  but	  he	  
recognizes	  it	  as	  the	  climax	  of	  his	  exploration	  of	  her	  work.	  	  
	   In	  a	  passage	  of	  Wilson’s	  book	  I’ve	  quoted	  previously,	  Stephanie,	  one	  of	  the	  
Céline	  fans	  he	  interviewed,	  decries	  the	  fact	  that	  “‘we	  live	  in	  a	  society	  where	  people’s	  
visceral	  responses	  or	  emotional	  responses	  aren’t	  really	  respected.	  And	  I	  think	  they	  
should	  be.	  .	  .	  .	  Even	  if	  it’s	  not	  cool.”284	  It	  is	  fitting	  that	  Wilson	  uses	  this	  quote	  to	  lead	  
in	  to	  his	  description	  of	  how	  he	  felt	  at	  Dion’s	  Las	  Vegas	  performance.	  Although	  he	  
does	  not	  say	  so	  explicitly,	  given	  his	  prominent	  placement	  of	  the	  quote	  he	  seems	  
implicitly	  to	  agree	  with	  the	  sentiment	  and	  to	  grant	  the	  quote	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  
significance.	  
	   Despite	  his	  appreciation	  of	  the	  “gut”	  feeling	  he	  experienced	  at	  the	  Céline	  
show	  and	  the	  importance	  he	  places	  on	  Stephanie’s	  comment	  about	  “visceral	  
responses,”	  Wilson	  remains	  suspicious	  of	  other,	  similar	  emotions.	  As	  I	  pointed	  out	  
previously,	  he	  locates	  a	  feeling	  of	  disidentification	  in	  the	  same	  “gut”	  region	  when	  he	  
writes	  that	  “[m]y	  aversion	  to	  Dion	  more	  closely	  resembles	  how	  put	  off	  I	  feel	  when	  
someone	  says	  they’re	  pro-­‐life	  or	  a	  Republican:	  intellectually	  I’m	  aware	  how	  personal	  
and	  complicated	  such	  affiliations	  can	  be,	  but	  my	  gut	  reactions	  are	  more	  crudely	  
tribal.”285	  Feeling	  “put	  off”	  by	  someone	  else’s	  musical	  taste	  or	  trusting	  one’s	  “own	  
enjoyment”	  are	  both	  feelings	  Wilson	  does	  not	  trust.	  Instead	  of	  feeling	  these	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emotions	  fully	  in	  the	  way	  he	  embraces	  being	  moved	  by	  Dion’s	  music,	  he	  applies	  the	  
very	  strategies	  mentioned	  earlier,	  choosing	  to	  “scrutinize”	  his	  distaste	  “from	  all	  
angles,”	  “messing	  with”	  his	  enjoyment,	  and	  reacting	  to	  each	  emotion	  by	  
“bargain[ing]	  with	  it	  until	  it	  becomes	  something	  else.”286	  	  
	   This	  disparity	  in	  Wilson’s	  attitude	  toward	  emotion	  is	  somewhat	  
contradictory,	  but	  it	  is	  also	  consistent.	  When	  his	  feelings	  lead	  him	  toward	  critical	  
consensus	  and	  a	  high	  degree	  of	  cultural	  capital	  or	  when	  they	  impede	  his	  attempts	  at	  
populism,	  he	  “bargains”	  with	  them.	  Yet	  he	  embraces	  them	  when	  they	  help	  him	  to	  
appreciate	  music	  he	  thinks	  he	  should	  like.	  He	  uses	  intellectualization	  to	  quell	  
feelings	  that	  are	  at	  odds	  with	  his	  goals	  while	  allowing	  himself	  to	  experience	  other	  
emotions	  more	  freely.	  These	  goals	  are	  in	  line	  with	  his	  desired	  self-­‐image;	  I	  
mentioned	  earlier	  Wilson’s	  profound	  regret	  about	  his	  former	  pretentiousness	  and	  
his	  determination	  to	  turn	  over	  a	  new	  leaf	  in	  part,	  he	  admits,	  due	  to	  his	  approaching	  
fortieth	  birthday	  (meaning	  that	  as	  long	  as	  he	  is	  “half-­‐willingly	  being	  carried	  out	  the	  
exit	  of	  youth	  culture,”	  he	  might	  as	  well	  embrace	  a	  more	  “democratic”	  attitude	  that	  
he	  finds	  more	  mature).287	  	  
	   The	  irony	  of	  Wilson’s	  ambivalent	  approach	  is	  that	  when	  he	  attempts	  to	  use	  
intellectualization	  in	  the	  service	  of	  populism,	  he	  is	  employing	  a	  strategy	  traditionally	  
used	  to	  gain	  cultural	  capital.	  As	  Henry	  Jenkins	  points	  out	  in	  Textual	  Poachers:	  
Television	  Fans	  and	  Participatory	  Culture,	  “[t]he	  ‘bourgeois’	  aesthetic	  Bourdieu	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identifies	  often	  distrusts	  strong	  feelings	  and	  fears	  the	  loss	  of	  rational	  control	  
suggested	  by	  intense	  and	  close	  engagement	  with	  the	  popular.	  Even	  when	  .	  .	  .	  critics	  
[who	  adhere	  to	  this	  aesthetic]	  accept	  some	  popular	  culture	  as	  worthy	  of	  serious	  
attention,	  they	  typically	  read	  popular	  works	  as	  if	  they	  were	  materials	  of	  elite	  
culture,	  introducing	  ‘a	  distance,	  a	  gap’	  between	  themselves	  and	  the	  text.”288	  	  
	   Unlike	  Wilson,	  whose	  degree	  of	  distance	  varies	  somewhat,	  Jenkins	  writes	  
that	  Bourdieu’s	  ‘bourgeois’	  viewers	  “consistently	  deny	  the	  pleasure	  of	  affective	  
immediacy	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  insights	  gained	  by	  contemplative	  distance.”289	  In	  addition	  
to	  the	  implications	  distance	  has	  for	  cultural	  capital	  and	  class	  distinction,	  it	  also	  has	  
gendered	  connotations.	  Jenkins	  paraphrases	  Mary	  Ann	  Doane,	  writing,	  “traditional	  
masculinity	  provides	  spectators	  with	  some	  critical	  distance	  from	  media	  texts”	  while	  
“the	  female	  spectator	  is	  often	  represented	  as	  drawn	  so	  close	  to	  the	  text	  that	  she	  is	  
unable	  to	  view	  meanings.”290	  But	  contrary	  to	  these	  stereotypes,	  Jenkins	  finds	  that	  
intensely	  involved	  TV	  fans	  (many	  of	  them	  female)	  are	  not	  blind	  to	  their	  favorite	  
shows’	  boundaries;	  rather,	  “the	  fan,	  while	  recognizing	  the	  story’s	  constructedness,	  
treats	  it	  as	  if	  its	  narrative	  world	  were	  a	  real	  place	  that	  can	  be	  inhabited	  and	  explored	  
and	  as	  if	  the	  characters	  maintained	  a	  life	  beyond	  what	  was	  represented	  on	  the	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screen;	  fans	  draw	  close	  to	  that	  world	  in	  order	  to	  enjoy	  more	  fully	  the	  pleasure	  it	  
offers	  them.”291	  
	   Some	  music	  genres	  encourage	  a	  similarly	  passionate	  degree	  of	  fandom	  and	  
maximum	  affective	  engagement.	  Emo	  (a	  highly	  contentious	  term	  which	  used	  to	  refer	  
to	  a	  specific	  brand	  of	  hardcore	  punk	  in	  the	  1980s	  but	  which	  was	  popularized,	  
beginning	  in	  the	  mid-­‐1990s,	  as	  a	  term	  for	  a	  newer	  type	  of	  overwrought	  pop-­‐punk)	  is	  
one	  such	  genre.	  In	  Andy	  Greenwald’s	  Nothing	  Feels	  Good:	  Punk	  Rock,	  Teenagers,	  and	  
Emo,	  he	  describes	  Rites	  of	  Spring,	  one	  of	  the	  most	  visible	  bands	  within	  emo’s	  first	  
wave,	  as	  “[bringing]	  together	  an	  inspired	  hodgepodge	  of	  individuals	  eager	  to	  
convert	  private	  pain	  into	  public	  purging.	  At	  Rites	  of	  Spring	  shows,	  audience	  
members	  would	  weep	  among	  strangers;	  hardened	  cynics	  would	  rock	  and	  sway	  like	  
born-­‐agains.”292	  Greenwald	  also	  quotes	  Brett	  Matthews,	  a	  fan	  of	  the	  archetypal	  
second-­‐wave	  emo	  band	  Jawbreaker,	  describing	  his	  first	  experience	  seeing	  them	  
perform	  live:	  “‘they	  brought	  the	  entire	  crowd	  into	  a	  trance.	  They	  could	  transcend	  
and	  transfer	  these	  emotions	  to	  the	  audience	  through	  these	  instrumental	  
grooves.’”293	  	  
	   In	  addition	  to	  their	  intense	  affective	  engagement	  with	  their	  chosen	  texts	  or	  
artists,	  Jenkins’s	  television	  fans	  and	  Greenwald’s	  emo	  kids	  have	  another	  quality	  in	  
common:	  part	  of	  their	  enjoyment	  is	  social,	  integrally	  connected	  to	  their	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  Ibid.,	  115.	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  Ibid.,	  13.	  
293	  Andy	  Greenwald.	  Nothing	  Feels	  Good:	  Punk	  Rock,	  Teenagers,	  and	  Emo,	  (New	  York:	  
St.	  Martin’s	  Griffin,	  2003),	  21.	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participation	  in	  a	  fan	  group.	  Following	  Bourdieu,	  critics	  like	  Wilson	  emphasize	  the	  
way	  affiliations	  with	  certain	  texts	  can	  serve	  to	  differentiate	  fans	  from	  others,	  but	  
this	  salient	  point	  should	  not	  overshadow	  the	  equally	  significant	  fact	  that	  these	  
affiliations	  also	  bring	  fans	  together	  to	  enjoy	  beloved	  texts	  as	  a	  group.	  	  
	   It	  is	  possible	  to	  read	  associations	  with	  fan	  groups	  as	  nothing	  more	  than	  the	  
other	  side	  of	  distinction;	  just	  as	  cultural	  capital	  can	  be	  gained	  by	  distinguishing	  
oneself	  from	  abject	  groups,	  it	  can	  increase	  due	  to	  an	  affiliation	  with	  high-­‐status	  
ones.	  But	  the	  meaning	  that	  television	  watchers	  and	  emo	  listeners	  attach	  to	  their	  
fandom	  clearly	  extends	  beyond	  social	  climbing.	  That	  both	  fan	  groups’	  chosen	  media	  
texts	  are	  low	  on	  accepted	  cultural	  capital	  further	  supports	  this	  view:	  intense	  
engagement	  with	  television	  texts	  has	  been	  somewhat	  normalized	  in	  recent	  years	  
but	  was	  stigmatized	  during	  the	  period	  when	  Jenkins	  studied	  his	  subjects,	  and	  “emo	  
kids”	  are	  frequently	  a	  subject	  of	  derision.	  To	  put	  it	  more	  clearly,	  every	  type	  of	  
fandom	  has	  a	  type	  of	  cultural	  capital	  which,	  to	  extend	  the	  metaphor,	  has	  currency	  
within	  the	  group;	  but	  fans	  of	  low-­‐status	  texts	  accumulate	  a	  type	  of	  cultural	  capital	  
that	  people	  outside	  their	  groups	  are	  unlikely	  to	  value.	  The	  Céline	  fans	  whose	  
enjoyment	  Wilson	  accepts	  uncritically	  would	  fall	  in	  a	  similar	  category.	  Although	  he	  
never	  states	  this	  clearly,	  it	  seems	  that	  he	  exempts	  them	  from	  scrutiny	  because	  the	  
cultural	  capital	  they	  gain	  through	  their	  familiarity	  with	  Dion’s	  work	  does	  not	  carry	  
much	  currency	  in	  high-­‐status	  circles.	  	  
	   This	  brings	  me	  back	  to	  my	  initial	  discussion	  of	  authenticity:	  Wilson	  views	  the	  
enjoyment	  Dion	  fans	  take	  in	  her	  music	  as	  self-­‐evidently	  authentic	  while	  doubting	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similar	  feelings	  about	  higher-­‐status	  cultural	  objects	  in	  both	  himself	  and	  others.	  
Although	  I	  have	  proceeded	  in	  a	  linear	  fashion	  through	  my	  analysis,	  the	  terms	  
authenticity,	  reflexivity,	  identity,	  difference,	  guilt,	  pleasure,	  value,	  and	  badness	  are	  
interconnected	  in	  more	  ways	  than	  such	  a	  sequential	  narrative	  can	  convey.	  If	  I	  were	  
to	  try	  to	  illustrate	  their	  relationship	  visually,	  they	  would	  form	  a	  tangled	  cloud	  rather	  
than	  one	  smooth	  strand.	  	  
	   Musical	  reception	  contains	  aspects	  of	  all	  of	  these	  terms,	  and	  each	  are	  
interconnected.	  Musical	  texts	  acquire,	  or	  fail	  to	  acquire,	  value	  in	  our	  minds	  and	  we	  
invest,	  or	  fail	  to	  invest,	  in	  them	  emotionally.	  Within	  the	  context	  of	  a	  cultural	  field	  
loaded	  with	  status	  implications	  for	  every	  taste	  decision,	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  we	  see	  
ourselves	  or	  wish	  to	  see	  ourselves—in	  other	  words,	  our	  perception	  of	  our	  
identities—affect	  our	  value	  judgments	  and	  emotional	  investments	  in	  complex	  ways.	  
The	  existence	  of	  cultural	  capital	  may	  motivate	  us	  to	  align	  ourselves	  with	  high-­‐status	  
objects,	  or	  it	  may	  not.	  Our	  awareness	  of	  cultural	  capital’s	  existence	  (an	  awareness	  
most	  people	  share	  whether	  or	  not	  they	  are	  familiar	  with	  the	  term	  or	  the	  work	  of	  
Bourdieu)	  and	  our	  reflexive	  view	  of	  ourselves	  cut	  both	  ways,	  causing	  us	  to	  blend	  in	  
with	  the	  crowd	  or	  stand	  out	  from	  it,	  accept	  high-­‐cultural	  modes	  of	  reception	  or	  rebel	  
against	  them,	  depending	  on	  the	  context.	  All	  of	  these	  dynamics	  have	  a	  myriad	  of	  
implications	  for	  identity	  politics.	  These	  are	  just	  a	  few	  of	  the	  connections	  between	  
these	  concepts,	  a	  few	  of	  the	  strands	  that	  connect	  this	  tangle	  of	  ideas.	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   It	  is	  into	  this	  context	  that	  poptimism	  as	  a	  concept	  developed.	  “Superword,”	  a	  
term	  developed	  by	  Frank	  Kogan,	  helps	  to	  explain	  how	  difficult	  this	  concept	  is	  to	  pin	  
down.	  As	  Kogan	  puts	  it	  in	  “Superwords	  Revisited,”	  	  
a	  Superword	  is	  a	  word	  like	  “punk,”	  which	  is	  among	  other	  things,	  a	  
battleground,	  a	  weapon,	  a	  red	  cape,	  a	  prize,	  a	  flag	  in	  a	  bloody	  game	  of	  
Capture	  the	  Flag.	  To	  put	  this	  in	  the	  abstract,	  a	  Superword	  is	  a	  word	  or	  phrase	  
that	  not	  only	  is	  used	  in	  fights	  but	  that	  is	  itself	  fought	  over.	  The	  fight	  is	  over	  
who	  gets	  to	  wear	  the	  word	  proudly,	  who	  gets	  the	  word	  affixed	  to	  himself	  
against	  his	  will,	  etc.	  So	  the	  use	  is	  fought	  over,	  and	  this—the	  fight	  over	  
usage—is	  a	  big	  part	  of	  the	  word’s	  use.	  That	  is,	  we	  use	  the	  term	  in	  order	  to	  
engage	  in	  arguments	  over	  how	  to	  use	  the	  term.	  294	  
In	  addition,	  Kogan	  writes,	  “a	  Superword	  isn’t	  simply	  fought	  over,”	  rather,	  “what	  
makes	  a	  Superword	  really	  super	  is	  that	  some	  people	  use	  the	  word	  so	  that	  it	  will	  
jettison	  adherents	  and	  go	  skipping	  on	  ahead	  of	  any	  possible	  embodiment.”295	  
Kogan’s	  examples	  of	  Superwords	  are	  mostly	  genre	  terms,	  not	  terms	  that	  anyone	  
would	  self-­‐apply,	  but	  he	  still	  emphasizes	  their	  significance	  to	  identity.296	  “Genre	  
names	  would	  be	  neither	  hot-­‐button	  words	  nor	  Superwords	  if	  people	  didn’t	  use	  them	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  Frank	  Kogan.	  “Superwords	  Revisited,”	  in	  Real	  Punks	  Don’t	  Wear	  Black:	  Music	  




to	  differentiate	  themselves	  from	  each	  other,”	  he	  writes,	  adding	  that	  “we	  jigger	  the	  
Superwords”	  in	  order	  to	  identify	  or	  disidentify	  with	  certain	  groups.297	  	  
	   Kogan	  has	  never	  named	  poptimism	  a	  Superword,	  but	  it	  clearly	  fits	  the	  
definition.	  And	  pop,	  the	  genre	  term	  from	  which	  poptimism	  (sometimes	  simply	  called	  
“popism”)	  is	  derived,	  is	  an	  acknowledged	  Superword.	  If	  you	  find	  Kogan’s	  
formulation	  convincing,	  which	  I	  do,	  it	  helps	  to	  clarify	  the	  reason	  that	  so	  few	  music	  
journalists	  explicitly	  self-­‐identify	  as	  poptimists.	  It	  also	  makes	  sense	  that	  critics	  
whose	  arguments	  I	  have	  identified	  as	  poptimist	  (Wilson,	  Frere-­‐Jones,	  Hopper,	  
Ewing,	  and	  Kogan	  himself)	  put	  such	  a	  focus	  on	  identity	  issues.	  	  
	  
Conclusion	  
	   Nearing	  the	  end	  of	  my	  exploration	  of	  poptimism,	  I	  have	  come	  to	  some	  
conclusions	  about	  this	  slippery	  term	  and	  how	  it	  relates	  to	  contemporary	  questions	  
about	  identity,	  authenticity,	  emotion	  and	  value.	  Poptimism	  came	  into	  being	  in	  recent	  
years	  for	  historically	  specific	  reasons.	  Many	  of	  the	  conventions	  of	  popular	  music	  
journalism	  were	  formed	  in	  the	  1960s.	  In	  the	  decades	  since	  then,	  a	  number	  of	  
important	  factors	  have	  changed.	  	  
	   One	  important	  factor	  is	  that	  mass	  media	  forms	  have	  become	  increasingly	  
accepted	  as	  legitimate	  objects	  of	  serious	  study.	  Film	  studies	  has	  developed	  a	  great	  
deal	  of	  prestige,	  with	  television	  studies	  somewhat	  less	  accepted	  but	  gaining	  ground,	  
and	  popular	  music	  studies,	  while	  still	  underdeveloped	  compared	  to	  scholarly	  work	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
297	  Ibid.,	  225–6.	  
	  132	  
on	  film	  and	  television,	  has	  made	  significant	  strides.	  Even	  for	  critics	  and	  fans	  who	  
have	  never	  taken	  coursework	  in	  a	  media	  studies	  department,	  this	  shift	  in	  academic	  
conventions	  has	  inevitable	  consequences.	  Academic	  references	  increasingly	  
proliferate	  in	  popular	  music	  criticism;	  you	  might	  expect	  Wilson’s	  references	  to	  
Bourdieu	  and	  Kogan’s	  obsession	  with	  science	  historian	  Thomas	  Kuhn	  to	  be	  
exceptional,	  but	  allusions	  to	  theorists	  from	  Jacques	  Derrida	  to	  Slavoj	  Žižek	  in	  
journalistic	  music	  writing	  have	  become	  rather	  commonplace.	  	  
	   I	  mentioned	  that	  popular	  music	  scholarship	  has	  not	  developed	  as	  fully	  as	  
scholarship	  on	  other	  popular	  media.	  I	  believe	  that	  this	  is	  another	  reason	  for	  the	  rise	  
of	  poptimism	  in	  recent	  years.	  While	  the	  awareness	  that	  popular	  forms	  can	  be	  
viewed	  in	  highly	  complex	  intellectual	  ways	  has	  grown,	  actual	  development	  in	  
popular	  music	  studies	  is	  rather	  stunted.	  Whether	  this	  is	  due	  to	  a	  greater	  lag	  in	  the	  
recognition	  of	  popular	  music’s	  importance,	  disciplinary	  turf	  wars	  within	  the	  
academy,	  or	  any	  number	  of	  other	  factors	  is	  a	  question	  that	  lies	  outside	  of	  my	  
discussion	  here,	  but	  one	  that	  would	  be	  well	  worth	  exploring	  in	  future	  research.	  
Whatever	  the	  reasons	  behind	  it,	  the	  underdeveloped	  state	  of	  contemporary	  popular	  
music	  scholarship	  has	  important	  implications	  for	  popular	  music	  journalists	  and	  
fans.	  	  
	   The	  overt	  intellectualization	  of	  popular	  music	  writing,	  which	  amounts	  to	  a	  
blurring	  of	  boundaries	  between	  scholarship	  and	  journalism,	  constitutes	  a	  form	  of	  
compensation.	  In	  the	  absence	  of	  meaningful	  input	  from	  a	  vital,	  visible	  popular	  music	  
studies	  community	  and	  saddled	  with	  outdated	  concepts	  that	  chafe	  under	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contemporary	  conditions,	  writing	  by	  journalists	  and	  fans	  must	  pick	  up	  the	  slack.	  
Given	  all	  of	  this,	  it	  makes	  sense	  that	  critics’	  efforts	  to	  integrate	  scholarly	  theory	  into	  
their	  writing,	  while	  helpful	  at	  times,	  frequently	  results	  in	  distorted,	  out-­‐of-­‐context	  
quotes	  that	  oversimplify	  the	  work	  of	  the	  scholars	  being	  referenced.	  To	  put	  it	  more	  
simply,	  when	  journalists	  attempt	  to	  be	  academics,	  it	  makes	  sense	  that	  they	  seldom	  
do	  a	  great	  job.	  But	  the	  reason	  for	  this,	  it	  seems	  to	  me,	  originates	  with	  failures	  within	  
the	  academy.	  
	   Another	  significant	  shift	  that	  impacts	  poptimism	  is	  the	  increase	  in	  awareness	  
of	  identity	  politics	  due	  to	  anti-­‐racist,	  gay	  rights	  and	  women’s	  liberation	  movements	  
and	  other	  such	  factors.	  When	  the	  conventions	  of	  popular	  music	  criticism	  identified	  
with	  rockism	  were	  solidifying	  in	  the	  middle	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century,	  journalists	  
may	  not	  have	  been	  overly	  concerned	  with	  the	  politics	  of	  their	  representation	  of	  
women,	  people	  of	  color,	  people	  on	  the	  GLBTQI	  continuum,	  the	  working	  class	  or	  
other	  underprivileged	  groups,	  but	  as	  I	  have	  demonstrated	  in	  a	  multitude	  of	  
examples,	  these	  considerations	  are	  very	  important	  to	  many	  critics	  today.	  	  
	   Changes	  in	  prevailing	  ideas	  about	  truth	  and	  authority	  also	  influenced	  
poptimism.	  This	  shift	  is	  connected	  with,	  but	  not	  reducible	  to,	  the	  shift	  toward	  
greater	  awareness	  of	  identity	  politics.	  It	  is	  this	  critical	  attitude	  toward	  assertions	  of	  
self-­‐evident	  truth	  and	  traditional	  sources	  of	  authority	  that	  fuels	  the	  anxiety	  about	  
value	  judgments	  that	  Simon	  Frith	  describes	  within	  the	  academy.	  It	  also	  contributes	  
to	  anxiety	  within	  the	  music	  critic	  community,	  along	  with	  other	  factors	  such	  as	  the	  
lack	  of	  consensual	  standards	  pointed	  to	  by	  Deena	  Weinstein.	  One	  hallmark	  of	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contemporary	  critical	  awareness	  is	  that	  insight	  is	  sought	  through	  placing	  ideas	  
within	  an	  historical	  context.	  Another	  reason	  for	  anxiety	  within	  music	  criticism	  is	  the	  
fact	  that	  this	  form	  of	  journalism	  has	  existed	  just	  long	  enough	  to	  have	  a	  significant	  
history.	  It	  has	  only	  recently	  become	  possible	  for	  critics	  like	  Carl	  Wilson	  to	  realize	  
that	  genres	  and	  artists	  that	  were	  once	  critically	  reviled	  have	  a	  consistent	  pattern	  of	  
later	  reevaluation.	  Now	  that	  the	  history	  of	  this	  type	  of	  music	  criticism	  has	  developed	  
enough	  for	  such	  retrospective	  analysis,	  this	  realization	  and	  others	  like	  it	  have	  the	  
potential	  to	  call	  into	  question	  a	  number	  of	  practices	  within	  the	  music	  journalism	  
community.	  	  
	   Poptimism	  is	  a	  reaction	  to	  all	  of	  these	  aspects	  of	  our	  own	  historical	  context.	  It	  
is	  also	  part	  of	  a	  timeless	  cycle	  of	  aesthetic	  trends.	  Wilson	  notes	  that	  critics’	  desire	  to	  
distinguish	  themselves	  from	  previous	  generations	  of	  critics	  perpetuates	  the	  cycle	  of	  
aesthetic	  reclamation,	  but	  fails	  to	  note	  how	  his	  own	  efforts	  serve	  as	  yet	  another	  
means	  of	  self-­‐aggrandizement.	  After	  all,	  his	  book	  on	  the	  Céline	  project	  has	  garnered	  
more	  attention	  than	  anything	  else	  in	  his	  career,	  selling	  briskly	  and	  leading	  to	  a	  great	  
deal	  of	  recognition	  and	  even	  television	  appearances.	  Distinguishing	  oneself	  by	  
critiquing	  the	  very	  notion	  of	  critique	  is	  a	  more	  original,	  sophisticated	  means	  of	  
distinguishing	  oneself	  from	  other	  critics	  than	  simply	  championing	  a	  previously	  
abject	  genre,	  but	  the	  result	  is	  largely	  the	  same.	  	  
	   Jody	  Rosen	  accuses	  anti-­‐rockist	  critics	  of	  making	  poptimism	  “about	  critics	  
working	  through	  their	  daddy	  issues	  and	  straining	  to	  prove	  they’re	  hipper	  than	  Greil	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Marcus.”298	  This	  interpretation	  may	  be	  excessively	  cynical,	  but	  it	  has	  at	  least	  a	  grain	  
of	  truth.	  Critics	  like	  Wilson	  can	  make	  a	  name	  for	  themselves	  by	  taking	  such	  stances,	  
demonstrating	  their	  ability	  to	  do	  something	  new.	  Even	  if	  one	  takes	  Wilson’s	  
idealism	  at	  face	  value,	  trusting	  that	  the	  impetus	  for	  his	  study	  was	  a	  populist	  impulse,	  
the	  benefits	  to	  his	  career	  and	  his	  ego	  that	  can	  be	  garnered	  by	  distinguishing	  himself	  
from	  other	  critics	  remain	  significant.	  	  
	   The	  same	  could	  be	  said	  of	  every	  other	  poptimist	  or	  “anti-­‐rockist”	  critic	  I	  have	  
described	  in	  this	  study.	  Even	  when	  controversy	  comes	  up,	  as	  in	  the	  uproar	  over	  
Jessica	  Hopper’s	  and	  Sasha	  Frere-­‐Jones’s	  criticism	  of	  Stephin	  Merritt	  or	  the	  negative	  
reaction	  to	  Kogan’s	  “Paris	  Hilton	  is	  Our	  Vietnam”	  column,	  for	  writers	  in	  the	  
commercial	  sphere	  there	  is	  no	  such	  thing	  as	  bad	  publicity,	  and	  all	  three	  have	  
prospered	  in	  the	  aftermath	  of	  their	  respective	  controversies.	  Each	  of	  these	  three	  
also	  made	  a	  statement	  about	  who	  they	  were	  in	  relation	  to	  established	  conventions	  
within	  music	  criticism	  which	  fell	  in	  line	  with	  their	  desired	  images	  of	  themselves,	  a	  
goal	  whose	  importance	  should	  not	  be	  underestimated.	  	  
	   The	  impulse	  to	  distinguish	  oneself	  from	  one’s	  forebears	  and	  the	  desire	  to	  
apply	  rigorous	  ethical	  standards	  to	  aesthetic	  judgments	  may	  sound	  like	  
contradictory	  ones,	  but	  for	  the	  critics	  whose	  work	  I	  have	  examined,	  the	  two	  seem	  to	  
come	  together	  seamlessly.	  After	  all,	  if	  one	  views	  one’s	  forebears	  as	  possessed	  of	  
some	  problematic	  ideas	  about	  identity	  politics,	  or	  simply	  complacent	  in	  the	  face	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
298	  Jody	  Rosen.	  “The	  Perils	  of	  Poptimism:	  Does	  hating	  rock	  make	  you	  a	  music	  critic?”	  
Slate,	  May	  9,	  2006,	  http://www.slate.com/id/2141418	  (accessed	  August	  4,	  2010).	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hegemonic	  ideas	  about	  aesthetics	  that	  were	  loaded	  with	  politically	  questionable	  
baggage,	  distinguishing	  oneself	  from	  them	  would	  be	  an	  ethical	  matter	  as	  well	  as	  a	  
matter	  of	  prestige.	  This,	  explicitly	  or	  implicitly,	  is	  the	  view	  put	  forth	  by	  the	  poptimist	  
writers	  whose	  work	  I	  have	  explored.	  	  
	   Yet	  another	  possible	  cause	  for	  the	  development	  of	  poptimism	  is	  that	  along	  
with	  anxiety	  about	  truth	  and	  authority	  there	  is	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  ambivalence	  in	  
contemporary	  culture	  about	  authenticity.	  As	  I	  detailed	  in	  my	  second	  chapter,	  the	  
prevailing	  attitude	  toward	  authenticity	  among	  popular	  music	  critics	  and	  serious	  
fans	  is	  one	  that	  combines	  dismissal	  and	  longing.	  The	  notion	  of	  true	  authenticity	  is	  
viewed	  derisively	  and	  others’	  pretensions	  of	  authenticity	  are	  deconstructed,	  but	  at	  
the	  same	  time	  there	  is	  a	  palpable	  sense	  that	  authenticity	  continues	  to	  matter	  a	  great	  
deal.	  The	  search	  for	  an	  unimpeachable	  form	  of	  musical	  authenticity	  can	  be	  seen	  at	  
work	  behind	  a	  number	  of	  musical	  trends,	  from	  those	  that	  attempt	  to	  recapture	  a	  
sense	  of	  realness	  by	  various	  means,	  such	  as	  the	  recent	  “freak	  folk”	  trend	  with	  its	  
naïve	  outsider	  artists	  seemingly	  incapable	  of	  artifice,	  to	  those	  that	  embrace	  
reflexivity	  by	  championing	  the	  unapologetic	  fakery	  of	  commercial	  pop.	  	  
	   When	  it	  comes	  to	  locating	  authenticity	  with	  artists,	  poptimism	  is	  linked	  more	  
to	  the	  latter	  strategy	  than	  the	  former.	  As	  writing	  by	  Wilson	  and	  Ewing	  show,	  
poptimist	  writing	  also	  seeks	  to	  locate	  authenticity	  in	  the	  process	  of	  reception	  via	  a	  
different	  sort	  of	  reflexivity—the	  reflexivity	  of	  the	  thoughtful	  critic	  or	  fan	  who	  
subjects	  his	  or	  her	  reception	  practices	  to	  rigorous	  scrutiny.	  In	  the	  absence	  of	  
straightforward,	  believable	  standards	  of	  authenticity	  in	  the	  production	  process,	  the	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search	  for	  authenticity	  in	  reception	  can	  serve	  as	  a	  substitute.	  Perhaps	  the	  content	  of	  
a	  musical	  text	  cannot	  be	  guaranteed	  to	  be	  irreproachably	  sincere,	  but	  one’s	  affective	  
investment	  in	  it	  can	  be	  more	  thoroughly	  assured.	  Perhaps	  the	  rise	  of	  this	  approach	  
could	  also	  be	  attributed	  to	  academic	  ideas	  making	  their	  way	  into	  the	  ethos,	  given	  
that	  reception-­‐oriented	  theories	  that	  give	  consumers	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  meaning-­‐
making	  agency	  have	  been	  developing	  in	  the	  academy	  for	  decades.	  	  
	   These	  parallels	  between	  academic	  theory,	  popular	  awareness,	  and	  music	  
critic	  discourse	  occur	  at	  a	  number	  of	  points.	  What	  it	  all	  boils	  down	  to	  is	  an	  impulse	  
to	  question	  the	  old	  ways	  of	  placing	  value	  on	  music	  and,	  in	  the	  process,	  asking	  how,	  if	  
the	  people	  who	  formed	  these	  outdated	  standards	  in	  the	  past	  were	  wrong,	  we	  can	  be	  
assured	  of	  our	  own	  rightness	  in	  forming	  new	  ones	  today.	  Academics	  have	  a	  special	  
sort	  of	  responsibility	  here	  given	  their	  roles	  in	  the	  education	  system	  and	  the	  prestige	  
they	  command	  in	  the	  popular	  consciousness.	  Yet	  music	  critics	  have	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  
responsibility,	  too,	  as	  tastemakers	  and	  keepers	  of	  immense	  amounts	  of	  cultural	  
capital	  (particularly	  of	  “coolness,”	  which	  sometimes	  evades	  academics).	  The	  issue	  of	  
authority	  is	  all	  the	  more	  fraught	  for	  music	  critics	  since	  they	  are	  expected	  to	  make	  
value	  judgments	  regularly,	  a	  task	  which	  academics	  can	  (and	  often	  do)	  readily	  avoid.	  
Academic	  music	  scholars,	  with	  the	  notable	  exception	  of	  Frith,	  have	  almost	  
completely	  skirted	  the	  thorny	  issue	  of	  authority	  and	  the	  politics	  of	  value.	  But	  music	  
critics	  have	  been	  forced	  to	  come	  up	  with	  a	  way	  of	  making	  value	  judgments	  so	  that	  
they	  can	  do	  their	  jobs	  and	  still	  live	  with	  their	  consciences.	  This	  is	  the	  purpose	  of	  
poptimist	  discourse.	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   But	  do	  poptimist	  approaches	  to	  music	  criticism	  actually	  create	  results	  that	  
are	  progressive	  and	  populist?	  This	  question	  has	  been	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  my	  analysis,	  
and	  unsurprisingly,	  the	  answer	  is	  not	  a	  simple	  one.	  Many	  aspects	  of	  poptimist	  
writing	  work	  against	  its	  stated	  aims.	  One	  problem	  is	  the	  frequent	  use	  of	  academic	  
references,	  which	  has	  a	  couple	  of	  significant	  downsides:	  first,	  these	  references	  are	  
often	  misused,	  meaning	  that	  the	  insights	  scholarly	  theory	  could	  offer	  are	  
squandered	  or	  mangled,	  and	  second,	  critics	  play	  into	  the	  dominant	  cultural	  capital	  
game	  by	  borrowing	  the	  prestige	  of	  the	  academy	  to	  shore	  up	  their	  arguments	  and	  in	  
the	  process,	  make	  their	  work	  less	  accessible	  to	  many	  potential	  readers.	  	  
	   Another	  problem	  is	  the	  rather	  two-­‐dimensional	  view	  of	  identity	  politics	  
embraced	  by	  many	  critics.	  As	  I	  demonstrated	  in	  my	  third	  chapter,	  many	  poptimist	  
writers	  approach	  identity	  issues	  very	  reductively,	  oversimplifying	  the	  complex	  
politics	  of	  representation.	  For	  example,	  simply	  listening	  to	  and	  liking	  music	  by	  racial	  
minorities	  is	  not,	  by	  definition,	  necessarily	  anti-­‐racist;	  in	  fact,	  this	  strategy	  can	  serve	  
hegemonic	  ends,	  gobbling	  up	  diverse	  cultures	  for	  the	  enjoyment	  of	  privileged	  
omnivores.	  Yet	  writers	  like	  Hopper	  and	  Frere-­‐Jones	  champion	  neo-­‐eclecticism	  as	  
the	  unproblematic	  alternative	  to	  Merritt’s	  supposed	  racism	  (though	  to	  his	  credit,	  
Frere-­‐Jones	  shows	  a	  greater	  awareness	  of	  the	  nuances	  of	  racial	  politics	  in	  other	  
pieces).	  Poptimist	  critics	  also	  show	  a	  woeful	  lack	  of	  awareness	  of	  intersectionality,	  
as	  evidenced	  by	  the	  argument	  that	  developed	  about	  which	  was	  a	  more	  primary	  
problem	  with	  indie	  rock	  elitism—classism	  or	  racism—as	  opposed	  to	  a	  nuanced	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model	  that	  would	  acknowledge	  that	  both	  issues,	  among	  others,	  could	  occur	  in	  
combination	  without	  either	  taking	  special	  precedence.	  	  
	   Poptimists’	  awareness	  of	  authenticity	  issues	  is	  also	  somewhat	  lacking,	  as	  I	  
noted	  in	  my	  second	  chapter.	  They	  have	  a	  critical	  attitude	  toward	  the	  traditional	  
notions	  of	  authenticity	  so	  crucial	  to	  rockism,	  which	  makes	  sense	  given	  that	  qualms	  
about	  authenticity	  have	  become	  so	  widespread.	  What	  they	  fail	  to	  account	  for	  is	  the	  
continuing	  importance	  authenticity	  has	  for	  music	  listeners,	  which	  lingers	  under	  the	  
surface	  of	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  fan	  and	  critic	  discourse	  although	  discussing	  it	  openly	  is	  
seen	  as	  a	  bit	  gauche.	  It	  seems	  a	  shame	  that	  poptimists	  have	  not	  tackled	  these	  issues	  
more	  fully.	  Their	  grasp	  of	  reflexivity	  in	  reception	  is	  well	  articulated	  and	  the	  
mainstream	  pop	  they	  often	  endorse	  has	  a	  reflexive	  potential	  that	  could	  be	  read	  as	  
supportive	  of	  a	  new,	  more	  tenable	  form	  of	  authenticity.	  	  
	   Poptimist	  critics’	  grasp	  of	  reception	  reflexivity	  is	  also	  limited	  by	  their	  
haphazard	  treatment	  of	  identity	  issues.	  Their	  primary	  strategy	  for	  combating	  
hegemony	  is	  to	  apply	  a	  reflexive	  position	  to	  their	  own	  tastes,	  with	  implications	  for	  
their	  own	  self-­‐images.	  But	  an	  incomplete	  understanding	  of	  theories	  of	  identity	  
hampers	  them.	  So	  does	  their	  inconsistent	  treatment	  of	  emotion.	  The	  critics	  I	  have	  
studied	  alternately	  reinscribe	  hegemonic	  notions	  of	  rationality	  and	  champion	  
emotions	  which,	  without	  stating	  so	  clearly,	  they	  seem	  to	  find	  more	  authentic.	  The	  
end	  result	  is	  a	  chaotic	  approach	  to	  value	  judgments.	  It	  seems	  that	  Weinstein	  had	  a	  
point	  about	  a	  lack	  of	  consensual	  standards	  popular	  music	  journalists	  can	  refer	  to	  in	  
order	  to	  make	  positive	  assessments.	  Poptimist	  discourse	  could	  lead	  the	  way	  toward	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rectifying	  the	  situation,	  but	  so	  far	  its	  efforts	  have	  been	  too	  disorganized	  to	  be	  much	  
help.	  
	   As	  a	  reader	  of	  poptimist	  music	  writing,	  I	  have	  another	  issue	  with	  many	  of	  the	  
critics	  I	  have	  discussed—one	  that	  is	  highly	  subjective.	  I	  simply	  have	  a	  hard	  time	  
believing	  in	  the	  purity	  of	  many	  of	  these	  critics’	  motivations.	  This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  I	  
doubt	  that	  Frere-­‐Jones	  and	  Hopper	  care	  deeply	  about	  racism,	  that	  Wilson	  is	  
questioning	  his	  elitism	  as	  he	  reaches	  middle	  age,	  or	  that	  any	  of	  the	  critics	  I	  have	  
discussed	  have	  willingly	  misrepresented	  themselves.	  They	  seem	  to	  have	  a	  
simultaneous	  awareness,	  whether	  it	  is	  entirely	  conscious	  or	  not,	  of	  how	  they	  stand	  
to	  benefit	  from	  taking	  the	  stances	  they	  do.	  At	  times	  a	  hint	  of	  smugness	  creeps	  in,	  
reminding	  me	  that	  critiquing	  elitism	  carries	  the	  fringe	  benefit	  or	  portraying	  oneself	  
as	  a	  champion	  of	  the	  common	  man.	  	  
	   And	  there	  is	  no	  skirting	  the	  fact	  that	  poptimist	  controversy	  is	  good	  business.	  
Wilson,	  Frere-­‐Jones,	  Hopper,	  and	  Kogan	  all	  benefited	  from	  controversial	  pieces	  that	  
raised	  their	  profile,	  and	  the	  increasing	  awareness	  of	  poptimism	  itself	  likely	  helped	  
Tom	  Ewing	  to	  land	  his	  prestigious	  Pitchfork	  column	  (called,	  appropriately	  enough,	  
Poptimist).	  Even	  opposing	  poptimism	  attracts	  attention,	  as	  critic	  Simon	  Reynolds,	  
frequent	  antagonist	  to	  poptimists	  everywhere,	  can	  attest.	  	  
	   But	  the	  benefits	  of	  espousing	  poptimist	  views	  does	  not	  invalidate	  either	  
critics’	  more	  admirable	  motivations	  or	  the	  potential	  positive	  impact	  of	  their	  work.	  
After	  all,	  any	  effort	  to	  counteract	  cultural	  hegemony	  is	  likely	  to	  have	  some	  kind	  of	  
fringe	  benefits,	  whether	  material	  (advancing	  one’s	  career	  as	  an	  academic,	  writer,	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professional	  organizer,	  etc.),	  social	  (gaining	  the	  approval	  of	  people	  whose	  opinion	  
one	  values),	  or	  psychological	  (believing	  oneself	  to	  be	  a	  good	  person,	  exempting	  
oneself	  from	  guilt	  about	  privilege).	  None	  of	  these	  nullify	  the	  good	  intentions	  behind	  
such	  efforts	  or	  preclude	  their	  leading	  to	  real	  progress.	  	  
	   What	  has	  nagged	  at	  me	  during	  my	  analysis	  of	  poptimist	  discourse	  is	  the	  
frequent	  failure	  of	  writers	  to	  thoroughly	  state	  their	  own	  investments	  in	  the	  
positions	  they	  take.	  This	  is	  not	  to	  deny	  that	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  reflexivity,	  even	  
downright	  soul-­‐searching,	  goes	  on	  in	  poptimist	  writing.	  When	  Frere-­‐Jones	  opens	  up	  
about	  his	  qualms	  about	  emulating	  African-­‐American	  performers	  as	  a	  musician,	  
when	  Wilson	  admits	  to	  his	  own	  past	  snobbishness	  and	  queries	  his	  dislike	  of	  a	  
popular	  recording	  artist,	  and	  when	  Kogan	  reflects	  on	  his	  desire	  to	  distinguish	  
himself	  from	  other	  people,	  in	  each	  case	  their	  self-­‐awareness	  leads	  to	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  
insight.	  	  
	   However,	  the	  intense	  degree	  of	  self-­‐scrutiny	  (and	  scrutiny	  of	  others,	  as	  in	  the	  
case	  of	  the	  Merritt	  controversy)	  demonstrated	  in	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  poptimist	  writing	  
makes	  any	  elision	  stand	  out	  even	  more.	  Kogan	  is	  admirably	  thorough	  in	  his	  self-­‐
disclosure,	  but	  his	  intense	  intellectualism	  (which	  at	  times	  means	  his	  writing	  is	  as	  
dense	  and	  inaccessible	  as	  a	  challenging	  theoretical	  tome)	  keeps	  the	  affective	  impact	  
of	  his	  revelations	  at	  an	  arm’s	  length.	  Wilson	  is	  very	  hard	  on	  himself	  in	  retrospect,	  
but	  fails	  to	  turn	  the	  same	  critical	  eye	  on	  his	  present-­‐day	  behavior	  or	  the	  Céline	  
project	  itself	  and	  in	  the	  process,	  neglects	  opportunities	  for	  greater	  understanding.	  
Frere-­‐Jones	  and	  Hopper	  fail	  to	  dig	  deeper	  into	  questions	  of	  racism	  and	  musical	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reception	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  their	  condemnation	  of	  Merritt	  seems	  to	  hint	  that	  they	  
are	  also	  congratulating	  themselves	  on	  their	  own	  lack	  of	  prejudice.	  	  
	   A	  cynical	  reading	  would	  say	  that	  the	  essential	  poptimist	  strategy	  is	  selective	  
self-­‐disclosure,	  employing	  a	  controlled	  amount	  of	  reflexivity	  that	  gives	  the	  
appearance	  of	  openness	  but	  stops	  short	  of	  moving	  into	  truly	  risky	  territory.	  But	  I	  do	  
not	  think	  that	  reading	  would	  be	  an	  accurate	  one.	  The	  limits	  of	  poptimist	  disclosure	  
seem	  to	  stem	  from	  limited	  self-­‐awareness	  rather	  than	  intentional	  omissions.	  If	  this	  
is	  true,	  perhaps	  these	  incomplete	  revelations	  will	  pave	  the	  way	  for	  a	  greater	  degree	  
of	  self-­‐understanding	  on	  the	  part	  of	  poptimist	  critics,	  which	  could	  lead	  to	  more	  
meaningful	  insights.	  
	   Looking	  at	  the	  big	  picture,	  the	  most	  important	  thing	  seems	  to	  be	  that	  
poptimist	  critics	  have	  a	  real	  commitment	  to	  exploring	  issues	  like	  elitism	  and	  racism	  
through	  which	  hegemonic	  power	  finds	  expression	  in	  popular	  culture.	  Even	  though	  
examining	  these	  issues	  means	  braving	  the	  discomfort	  of	  confronting	  one’s	  own	  
privilege	  and	  risks	  putting	  off	  readers	  with	  realities	  they,	  too,	  might	  prefer	  to	  ignore,	  
these	  critics	  have	  forged	  ahead.	  There	  are	  serious	  problems	  with	  the	  results	  of	  these	  
efforts.	  Complex	  dynamics	  have	  been	  oversimplified,	  rigorous	  questioning	  has	  been	  
inconsistently	  applied,	  and	  academic	  theory	  has	  been	  mutilated.	  The	  most	  harmful	  
mistake,	  to	  my	  mind,	  is	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  Merritt	  was	  singled	  out	  for	  criticism	  for	  
ethnocentric	  listening	  habits	  that	  he	  shares	  with	  multitudes	  of	  other	  people.	  An	  
accusation	  of	  racism	  can	  be	  very	  damaging,	  and	  this	  one	  was	  applied	  to	  Merritt	  with	  
apparent	  capriciousness.	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   Overall,	  though,	  poptimist	  critics	  seem	  to	  have	  both	  good	  intentions	  and	  
laudable	  goals.	  Many	  of	  the	  problems	  with	  their	  efforts	  could	  be	  lessened,	  even	  
eliminated,	  if	  supported	  by	  a	  communicative	  partnership	  with	  an	  active	  community	  
of	  academics	  doing	  vital	  work	  on	  popular	  music.	  Under	  current	  conditions,	  
journalists	  are	  in	  effect	  “picking	  up	  slack”	  for	  the	  underdeveloped	  state	  of	  popular	  
music	  studies	  within	  the	  academy;	  much	  more	  could	  be	  accomplished	  if	  instead,	  
both	  journalists	  and	  academics	  worked	  to	  their	  individual	  strengths	  and	  pooled	  
their	  efforts.	  Whether	  or	  not	  this	  happens,	  I	  remain	  hopeful.	  Although	  poptimist	  
efforts	  have	  met	  with	  many	  failures,	  the	  fact	  that	  these	  critics	  are	  committed	  to	  
posing	  difficult	  questions	  about	  the	  impact	  of	  power	  structures	  on	  our	  culture	  is	  an	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